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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis will develop the claim made by Nancy in the essay “Shattered Love” 
that it is possible to read Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right and The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, for the expositions they offer on relational being, 
despite, for Nancy, their dialectical structure. I will argue that for Nancy, the 
situations that Hegel calls Self-Consciousness and The State are better 
understood as Singularity and Community respectively, both of which are 
relations to be experienced not works to be achieved, and which furthermore 
are the same relation, the same situation of Being. Hegel’s project of dialectical 
assimilation, I will argue, can be seen therefore as one that tries to convert this 
problematic multiple non-presentable Being into a singular identity which does 
have presence.  
Whilst the current Nancy scholarship acknowledges Nancy’s preoccupation with 
Hegel’s philosophy as evidenced by Nancy’s two books on Hegel, there is at 
present no study in the secondary literature on Nancy’s reception of Hegel’s 
philosophy generally, let alone with a specific focus on community and social 
being. This thesis therefore will seek to offer a trajectory of Nancy’s reception of 
Hegel’s philosophy, covering both Nancy’s works on Hegel, The Speculative 
Remark and The Restlessness of the Negative and the two most well-known 
works specifically concerned with community and social being, The Inoperative 
Community and Being Singular Plural. Additionally, it will seek to positon Nancy’s 
reception of Hegel against a backdrop of the receptions of Marx, various French 
Twentieth Century receptions and also a selection of those from the Analytic 
tradition.  
In conclusion, following a reading of Nancy’s essay, “The Surprise of The Event” I 
argue that Hegel misses what Nancy calls the very “event-ness” of the situations 
of Community and Singularity with the consequence that he ends up with 
sundered instances or moments rather than the movement he wishes for. 
Finally, I will argue that Nancy’s response to the problem of trying to preserve 
the event-ness of event is to provoke a situation of simultaneous separation and 
connection, or to give it for Nancy its proper name, wonder. 
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Abbreviations and References 
 
 
The following abbreviations are used for frequently referenced works by Nancy 
and Hegel.  
 
Works by Nancy 
 
SL  “Shattered Love” 
SR The Speculative Remark 
RN The Restlessness of the Negative 
IC “The Inoperative Community” 
JHM “The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch” 
BSP “Being Singular Plural” 
BEL  “Rives, Bords, Limites (de la singularité) Banks, Edges, Limits (of     
singularity)” 
SoE    “The Surprise of the Event” 
 
 
Works by Hegel 
 
EPR Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
PoS The Phenomenology of Spirit 
SL The Science of Logic 
 
 
 
Publication details are given in footnotes for the first reference for each text and 
also in the bibliography. 
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The reader is not a simple reader, free in regard to what he reads. He is desired, 
loved, and perhaps intolerable. He cannot know what he knows, and he knows 
more than he knows. He is a companion who gives himself over to 
abandonment, who is himself lost and who at the same time remains at the edge 
of the road the better to disentangle what is happening and which therefore 
escapes him. 
           Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Problematic  
In this chapter I will offer a reading of Nancy's essay "Shattered Love" which 
suggests that Hegel's Elements of The Philosophy of Right and The Phenomenology 
of Spirit could be read for the expositions they offer of Relational Being, a fairly 
uncontroversial claim. However, as we shall see, for Nancy the dialectic will turn 
out to be that which obscures relation and therefore the accounts of relational 
Being that Nancy reads in Hegel’s project generally, are ones which will be 
unexpected and unintended, that will as Nancy will describe in his essay “Surprise 
of the Event” “surprise Hegelian thinking from the inside.”1 The claim and 
therefore the task of the thesis becomes one of reading accounts of relational 
Being in Hegel’s texts despite their dialectical structure.  
 
Reading Nancy and Hegel together presents a number of challenges. The first 
seems to be an unhelpful mismatch in their styles of exposition, Hegel is dedicated 
                                                          
1 Nancy J.L. “The Surprise of the Event” in Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert.D.Richardson and 
Anne.E.O’Byrne, (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 2000), p.164  
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to system and structure, whilst Nancy is equally committed to fragment and 
incompleteness. The second is that each has an utterly idiosyncratic writing style 
and a reputation for being formidable to read. Of Hegel’s writing style Marx said 
he “did not care for its grotesque and rocky melody”2 and it is true that it is a shock 
to find out how a project that sets out be logical and rational can be expressed in 
such murky prose. Nancy on the other hand presents an entirely different 
problem, his fragments and mediations are as Marie-Eve Morin describes, 
“straightforward and affirmative, in an almost unsettling way.”3 Seemingly simple 
sentences most frequently of the form X is Y, or X is nothing other than Y, reveal 
themselves to be expressing something more complex than a simple equivalence 
between X and Y, especially as this equivalence is never argued for in Nancy’s 
texts. Before his reader has barely caught their breath, a typical Nancean 
technique is to bombard his reader with further assertions, X is Y, Y is Z and Z, is 
nothing other than X, all implying but not arguing for some kind of relationship 
between X, Y and Z.  As Morin explains, “it is worth emphasizing from the start 
that Nancy’s concept of sense, as opposed to signification, is not only central to 
the content of his philosophy but also the form of his writing.”4  What this means 
from the start is that we are dealing with a writer for whom signification is not 
simple and is always in play. The way therefore, to navigate these potentially 
choppy waters is to use the philosophy to understand the writing and the writing 
to understand the philosophy. The obvious problem therefore is where to start 
                                                          
2 Marx, K “Letter to his father, 1837” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p. 6 
3 Morin, M-E. Jean-Luc Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p. 5 
4 Morin, Ibid.  
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with this approach, the simple truth being that one has no choice but to jump in 
building up a picture of both the philosophy and the writing as one goes along, the 
challenge lying in structuring the subsequent report on this activity in a 
comprehensible way. The guiding principle that writing style is intrinsic to the 
philosophy being expressed and that comprehension of one will aid the 
comprehension of the other will however be followed and applied not just to my 
considerations of Nancy’s texts but also Hegel’s. 
 
In this Introduction, I will therefore further define the task of this thesis in the 
following way. I will start by explicating the claim that Hegel's Elements of The 
Philosophy of Right and The Phenomenology of Spirit could be read for the 
expositions they offer of relational Being despite their dialectical structure, as I 
find it in Nancy’s essay “Shattered Love”. Next, I will provide a context for this 
claim by offering a history of thought about the dialectic, considering the Pre-
Socratics, Plato, Aristotle and Kant and beginning a sketch of Hegel’s use of the 
dialectic as a response to Kant. I will then build on the sketch by offering an 
overview of Hegel’s project and the place of the dialectic within it. In order to 
provide a context for Nancy’s readings of Hegel to be explored in the following 
chapters, I will then offer considerations of various receptions of Hegel’s thought. 
I shall begin with a consideration of Marx’s take up of Hegel’s dialectic, before 
moving next to consider French Twentieth Century receptions of Hegel and then 
finally offering selected responses from the Analytical tradition. Finally, I will set 
out how the task of the thesis will be taken up in the following chapters. 
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“Shattered Love”  
In his essay “Shattered Love,”5 Nancy offers the thought that, “Love does not call 
for a certain kind of thinking, or for a thinking of love, but for thinking in its essence 
and its totality.  And this is because thinking, most properly speaking, is love.” (SL 
p. 84). Furthermore, we have missed the “rendez-vous” with love, (we have not 
yet met it and understood it) because we have thought it dialectically. Similarly, 
we have missed the rendez-vous with thinking because we have also thought 
thinking dialectically. For Nancy, the varied thinking about love that has occurred 
so far has tended to begin from a “philosophy of love” that would hold that “love 
is the extreme movement, beyond the self, of a being reaching completion.” (SL, 
p. 86).  In this depiction, love would be something in which we transcend ourselves 
to achieve a kind of completion in communion with the object of our love. 
Therefore, for Nancy love under this view is inherently dialectical. For Nancy,  
If the dialectic is the process of that which must appropriate its own becoming in order to 
be, exposition on the other hand, is the condition of that whose essence or destination 
consists in being presented; given over, offered to the outside, to others and even to the 
self. The two regimes do not exclude one another (they do not form a contradiction) but 
they are not of the same order. (SL, p. 89) 
 
If the dialectic is a process in which something is given only as a completed unity 
in which its problematically opposing components are subsumed, then exposition 
is that in which all parts are offered in all their problematic opposition. If 
something cannot be given as a unity it becomes problematic to speak of and Love 
                                                          
5 Nancy, JL. “Shattered Love” in The Inoperative Community, trans. Lisa Garbus and Simona 
Sawhney, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Hereafter referred to in the text as 
SL, followed by page number. 
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for Nancy is just such an entity. For Nancy, allowing the offering of the essence of 
Love to take place requires a reticence.  
Nancy does, however, offer us some words and statements about what, for him, 
love is: 
Love arrives, it comes or else it is not love. […] exposed to arrival and departure, the singular 
being is traversed by the alterity of the other, which does not stop or fix itself anywhere, 
neither in “him” nor in “me”, because it is nothing other than coming and going. (SL, p. 98)  
 
Love for Nancy is that in which the singular being is touched by the arriving other 
in its crossing of the singular being. This crossing of the other is incessant and 
restless and what touches us in its crossing, in each arrival, is its very alterity. The 
moment of contact is also a moment of separation and it is this moment, or better, 
this situation that is for Nancy, precisely, love. For Nancy there are many types of 
love, as “love arrives in all the forms and in all the figures of love; it is projected in 
all its shatters.” (SL, p. 101). This situation of a moment of contact which is also a 
separation, is not just limited to a pair of romantic lovers, it is the same situation 
that exists between pairs and larger numbers of friends, family members and 
other groupings. But in each case, whoever and how many are involved it is the 
same situation and each evokes all the others (the shatters) or the possibility of 
all the others. 
 
Nancy offers some comment on perhaps the most well know dialectician, Hegel, 
but only in elusive glimmers; whilst “the dialectic” is frequently referenced, 
Hegel’s actual name is far less so. However, Nancy does make some mention of 
Hegel specifically and in the essay, Nancy states that,  
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there is not one Philosophy that has escaped this double constraint [saying and failing to 
say that thinking is love]. In each, love occupies a place that is […] essential and subordinate 
(as, in Hegel, in the theory of The State). (SL, p. 86) 
 
For Nancy, all philosophy, thus far, has failed to say explicitly that thinking is love 
(which we must remember for Nancy means contact that is also separation) but 
at the same time has allowed that notion to be read in it, or to put it another way, 
has inadvertently offered it. This “double restraint” (Nancy goes out of his way to 
avoid a setting up a contradiction) of saying and not saying is also present for 
Nancy in what he reads as Hegel’s depiction of love as relation as set out in 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right.  In his reading of this text, in which Hegel 
considers The State as the most perfect form of relation between beings that 
would allow there to be no contradiction between morality and freedom, Nancy 
seems to be implying that it can be read for what it offers, perhaps inadvertently, 
about love as relation (casting it as both essential and subordinate) as much as 
what its author intends it to say. Later in the essay, Nancy says that,  
The being that has become through a dialectical process is perhaps destined to be exposed 
(one could show that this is what happens, despite everything, at the end of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit) – but the dialectic knows nothing of this, it believes it has 
absorbed the entire destination in the becoming-proper. (SL, p. 89) 
 
Whilst the dialectical process is that which seeks to resolve contradiction and 
present a completed unity, it is not incompatible with exposition (they are not a 
pair of opposites) but rather exposition is readable through or in the dialectical 
process although the dialectical process (or its creator) is unaware of this. For 
Nancy, when Hegel believes he is completing unity he may just be exposing and 
offering instead and Nancy seems to be implying that Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit can be read for this unintentional exposition. 
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Towards the end of the essay, Nancy touches on why the topic of love is so fruitful 
for him. In his discussion of joy, which Nancy describes as the “verb of love” (SL, 
p.107), it is the action, the doing, the happening or experience of the otherwise 
abstract notion of love. Nancy says, “to joy poses without reserve the question of 
singular being, which we are no doubt barely on the way to broaching. It is the 
question of that which remains “self” when nothing returns to the self.” (SL, p. 
107) The action or experience of love is for Nancy, the posing of the question of 
singular being. This is because for Nancy, love, as that in which there is contact 
and separation at the same time, poses, unavoidably, the question of singular 
being or what it is that contacts and is separate, that returns to itself. Framed 
against Hegel’s project this would be the question of what it is that Self-
Consciousness is when it returns from the other. For Nancy, “there is this brilliant, 
shattering constitution of being. Love does not define it, but it names it, and 
obliges us to think it.” (SL, p. 108) What emerges at this point is that for Nancy, 
being has the same brilliant shattering constitution he has described love as 
having but that love does not name Being but poses the question of it. By 
implication we can also see that Being will have the same structure of contact and 
separation for Nancy. For Nancy the demand is clear, we must endeavour to find 
a way to think this paradoxical structure. 
 
What emerges from this reading is the notion that we have missed love, and by 
extension thinking because we have thought dialectically, that is we have thought 
that being is something that can captured in a concept, the resolution of a pair of 
16 
 
opposites into a unity, rather than conceiving of it as that which is offered and 
exposed.  We have had tantalising hints that we could explore this further by 
reading Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right and the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, for what they inadvertently expose about the situation of simultaneous 
connection and separation and what it means to be a singular being and by 
extension what sort of being it is that is other than singular, a situation I will 
provisionally term ‘relational being.’ For Nancy, we are in fact obliged, by the 
name love, to think this situation, which is for him the situation of being. 
Therefore, the initial problematic here becomes the question of relational being, 
how this question has been thought by Nancy and Hegel and how Nancy can read 
this question in a discourse by Hegel that Nancy claims none the less occludes it. 
The next stage in refining this problematic will be to further clarify the term 
dialectic, beginning with a consideration of its use prior to its take up by Hegel.  
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1.2 A History of the Dialectic 
 
Gilbert Ryle, following Favorinus, speculates that in order to describe a practice 
which pre-existed Plato himself, Plato coined the noun dialectic, from the Greek 
verb διαλέγεσθαι which, Ryle maintains, means to debate and discuss; specifically 
to “discuss by means of question and answer”.6 Several thousand years later in 
Hegel’s hands, the term has become, according to Stephen Houlgate, the name 
for: 
the principle whereby apparently stable thoughts reveal their inherent instability by turning 
into their opposites and then into new, more complex thoughts, as the first thought of being 
turns first into the thought of nothing and then into the thought of becoming.7 
 
What Nancy has in mind Hegel’s very specific appropriation of the term, or rather 
the method it refers to or comes to refer to, in his hands. To fully understand 
Nancy’s reception of Hegel’s thought on dialectic, it is necessary to see the scope 
of the passage from Plato to Hegel that the term itself takes. Unsurprisingly, the 
path of this journey is long, deviant and hotly contested, to consider all the 
thinkers involved or implicated and all the twists and turns of the adventure would 
require a separate thesis length work at the very least. However, a brief 
consideration of the activities taking place in Ancient Greece that came to be 
known as dialectics and the reaction to these of Plato and Aristotle, especially 
Aristotle’s use of the syllogism as a more reliable means of establishing truth 
                                                          
6 Ryle, G. ‘Dialectic in the Academy’ in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Renford 
Bambrough, (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1965) p. 44.  
7 Houlgate, S. An Introduction to Hegel; Freedom, Truth and History. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 
38 
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should make a good foundation. Following this I shall proceed to Kant’s attempts 
to better Aristotle’s syllogism by showing the hidden unity behind the antinomies 
in the Transcendental Dialectic. This will provide a point from which to establish 
Hegel’s use of the dialectic as a reaction to both Kant more immediately before 
him and Aristotle further back. 
 
Gilbert Ryle describes a practice in Ancient Greece in which two opponents agree 
to a kind of verbal battle or duel. The first puts forward a thesis and the second, 
by use of questions answerable only with “yes” or “no” attempts to drive the first 
into a contradiction or “elenchus”. If the first upholds their thesis without 
contradiction they win, but, if they are made to contradict themselves, the second 
is victorious. The second is also victorious if the first is reduced “to silence, to an 
infinite regress, to mere abusiveness, to pointless yammering or to an outrageous 
paradox”.8 Following Aristotle’s descriptions in The Topics, Ryle gives several 
purposes for this elenctic duelling; gymnastic, periastic (both related to training 
and education), agonistic, (enjoyment of competitive element), eristic (to 
compete publicly in order make money from those who pay to see such an event 
and also who wish to be trained themselves) and philosophical. Both Plato and 
Aristotle frown on elenctic duelling for eristic purpose,  however, according to 
Ryle, 
there can be no reasonable doubt that what Isocrates calls ‘eristic’ and Aristotle calls 
‘dialectic’ is, despite the veto in Republic VII, being taught to young men in the Academy in 
or before the middle 350’s; that Plato approves this teaching; and that Aristotle teaches it, 
in fairly close connection with his teaching of rhetoric.9 
                                                          
8 Ryle, Ibid. p.40 
9 Ryle, Ibid. p. 43. For subsequent commentators, “eristic” becomes a rather unhelpful catch 
phrase for any kind of elenctic duelling. Whatever its purpose, I have therefore tried to stick to 
elenctic duelling to keep a clear path through the various sources. 
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Certain aspects of elenctic duelling therefore are acceptable to Plato and Aristotle 
and will go on to become the kinds of logical processes we have in mind when we 
use the term dialectic. However, the claiming of certain aspects of elenctic 
duelling as proper for philosophy and the denigration of other aspects, and the 
subsequent labelling of their exponents, marks an important moment, arguably 
nothing less than the birth of philosophy itself. The exponents of the adjudged 
unfavourable aspects of elenctic duelling are the group generally known as the 
Sophists. Although membership is frequently hotly contested, it is a label that to 
some extent with the term Pre-Socratics. The Sophists, as Keith Crome explains, 
were: 
prominent [in the Athens of Pericles] as itinerant teachers who sold their wisdom, who 
could sway an audience and assembly with their words and in particular, given the 
litigious Athenian environment, persuade a judge by way of an argument.10 
 
Whilst the initial objection appears to be that the Sophists sold their wisdom, the 
objections of Plato and Aristotle are more complex and in fact on closer 
investigation reveal themselves to be concerned with the status of truth in the 
arguments made by the Sophists. 
 
In the Phaedrus, Plato has Socrates discuss the merits of speaking over writing but 
in respect to both modes, marks out a certain kind of communication and purpose 
behind that communication, saying: 
if any of them [poets, orators and lawmakers] has done his work with a knowledge of the 
truth […] he ought not to be designated by a name drawn from those writings but by one 
that indicates his serious pursuit. […] To call him wise, Phaedrus, would, I think, be going 
too far: the epithet is proper only to a god; a name that would fit him better, and have more 
seemliness, would be ‘lover of wisdom’ or similar.11 
                                                          
10 Crome, K. Lyotard and Greek Thought, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 14 
11 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. R.Hackforth, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1952), 278 b 
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For Plato’s Socrates, then, there is a certain kind of truth seeking enquiry that 
would mark out the enquirer as different to those that sell a technique to establish 
or persuade a “truth” or who produce poetry, make speeches or write laws whilst 
not concerned with establishing truth. However, this kind of truth seeking 
enquirer (including those who produce poetry, make speeches or write laws with 
a concern for truth) could not be accurately called wise, as this is a state of 
perfection that applies only to the divine. The more appropriate and modest term 
for Plato, would be to describe this kind of enquirer as a lover of wisdom, a 
philosopher. For Plato, things that exist and have substance, are particular 
examples of a universal form or idea, which is the particular thing’s true being, 
however we cannot apprehend this form or idea. The true being of things 
therefore is unknowable and therefore to pretend to have access to complete 
truth is hubristic and deluded. Crome explains that, for Plato, not only was the 
hubris of the Sophists preventing them from establishing truth or even 
understanding  what it would mean to do so, but furthermore: 
the sophists who rather than genuinely taking into view the eidē -the ideas- and the 
articulation of being that appertain to them, seek to conceal all differences, so as to be able 
to make one thing seem like another, and thus unlike what it really is.12 
 
The aim of the Sophists was to eradicate or cover over difference and where 
necessary make one thing look like another so as to present a unified winning 
argument, such a technique could not therefore account for the relation of the 
universal and particular, as Plato has it. For Plato then, dialectic as a term becomes 
mired as the general catch all for the denigrated elenctic duelling for eristic 
                                                          
12 Crome, Ibid.p. 53 
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purpose attributed to the Sophists. However, when put to philosophical purpose 
the dialectic has a use as a tool for Plato, in analysing the parts of a thing under 
consideration and pointing out contradictions, as evidenced not only by its use in 
his own academy but also by his practice of delivering Socrates’ wisdom to us in 
dialogues.13 It will be Aristotle however, who, taking up (and to some extent 
cementing for future philosophical interpretation) the critique of the wrong-
headed and hubristic dialectic of the Sophists, proposes a technique to better 
establish truth than the dialectic. 
 
The technique Aristotle proposes as  superior to dialectic is that of demonstration, 
and the specific logical operation that enables this is generally referred to as a 
syllogism. In the Prior Analytics Aristotle explains that: 
a demonstrative proposition differs from a dialectical one, because a demonstrative 
proposition is the assumption of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator 
does not ask for his premiss, but lays it down). Whereas a dialectical proposition [is a] choice 
between two contradictories.14 
 
A proposition is a sentence in its simplest form which affirms or denies something 
about something else, or to put it in formal terms, predicates something of a 
subject. In a dialectical proposition we cannot deduce any truth or falsity from the 
proposition itself, we can only choose, somewhat blindly, between contradictory 
propositions offered by different speakers. Aristotle’s demonstrative proposition 
is a sentence which allows us to deduce truth or falsity from its very structure, and 
                                                          
13 “Dialectic as question and answer is the Socratic element which forms the single thread 
running through his altering conceptions of the method”. Hall, R. The Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy Volume I, ed. Paul Edwards, (USA: Simon and Schuster Macmillan, 1996), p. 386 
14 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in The Complete works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathon Barnes, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1995.)  1, 24a 21 
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the “contradictory” parts, or premises, are both offered by the same speaker, or 
writer. In Prior Analytics Aristotle offers the following: “If A is predicated of every 
B, and B of every C, A must be predicated of every C.”15 In this configuration the 
proposition is a universal affirmative (A is predicated of every C), however it is 
quite possible to also formulate it as universal negative as Aristotle offers in the 
next line, “Similarly also, if A is predicated of no B, and B of every C, it is necessary 
that A will belong to no C”. Furthermore, it is also possible to formulate affirmative 
and negative particulars, e.g., A is affirmed (or denied) of some, or a sample of, 
C’s and also to create yet more variations by consideration of three further 
modalities which Jonathan Barnes describes as “assertoric, apodeictic and 
problematic.”16 However, whether affirming or denying about universal or 
particular cases, in whatever modality, what all the various permutations have in 
common is the structure of two premises and a conclusion which is reached via 
deduction (or assumption as in the larger quote above).  The two premises which 
Aristotle describes as contradictory, are not in opposition as would occur in a 
dialectic in which each of the participants claim that something is or is not the 
case. In this way, the special ability of the syllogism to provide demonstrative truth 
or falsity is that it precisely that sidesteps opposition. For Kant also, opposition 
and contradiction is also problematic in propositions and where it occurs, is the 
site of a misunderstanding of the nature and possibility of knowledge, which he 
sets out to show in the Antinomies of Pure Reason presented in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. 
                                                          
15 Aristotle, Ibid. p. 41, 4, 26a 1 
16 Barnes, J. Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 46 
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In the Critique, Kant sets out to provide an answer to the question: “how are a-
priori synthetic judgements possible?”.17 Seeking to reply to both Hume’s 
empiricism and Leibniz’s rationalism at once, he uses the four Antinomies to 
demonstrate the unacceptable dialectical illusions fallen into by what Howard 
Caygill calls “an illegitimate extension of finite human reason beyond its proper 
jurisdiction.”18 This would be the application of reason without also accounting 
for the empirical aspects of understanding. Each Antinomy deals with a different 
“transcendental concept” or philosophical problem, which is in dispute because, 
in each case, we must transcend what can be derived by experience alone in order 
to understand the particular problem and importantly for Kant to understand 
understanding itself. The dispute of the first Antinomy is concerned with the 
competing claims that Space and Time are Finite versus Space and Time are 
Infinite. The dispute in the second Antinomy is concerned with the claim that all 
things are composites of Simple Parts versus the claim that all things are 
composite but there are no Simple Parts. The third Antinomy is concerned with 
the claims that Causality is in accordance with the laws of nature only versus the 
claim that Causality is in accordance with the laws of both nature and Freedom or 
Spontaneity. The fourth Antinomy is concerned with the claim that there is a Being 
whose existence is necessary to the world versus the claim that there is no Being 
whose existence is necessary to the world. Kant presents the opposing sides of 
the Antinomies and provides a proof for each, labelling one ‘thesis’ and the other 
‘antithesis’, showing how, due to the misuse of reason (alone), both are plausible. 
                                                          
17 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), p. 55, B19. 
18 H. Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 76 
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Kant’s aim is to show how each antinomy arises in the first place due to a 
misunderstanding about what makes experience possible, namely, the 
transcendental unity of apperception.19 For example, in the third Antinomy Kant 
gives the thesis that to explain appearances, “it is necessary to assume that there 
is also another causality [than the laws of nature], that of freedom”, followed by 
the antithesis: “there is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in 
accordance with laws of nature.”20 The third Antinomy, and indeed all the 
antinomies, are according to Douglas Burnham and Harvey Young  the result of  “a 
confusion (by reason) of appearance and thing in itself.”21 According to Kant, when 
we perceive a relation of cause and effect we are in fact seeing the necessary time-
order of appearances, rather than the actual objects. It is perfectly possible 
therefore for something to exist outside the time–order of the series being 
perceived and this appears as free. The solution to the third antinomy (and in fact 
all the antimonies) is therefore not a logical deduction but instead an 
understanding that there was never an antinomy to start with. Dialectic for Kant 
therefore is an illusion of opposition caused by not understanding the nature of 
understanding, but its solution is not a unity of the paradox at hand, but instead, 
the dissolving of that paradox to reveal an underlying moment of the unity of 
entirely different opposition, that of the world and appearances. It will be Hegel 
                                                          
19 This is also Kant’s aim with the Paralogisms, which precede the Antinomies and the Ideal of 
Pure Reason, which deals with arguments for the existence of God, and which follows the 
Antinomies in the section of the Critique entitled the Transcendental Dialectic. 
20 Kant, Ibid. p. 409, B473 
21 Burnham, D and Young, H. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007), p. 149 
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who will finally propose a solution to the “problem” of dialectic which explicitly 
sets out to both dissolve and preserve opposition at one and the same time. 
 
John Llewelyn summarises Hegel on the underlying assumption Kant makes in his 
discussion of the antimonies: 
As Hegel says, Kant believes the general structure of the world to be as it appears. It is this 
belief which prevents Kant from achieving the right solution of the antinomies, the solution 
hinted at by Aristotle.22 
 
For Kant, whilst it is not possible to fully know and experience the thing in itself, 
preventing appearance from being a true reflection of the world, this reflection is 
incomplete rather than mis-matched. For Kant there is no doubt that the world 
conforms to a certain structure:  experience of it occurs in conformity with the 
pre-given framework of the categories, even if that experience gives a restricted 
view of the world. Whilst Kant is concerned with understanding how we 
understand, the assumption that there is no difference between how the world 
appears and how the world is prevents him from better understanding difference, 
and that where opposition occurs, 
each of the two opposed sides contains its other within itself and neither can be thought 
without the other, it follows that neither of these determinations, taken alone, has truth; 
this belongs only to their unity. This is the true dialectical consideration of them and also 
the true result. 23 
 
For Hegel, opposition is not the marker of a misunderstanding about how we 
understand in the first place, but will turn out to be special kind of relationship in 
                                                          
22 Llewelyn, J “Kantian Antinomy and Hegelian Dialectic” in Hegel's Critique of Kant ed. Stephen 
Priest, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p.88 
23 Llewelyn, Ibid, p. 92, quoted from Hegel, GWF. Science of Logic, trans. George di Giovanni, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 164 
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which the truth of each opposed side “belongs” to their unity. In fact, for Hegel it 
will turn out that there is no truth without the unity of opposites, but this unity is 
always one in which the opposition is not lost or dissolved but is, somehow, 
preserved. This special paradoxical kind of unity, which Hegel will call speculative, 
is achieved in the operation Hegel calls the Aufhebung or sublation as part of the 
famous three-stage process most commonly associated with the term ‘dialectic’, 
which will be examined in more detail shortly.24 Truth in speculative unity as the 
solution to antinomy is hinted at for Hegel by Aristotle’s proposition, which, as 
Crome put it; “consists in a holding together (sunthesis) and a separating (diairesis) 
of subject and predicate.”25 Whilst the unity achieved between A and C through 
the middle term of B, is readily grasped in the formulation “If A is predicated of 
every B, and B of every C, A must be predicated of every C”, it is imperative for 
Hegel that we not diminish the fact that B also stands for what separates and 
distinguishes A from C. Whilst Aristotle himself does not deny the double effect at 
work in the proposition, as we saw earlier his focus is on a unity in order to provide 
a deductible demonstrative proof. As Llewelyn remarks, “it is by no means unusual 
to find in Hegel ‘exaltations’ of authors deemed to have had his own insights 
without fully realizing they were having them.”26  
 
At this stage we now have before us at least the trace of a journey by the dialectic 
from the name of a discarded and decidedly non-philosophical practice in ancient 
                                                          
24 Whilst it will be Hegel’s commentators and successors that will largely insert the terms 
“thesis”, “antithesis” and “synthesis” into his work, most notably Engels and Marx, the repeating 
triadic forms and three stage process is found everywhere as will be explored in later chapters. 
25 Crome, Ibid. p. 54 
26 Llewelyn, Ibid, p. 100 
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Greece, to a useful tool for pointing out illusion and misunderstanding to better 
highlight the true nature of understanding in Kant’s hands. Under Hegel, the 
dialectic as a method will become the solution to opposition, a solution, which, 
will turn out for him to both preserve and resolve opposition at the same time. 
The next task therefore is to consider Hegel’s project and the place within it of the 
dialectic, as well as considering the aftermath of his project and the take up of his 
philosophy by subsequent philosophers. 
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1.3 Hegel and the Dialectic  
 
Born in Stuttgart 1770, into what was the relatively new Kingdom of Prussia , Hegel 
lived through an extraordinary period of change in his own country and in Europe 
generally.27 In 1788 Hegel attended a Seminary in Tübingen where he met 
Hölderlin and was later joined by Schelling, meanwhile in 1789 the French 
revolution had begun. Lacking the funds to consider an entry level unsalaried 
university teaching position, Hegel took up private tutoring posts in Bern and 
Frankfurt for several years before his father’s death in 1997 provided him with an 
inheritance. In 1801 he joined his friend Schelling at the University of Jena where 
he was to stay until 1807. In 1806 Hegel finally achieved his first salaried role at 
Jena and was drafting The Phenomenology of Spirit as Napoleon who had been 
crowned Emperor of the French, defeated the Prussian troops at the Battle of 
Jena. In 1807, The Phenomenology of Spirit was published and widespread reform 
in all areas of governance including education began in Prussia in order to bring it 
into line with the ideals of the French Empire, in many cases assisted by many 
Prussians who had been agitated for reform along these lines before finding 
themselves at war with the French.28 During this time Hegel was briefly an editor 
of a newspaper in Bamberg  before settling as the Rector of the 
Aegidiengymnasium in Nuremberg for the next nine years. Also during this time 
                                                          
27 The history of Prussia, its geographical territory and its status is long and complex but the 
moment of change from Duchy to Kingdom occurred in 1907 with the coronation of King 
Frederick as King in Prussia. Koch, H.W. A History of Prussia, (London: Longman, 1978), p. 72 
28 According to E.J. Feuchtwanger there had always been “an affinity between Prussia and France 
and it had been no mere accident that the two countries had so often been in alliance.” 
Feuchtwanger, E.J. Prussia, Myth and Reality: The Role of Prussia in German History, (London: 
Oswald Wolff, 1970), p. 99 
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Hegel began publishing the various sections of The Science of Logic beginning in 
1812 with Volume 1 The Logic of Becoming and in 1813, publishing Volume 2 The 
Logic of Essence. In 1815 Napoleon was defeated in at Waterloo and the alliance 
with Prussia ended. The following year Hegel took up a teaching post at the 
Fredrick William University of Berlin (now the Humboldt University) established 
during the reforms and published the Volume 3 of The Science of Logic, The Logic 
of the Concept. In 1821 Elements of the Philosophy of Right was published. Hegel 
remained at Berlin until his death in 1831, the same year he was decorated by 
Fredrick Wilhelm III of Prussia. His final publications during his time in Berlin were 
the three editions of Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in 1817, 1827 and 
1830. Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Lectures on Aesthetics, 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
were all published posthumously.29  
 
Hegel’s project and particularly his writing style has a certain notoriety, according 
to Peter Singer, “of all the Western philosophers, Hegel has gained the reputation 
of being the most impenetrable”30 while for Robert Pippin, “his language and 
approach were so heterodox that he has inspired as much controversy about the 
meaning of his position as about its adequacy.”31 Added to this is Hegel’s habit of 
revising his works, the Encyclopaedia was revised and re-published twice after its 
                                                          
29 For a fuller chronology of events Hegel’s life and lifetime see Houlgate, S. An Introduction to 
Hegel; Freedom, Truth and History. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. xiii. 
30 Singer, P. Hegel entry in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 365 
31 Pippin, R. Hegel entry in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 367 
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original publication and Elements of The Philosophy of Right also features lengthy 
additions made by Hegel in subsequent re-editions. That Hegel is as controversial 
for how he writes, as what he writes, is not coincidental, a project concerned with 
a special kind of paradoxical unity will always prove challenging to convey. A useful 
way in to Hegel’s thought, already begun in the history of the dialectic given 
above, is to consider the motivations behind Hegel’s project. For Michael Inwood 
these can be summarised in the following way: 
How can we be sure that we know things as they are in themselves and not simply (as Kant 
says) as they appear to us? […] How can a philosophy be constructed which does not 
depend on unproven and controversial presuppositions? Hegel also took seriously the fact 
that man (but not on his view nature) has a history. We cannot suppose (as Kant had done) 
that all men at all times share essentially the same thoughts or categories. A philosophical 
system must do justice to the fact that human thought, as well as human life, develops over 
time.32 
 
For Hegel then, we must understand things as they are in their essential being not 
just as they appear, we must not rely on unproven presuppositions and we must 
understand that humankind develops over history and that there are no shared 
thoughts or categories that do not change. Philosophy, Inwood adds, “must, in 
Hegel’s view, form a single system, in which not only the answers to such problems 
as these, but all human knowledge, has a place.”33 For Hegel then, the challenge 
is to find a system which can account for what is real and what is appearance and 
therefore explains the assumptions we can fall into and how human thought 
develops, a system that can account for difference. For Peter Singer,   
It follows from [Hegel’s] absolute idealism that ultimate reality is to be found in what is 
mental or intellectual, not in what is material. It is to be found, to be specific in rational 
thought. Logic is therefore the study of this ultimate reality in its pure form, abstracted 
                                                          
32 Inwood, M. Hegel entry in The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Thomas Mautner, 
(London: Penguin, 2005), p. 264. 
33 Inwood, Ibid, p.264 
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from the particular forms it takes in the finite minds of human beings or in the natural 
world.34  
 
The reality that Hegel is looking for will therefore be found in rational thought, 
which, for Hegel, underlies appearances, mistaken assumptions and the changing 
development of human thought. It will be rational thought, abstracted from the 
minds of finite humans, that will be able to account for change and difference and 
the study of this thought is Logic. The guiding principle for the shape of this logic, 
that Hegel both expects to find it conforming to and which he shapes his 
procedure after, is dialectical as Stephen Houlgate explains: 
The dialectical principle, is for Hegel, the principle whereby apparently stable thoughts 
reveal their instability by turning into their opposites and then into new, more complex 
thoughts, as the thought of being turns into the thought of nothing and then into the 
thought of becoming. This principle Hegel tells us, is ‘the soul of all genuinely scientific 
cognition’ and is what gives his thinking its distinctive character by breathing life and 
freedom into the concepts that he thinks through, by making his thought move in a way 
that ordinary thought is not used to. 35  
 
By attending to and explaining a situation in terms of how when thinking it, 
understanding goes through a process of thought negating itself before becoming 
a new more complex thought which encompasses both the original thought and 
its negation will, for Hegel, allow us to separate out what is real (i.e. rational) and 
what is change and appearance. As Houlgate says this, combined with Hegel’s 
focus on how this process occurs over time for humanity, gives Hegel’s writing a 
characteristic feel of movement.  
The new complex thought we will discover, is the truth in speculative unity 
preliminarily sketched earlier, which for Hegel is properly called the concept or 
                                                          
34 Singer, P. Hegel, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.76 
35 Houlgate, S. An Introduction to Hegel; Freedom, Truth and History, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 
p.39 
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sometimes the idea. This complex thought or concept comes about through what 
Hegel calls the Aufhebung or sublation.  Michael Inwood explains that Aufhebung 
comes from the German verb aufheben, which has three main senses: “ 
(1) ‘to raise, to hold, to lift up’ 
(2) ‘to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend 
(3) ‘to keep, save, preserve’”36 
 
The Aufhebung is therefore the moment in which the new complex thought is able 
to take up the original thought and the thought that is the original thought’s 
negation and allow them to both negate or cancel each other yet also to both be 
preserved. For Hegel, establishing the concept of the object or situation being 
thought about would allow us to see both what is real and rational and the 
appearance that negates it. Hegel’s project therefore is to examine the object or 
situation at hand and establish its concept and, as Inwood points out, “Hegel often 
conflates the logical sublation of a concept with a physical sublation of a thing.”37 
What this means is that Hegel often locates a logical sublation in physical 
synthesis, a child being the synthesis or sublation of its parents for example. 
For Hegel, once we have established the concept of a given object or situation, 
the movement can begin again, as Singer explains: 
Every dialectical movement terminates with a synthesis, but not every synthesis brings the 
dialectical process to a stop in the way that Hegel thought the organic community of his 
own time brought the dialectical movement of history to an end. Often the synthesis, 
although adequately reconciling the previous thesis and antithesis, will turn out to be one-
sided in some other respect. It will then serve as the thesis for a new dialectical 
movement.38  
 
                                                          
36 Inwood, M A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 19920, p. 283 
37 Inwood, Ibid. p. 284 
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For Hegel, once we have established the concept of the given object or situation 
what we frequently discover is that the synthesis or sublation that has taken place 
is only partial, or rather, whilst it preserves the original thought and its negation, 
it is revealed that it still does not completely account for the object or situation 
being considered and therefore it is necessary to treat it as an original thought 
and finds its negation and a new concept, opening up a path of development we 
can trace. In this way, we now have before us a complete system which will allow 
us to understand a given situation in terms of what is real and rational about it 
and what is mere appearance and presupposition. Furthermore, we can also then 
slot this into an account of the development of human consciousness (which Hegel 
calls Spirit but also sometimes Mind) through history. For Hegel, the dialectical 
progression of history will come to an end in a situation in which the sublation or 
synthesis will account for the world as it is and there will no longer be any 
opposition between the concept and the world and no need for further dialectical 
process. Hegel calls this situation Absolute Knowledge and famously describes it 
as a situation in which “what is rational is actual; And what is actual is rational .”39 
In this situation, the rational, the true reality that previously underlies 
appearance, is now no longer hidden, as there is now no conflict between the 
rational and appearance, the rational is actual and present.  
 
However odd it may sound to modern ears, the rationality Hegel seeks is, for him, 
not incompatible with religious faith. Whilst other religions can “reveal” this 
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rationality, it is, for Hegel, Christianity that reveals the truth of rationality most 
satisfactorily. As Stephen Houlgate puts it, “the word ‘God’ in Hegel’s view, is thus 
religion’s word for what philosophy knows to be reason or the ‘Idea’; that is, 
absolute reason active in the world.”40 For Hegel, rationality is to be found, to be 
revealed by the dialectic, as that which underlies change and appearance because 
ultimately God is rational.  
 
The impact of Hegel’s thought has been felt profoundly since his works were 
published. Much of the philosophical reaction to Hegel has centred around his 
concept of the Aufhebung, this is particularly true of the French Twentieth Century 
reception and especially the thinkers often categorised as post-structuralist, 
whilst the typically Analytical and Anglophone response has objected to Hegel’s 
idealism and levelled charges of mysticism. Marx’s take up of Hegel’s dialectic as 
method for examining history and especially the Master/Slave dialectic as a way 
to understand class relations, has propagated the impact of Hegel’s thought well 
beyond philosophy. In order therefore, to contextualise Nancy’s own readings of 
and engagement with Hegel’s thought and in particular the dialectical method, 
the final task of this chapter will then be to briefly consider these other reactions. 
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1.4 Receptions of Hegel’s Philosophy 
 
Marx and the Dialectic 
Hegel’s impact has been widely felt, not only within Philosophy but beyond, as 
Bertrand Russell acknowledges: 
Outside of pure philosophy, many Protestant theologians adopted his doctrines, and his 
philosophy of history profoundly affected political theory. Marx, as everyone knows, was a 
disciple of Hegel in his youth, and retained in his own finished system some important 
Hegelian features.41 
 
The important Hegelian feature that Marx famously retains, is that of the dialectic. 
It will be Marx and also Engel’s reading of Hegel with a focus that sees that “Man 
not the Idea is the true subject” as Michael Rosen puts it, that will pave the way 
for the later theories of Dialectical Materialism.42  
 
Marx completed a doctoral thesis in philosophy at the University of Jena in 1841 
entitled “The Difference between Democritus’ and Epicurus’ Philosophy of 
Nature”.43  At this time Marx associated with a group of thinkers interested in the 
philosophy of the relatively recently deceased Hegel and who were subsequently 
labelled the Young Hegelians.44 In the thesis, Marx says of Hegel: 
It is conceivable that a philosopher should be guilty of this or that inconsistency because of 
this or that compromise; he may himself be conscious of it. But what he is not conscious of 
is that in the last analysis this apparent compromise is made possible by the deficiency of 
his principles or an inadequate grasp of them. So if a philosopher really has compromised 
                                                          
41 Russell, B. History of Western Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 2005), p.661 
42 Rosen, M. Marx entry in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol 6, London: Routledge, 
1998, p. 119 
43 Marx, K. “Doctoral Thesis” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), p. 11. Trans. David.McLellan 
44 Hegel died in 1831, exactly a decade before Marx’s thesis was accepted at the same university 
Hegel was employed at during the production The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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it is the job of his followers to use the inner core of his thought to illuminate his own 
superficial expressions of it.45 
 
Developing the inner core of Hegel’s philosophy to expose the superficial 
expressions of Hegel’s philosophy became then imperative for Marx and his 
colleagues. Peter Singer explains that: 
For the young Hegelians, the ‘superficial expression’ of Hegel’s philosophy was his 
acceptance of The State of politics, religion, and society in early nineteenth century Prussia: 
the inner core was his account of Mind overcoming alienation, reinterpreted as an account 
of human self-consciousness freeing itself from the illusions that prevent it achieving self-
understanding and freedom.46 
 
For Marx and his fellow Hegel enthusiasts, the inner core of Hegel’s philosophy, 
his dialectical account of alienation and the possibility of self-consciousness 
achieving self-understanding and freedom could be extracted from Hegel’s 
unfortunate acceptance of contemporary political conditions in nineteenth 
century Prussia. Chief of the illusions that might prevent Self-Consciousness from 
achieving its own full understanding was Religion, famously for Marx “the opium 
of the people.”47 Marx’s transformative reading of Hegel does, then, extract 
Hegel’s method of examination of a matter under consideration, the dialectic, and 
the method for dealing with history that arises from it, but leaves behind all 
religious and metaphysical aspects, in this way the subject of philosophy for Marx 
becomes Man not Idea. 
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46 Singer, P Karl Marx, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 15 
47 Marx, K. “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” in Critique of Hegel’s 
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Peter Singer explains that “when the Prussian government suppressed the 
newspaper he had been editing, Marx started work on a critique of Hegel’s 
political philosophy.”48 Whilst this projected critique of Hegel’s Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right was never finished, Marx did produce a short essay intended 
to detail what this work would contain. 49 It is in this short essay “A Contribution 
to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”, that two important new themes 
arise, the proletariat as the redemption of humanity and the suggestion, as Singer 
puts it that “criticism by itself is not enough” to achieve this.50  For Marx, The State 
as Hegel explicates it in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, is problematic 
because, as he says in the unfinished notes,  
Sovereignty, the ideality of the State, exists merely as internal necessity as idea. And Hegel 
is satisfied with that because it is a question merely of the idea. […] Had Hegel started with 
real subjects as the bases of The State it would not have been necessary for him to let The 
State become subjected in a mystical way.51 
 
For Marx, the key issue here is that Hegel does not start with real subjects, he 
determines what they must be from the starting point that The State will be a 
concept, that it will be a whole with parts that will be revealed as contradictory 
and that the subjects of The State will be these parts. In this way, the proletariat 
are not considered for what they are but what they need to be to fit Hegel’s 
system.  What this insight combined with Marx’s attention to the role of Slave as 
worker gives rise to, is the notion that “Philosophy cannot be actualised without 
the abolition [Aufhebung] of the proletariat; the proletariat cannot be abolished 
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50 Singer, P Karl Marx, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 23 
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without the actualization of philosophy.”52 For Marx, the final synthesis, the 
becoming real of the situation in which there is no opposition, and for him in which 
Germany is emancipated, will occur when the proletariat is abolished, or rather 
when it no longer exists as a category to describe one specific class against others 
because there will be no class difference. For Marx, therefore, the dialectic as 
method is unproblematic and he and those who take up his thought will put it to 
much use.  For Marx, the problem with Hegel’s use of the dialectic, is therefore 
not with the tool itself but what it is applied to. Marx’s transformation of the 
dialectic then leaves its structure and movement untouched but radically re-
directs its focus. As we will come to see, French Twentieth Century receptions of 
Hegel will also grapple with whether or not to reject the dialectic (and specifically 
the Aufhebung) as method or tool or retain it but re-orientating the focus of its 
use. 
 
French Twentieth Century Philosophical Receptions of Hegel’s Philosophy 
The French Twentieth Century Philosophical scene was undeniably affected by 
Hegel’s thought, for Bruce Baugh in French Hegel,  
It is Hegel who most haunts French thought: nowhere is French philosophy more 
ambivalent and conflicted in its attitudes towards a philosopher, strenuously resisting and 
“correcting” Hegel at the very moment it find him most seductive. […] It’s as if French 
philosophy of the past century had to deny Hegel in order to affirm him, and affirm him in 
order to deny him.53 
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The various twists and turns of these occurrences of resistance and seduction are 
numerous, complicated and hotly disputed, the thinkers involved are as much in 
reaction to each other, as they are to Hegel. For Baugh, it is a “common-place that 
Hegel’s influence began with Kojève and ended with structuralism and post 
structuralism,”54 referring to the tactic of tracing a coherent line from the work of 
Kojève in the 1930’s, positioning Hyppolite’s work on Hegel as a response to that 
of Kojève, and then continuing this line through to two of Hyppolite’s later 
students, Derrida and Foucault. Indeed, this is very much the trajectory that is 
offered by Judith Butler in Subjects of Desire in which her focus is on the structure 
of Desire as given in the section on Self-Consciousness in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit 55 For Baugh, whose primary focus is the reception of Hegel’s Unhappy 
Consciousness as given in the section on Self-Consciousness in The 
Phenomenology, this tactic minimises the significance of Jean Wahl’s Le malheur 
de la conscience dans la philosphie de Hegel in 1929, which provides for Baugh: 
[a] penetrating analysis of an internally divided and self-alienated subject, a subject that 
strives vainly for synthesis but instead oscillates between self and not-self, being and 
nothingness.56 
 
However, as the aim here is to provide a sketch of the French Twentieth Century 
reception of Hegel with specific reference to the Aufhebung and the dialectical 
process against which I can outline Nancy’s own reception, I will stick with the 
tactic of a consideration of the trajectory of responses by Kojève, Hippolyte, 
                                                          
54 Baugh, Ibid, p. 7 
55 Butler also includes the thought of Sartre and later Lacan and Deleuze. 
56 Baugh, Ibid. p.5. Baugh’s consideration also includes, Lefebvre, Fondane, Breton, Bataille 
Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze. 
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Derrida and Foucault, but will consider the commentary of Butler and Baugh.57 A 
more detailed discussion of Derrida and Foucault’s repose to Hegel will also be 
given in the following chapter where they will be used to draw out the specificity 
of Nancy’s own readings of Hegel.  
 
To bring together the specificity of Kojève and Hyppolite’s readings of Hegel’s 
thought and also the commentary of both Butler and Baugh it will be necessary to 
briefly consider Hegel’s aim in the Self-Consciousness section on The 
Phenomenology, although this will be explicated later in greater detail. In short, 
Hegel’s concern in the section is Desire as that by which Consciousness comes to 
painfully realise that there is a consciousness other than itself and the subsequent 
process by which it attempts to negate this other consciousness in a bid to be once 
again, a unified, sublated Self. Hegel will go on to explain that consciousness and 
the other consciousness will take up opposing positions that he calls Lord and 
Bondsman (frequently also alternatively translated as Master and Slave) who each 
desire the other’s recognition. Before they are finally sublated in the dialectical 
process, these positions will come to reside together in a truly wretched individual 
that Hegel calls the Unhappy Consciousness who cannot complete into a unified 
Self. These three positions, and many others, form steps on the way to a final 
situation described at the end of The Phenomenology in which there will be no 
opposition between Self and what is not the Self, in which truth as unity between 
                                                          
57 Additionally, at this time Wahl’s work on Hegel’s Unhappy Consciousness remains 
untranslated. 
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opposites is real and actual, in which History will be complete, the situation Hegel 
calls Absolute Knowledge. 
 
Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel comes to us almost entirely from Introduction to 
the Reading of Hegel (1947) which was composed of a selection of lectures given 
on The Phenomenology of Spirit at the École des Hautes Études from 1933 to 1939. 
Kojève’s reading of Hegel is highly influenced by Marx, whom he invokes from the 
outset of Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, with the following epigraph: 
“Hegel......erfasst die Arbeit also das Wesen, als das sich bewährende Wesen des 
Menschen.”58 In short, Kojève’s reading of Hegel accepts Hegel’s description of 
the development of human consciousness over time through dialectical process 
but diverges over what would constitute the end of this historical process. For 
Kojève, 
Man was born and History began with the first Fight that ended in the appearance of a 
Master and a Slave. […] History stops as the moment when the difference, the opposition, 
between Master and Slave disappears: at the moment when the Master will cease to be 
Master, because he will no longer have a Slave; and the Slave will cease to be Slave because 
he will no longer have a Master. 59 
 
For Hegel, the Master and Slave are positions that are in opposition as they each 
desire the other’s recognition that is, they each need to negate or sublate the 
other in order to be a unified self. These positions are ultimately sublated as part 
of a much longer, ongoing dialectical process which results in a situation in which 
                                                          
58 Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the reading of Hegel; lectures on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. James H.Nichols, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), p 3. The following 
translation is given by Robert Stern and Nicolas Walker. “Hegel sees labour as the essence of 
man, the self-confirming essence, of man.” Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol 4, 
London: Routledge, 1998, p. 293 
59 Kojève, A. Introduction to the reading of Hegel; lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. 
James H.Nichols, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), p.44 
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there is no longer any opposition between Self and not Self, in which mutual 
recognition is not oppositional. But for Kojève, as Michael Roth puts it, “once this 
desire was satisfied, history properly-so-called, was over.”60 The satisfaction 
Kojève has in mind is the mutual recognition that would come about through a 
revolution in which the Slaves overthrew the Masters. According to Butler, for 
Kojève, 
the ultimate project of desire is less a dialectical assimilation of subjectivity to the world, 
and the world to subjectivity, than a unilateral action upon the world in which 
consciousness instates itself as the generator of historical reality.61 
 
Desire is for Kojève, the “motor of history”62 and the dialectic is movement of this 
motor, it is what results from struggle but what ceases to move once that struggle 
is over, which for Kojève comes about by actual physical means. Dialectic for 
Kojève then, arises from history, it does not exist separate to history, a notion 
Bruce Baugh points out was already present in other interpretations of Hegel, 
notably, Koyré. 63 For Baugh,  
The fundamental difference between Kojève and Koyré is that whereas Koyré historicizes 
being by introducing the dialectic of human temporality into its heart, Kojève reduces being 
to history, and excludes the dialectic from nature. 64 
 
The dialectic is then, for Kojève, exclusively human as it is the human experience 
of struggle, and the moment of sublation comes about in human action. For this 
reason Kojève’s reading of Hegel is often referred to as anthropological.  
                                                          
60 Roth, M. Kojève entry in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol 5, (London: Routledge, 
1998, p. 289) 
61 Butler, J. Subjects of Desire, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), Ibid, p.69 
62 Roth, Ibid. p. 289) 
63 Baugh, Ibid. p. 26 
64 Baugh, Ibid. p. 26 
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Hyppolite’s interpretation of Hegel is generally taken from his texts The Genesis 
and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1947) which arose from the 
commentary supplied with his French translation of The Phenomenology in 1939 
and Logic and Existence (1953) which aims to bring together The Phenomenology 
and Hegel’s later Science of Logic.  Hyppolite’s reading is similarly influenced by 
Marx and for Robert Stern and Nicolas Walker, “Hyppolite emphasizes Hegel’s 
foreshadowing of Marx’s account of alienation and agrees with Kojève that 
recognition is capable of overcoming the tension between self and other.”65 
Hyppolite’s focus however is less strictly anthropological than that of Kojéve, and 
for Bruce Baugh, this means Hyppolite marks a shift in focus in studies of Hegel, 
from “from “man” to language.”66 Baugh’s main focus is his observation that in 
The Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Hyppolite,  
analysed language as Spirit’s negation of man’s natural Dasein, which by actualizing and 
expressing the individual self who speaks, produces a split between the natural, particular 
self and the “universal” self expressed by the pronoun “I”. The “laceration” […] of language 
thus both expresses and effects the laceration of consciousness, reflecting back to Spirit its 
alienation form itself.”67  
 
The laceration or alienation in language therefore both reflects and engenders 
consciousness own alienation from itself, or as Hegel wants it, the dialectical 
progress of the development of consciousness or Spirit. For Baugh this focus 
usefully opens up the notion that in reading Hegel we can read for a description 
of negativity, of the second stage of the dialectic, in which “”the power of the 
negative” is no longer that of human existence, but [that of the] negativity of 
                                                          
65 Stern, R and Walker, N. Hegelianism entry in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol 4, 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 293 
66 Baugh, Ibid. p. 32 
67 Baugh, Ibid. p.31 
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language.”68  As we will see shortly this notion was to prove especially significant 
for Hyppolite’s students. 
 
Butlers interest is in Hyppolite’s consideration of time: 
For Hyppolite, the absolute is not an achievement as such, but the dialectic of achievement 
and loss. [He] understands his own project less as a re-writing of Hegel than an elaboration 
of some underrepresented Hegelian themes [specifically] the interpretation of absolute 
knowledge as the thought of time.69  
 
For Hyppolite, the apparent final situation in which there is a unity between 
oppositions, or absolute Knowledge, is not a situation which achieved and 
secured, but is in fact better understood as the human experience of time. In 
Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Hyppolite says that, 
Human experience allows the self to discover itself and substance to reveal itself to the self. 
This experience necessarily takes place in time […]. Time is thus the disquiet of 
consciousness which has not attained itself, which sees itself as outside itself.70 
 
Time is that in which the self discovers itself and what is not itself, it is the medium 
in which the self brings together opposites. Time is therefore speculative and as 
such it is the very medium of the disquiet of consciousness. For Hyppolite, this 
medium of disquiet in which oppositions are experienced and brought together is 
the same situation Hegel wants in the projected Absolute Knowledge.  
 
For Hyppolite, “most contemporary thinkers […] generally prefer what Hegel calls 
“unhappy consciousness” to what he calls “spirit. […] They accept Hegel’s 
                                                          
68 Baugh, Ibid.  
69 Butler, Ibid. p.83 
70 Hyppolite, J. Genesis and structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak 
and John Heckman, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979), p. 579 
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phenomenology but reject his ontology.”71 Hyppolite is almost certainly referring 
to Wahl here who Baugh describes as rejecting “as illusory the Hegelian attempt 
to reconcile existence through speculative thought and so turned away from the 
mediation of the [concept] and the dialectic based on it.”72 For Hyppolite 
however, despite his assertion that he will not enter the debate, there seems to 
be an attempt to accept both Hegel’s phenomenology, as evidenced by his 
account of the alienation of the unhappy consciousness and his focus on language 
as Baugh points out, but there is also a certain acceptance of Hegel’s ontology by 
re-casting the Absolute Knowledge that Hegel is after as the experience of time.  
For Baugh, by “extending the theme of the unhappy consciousness into being, 
language and discourse, Hyppolite plays a key role in the Hegel interpretation of 
his students, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault and Althusser”73 This key role, however, 
is often one of highlighting a problem which the students in question take up and 
react against. For Butler, this double influence is felt in Derrida’s work in the 
following way: 
Although both Hyppolite and Derrida reveal the limits of the autonomous subject Hyppolite 
wants to retain the subject as an internally contradictory being, while Derrida argues that 
the subject no longer makes conceptual sense if referentiality is no longer possible.74 
 
Hyppolite’s drawing attention to the limit of what the subject is, as given in Hegel’s 
philosophy, opens up for Derrida that this subject in fact no longer makes 
conceptual sense, however much for Hyppolite this internal contradiction is not 
problematic. Baugh is in general agreement here but makes the further point that: 
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like Hyppolite, [Derrida] finds [subjectivity without a human subject] in the negative 
differences in language, in which each term is defined by what it is not but deprived of the 
mediating synthesis that for Hyppolite makes what each term is not into each other.75  
 
For Baugh, Hyppolite’s and Derrida’s shared agreement of the limits of the subject 
if not the ramifications of this limit, arises from the observation of negative 
difference in language, a theme Derrida famously went on to develop and which 
will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
 
For Baugh, Hyppolite’s influence on Foucault is also profound:  
For Foucault […] Hyppolite’s analysis of the genesis and structure of discourse, conceived 
as the “discourse of being”, especially his grasp of “the singularity of history, the regional 
totalities of science, the depths of memory” “traversed and formulated the most 
fundamental problems of our age.”76 
 
For Foucault, Hyppolite’s elucidation of the discourse of Being and grasp of the 
structure of History, as he reads it in Hegel, is fundamental to the formulation of 
the problem of History that Foucault was famously trying to work against and 
which will be considered more fully in the coming chapter. For Butler this means 
that, “like Derrida, Foucault is playing homage to Hyppolite but in such a way that 
a proper elucidation of Hegelian themes requires a turn away from Hegel.”77 An 
approach that recognises that to properly elucidate certain themes given within a 
text (themes given both intentionally or unintentionally) may involve a move away 
from the writer being read or a transformation of their text will prove highly 
characteristic to Nancy’s own reading of Hegel. For the Analytic tradition, 
elucidating the themes in Hegel’s texts in an adequate manner has frequently 
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involved something stronger than a move away from his thought, however a brief 
consideration will be offered below of recent more sympathetic readings. 
 
Responses to Hegel’s Philosophy from the Analytical Tradition 
In his paper, “The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel” Simon Lumsden refers to 
the common origin myth that “both traditions [Analytic Philosophy and Post-
Structuralism] are often represented as having their genesis in the rejection of 
Hegel’s metaphysics.”78 He then goes on to chart the emergence and 
development since the 1970s of “the non-metaphysical Hegel, which takes his 
thought to be a continuation of the Kantian project of critically examining the 
presuppositions of any normative claim.”79 Lumsden takes as his starting point 
what he describes as the resurgence of interest in Hegel’s thought that began with 
the publication of Charles Taylor’s Hegel in 1975, the decline of British 
Hegelianism having taken place following the First World War. Before beginning a 
consideration of Lumsden’s paper, then, it is worth filling in a little more of the 
Anglophone Analytical tradition’s reception of Hegel. 
 
According to Pippin, who Lumsden will later consider in his paper, “in Great Britain 
with its long sceptical, empiricist and utilitarian tradition, Hegel’s work had little 
influence until the latter part of the nineteenth century.”80 This nineteenth 
century scholarship was spear-headed by, 
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48 
 
Bosanquet, Mc Taggart and especially Bradley, all of whom were interested in many of the 
metaphysical implications of Hegelian idealism, what they took to be a Hegelian claim for 
the ‘internally related’ interconnection of all particulars within one single, ideal, or mental 
substance.81 
 
For Robert Stern and Nicholas Walker, Bradley’s main insight was the “conviction 
that from the perspective of the Absolute all aporiai could be overcome”82 whilst 
for Bosanquet it was imperative “to show how in these forms [judgement and 
syllogism as laid out by Hegel] all abstraction from the whole turns out to be 
incoherent”.83 What was attractive in Hegel’s philosophy for these two thinkers 
therefore was a system that accounted not only for all particulars but also all 
aporiai, as demonstrated by the incoherence that results from abstraction from a 
whole or conceptual understanding. However, for Pippin this was a brief 
flourishing was bought to an end by, 
Moore and Russell [who] waged a hugely successful counter attack in the name of 
traditional empiricism and what would be called “analytic philosophy” against such an 
enterprise and in this tradition largely finished off the influence of Hegel. 84  
 
The account of Hegel that Russell gives the chapter devoted to him in History of 
Western Philosophy, is indeed dismissive, describing Hegel’s project as one of 
intellectualising the “mystic insights” of his youth.85 Russell does concede 
however that there are others engaged in similar projects who are less coherent 
and less comprehensive than Hegel. For Russell, two things distinguish Hegel from 
these thinkers, “One of these is emphasis on logic […] the other distinguishing 
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feature (which is closely connected with the first) is the triadic movement called 
'dialectic.”86 Russell reconstructs Hegel’s use of the dialectic concluding that  
throughout the whole process, there is an underlying assumption that nothing can be really 
true unless it is about Reality as a whole. From this underlying assumption there is basis in 
traditional logic, which assumes that every proposition has a subject and a predicate.87 
 
As we saw in the earlier discussion of Aristotelian logic the proposition aims at 
establishing the whole but for Russell, Hegel’s interest the resolution of the 
dialectic in a paradoxical unity is unacceptable. For Russell, ultimately, Hegel’s 
project is misconceived from the beginning: 
Hegel thought that, if enough was known about a thing to distinguish it from all other 
things, then all its properties could be inferred by logic. This was a mistake, and from this 
mistake arose the whole imposing edifice of his system. This illustrates an important truth, 
namely, that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives 
rise.88 
 
Lumsden picks up the story of Hegel’s reception on the Anglophone Analytic 
tradition at a similarly scathing point: 
In the analytic tradition Hegel’s name is synonymous with a type of metaphysics, the 
murkiness and obscurity of which was corrected by the clarity of common sense, the 
methodology of the natural sciences and propositional logic, the success of which has 
relegated interest in Hegel to that long list of great errors that is the history of ideas. 89 
 
For Lumsden, the Analytic return to Hegel begins with Charles Taylor in the 1970s 
whom Lumsden describes as taking the view that Hegel responds to the challenge 
set in motion by Kant’s project “by reverting to an essentially pre-critical 
metaphysics.”90 However, according to Lumsden, “ultimately for Taylor, Hegel’s 
project fails because the diverse and disparate forces unleashed in modernity 
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cannot be contained in the pre-critical spiritual unity Hegel creates for them.”91 
For Lumsden, despite Taylor’s assertion that Hegel’s project ultimately fails, his 
book does at least work to serve to re-engage thought with Hegel;  transition to a 
non-metaphysical take up of Hegel begins with Klaus Hartmann. For Lumsden, 
“Hartmann rejected any conception of Hegel’s thought that presented itself as a 
grand metaphysical project” but focussed instead on Hegel’s logic which he 
claimed had an internal coherence and “reconstructs the real in a manner 
satisfactory to reason alone, the consequence of which Hartmann argued is that 
the categories of Hegel’s logic are self-legitimating.”92 For Lumsden, however, a 
way must be found to guarantee that this self-legitimating logic gives any 
understanding of the world and this comes with the publication of Robert Pippins, 
Hegel’s Idealism in 1989. According to Lumsden, Pippins key achievement is the 
insight that,   
core Hegelian concepts [spirit, reason, and ethical life] do not describe fixed attributes of 
the world or some kind of cosmic spiritual substance but are best conceived as conditions 
of the world’s intelligibility, conditions that are however historical achievements and which 
are themselves able to be transformed.93 
 
Spirit, or human consciousness, is then, under this view, the historically 
constituted way in which we understand the world and as such is changeable, 
rather any kind of metaphysical substance. Furthermore “on this post Kantian 
non-metaphysical view of Hegel the way Spirit transforms itself (through the 
movement of the negative) is through the recognition of deficiencies in existing 
prior norms.”94 The dialectic under this view, therefore becomes the recognising 
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(and presumably the correction of) deficiencies. The Concept is similarly 
transformed into the ‘space of reasons’ or “the socially and historically mediated 
space in which the determinations of our experience are forged”.95 Nancy’s 
approach, as we will come to see, will certainly prove to be non-metaphysical in 
Lumsden’s sense in as much as he will not posit any cosmic or religious entities.96 
He will not be in disagreement with Pippin on the socially and historically 
constituted nature of our understanding and experience, however what remains 
to be delineated is how Nancy will deal with the problematic non-being of the 
negative without, for the analytic tradition, falling into what could be described as 
‘mysticism’. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
 
Having clarified the problematic by looking at the history of the use of the 
dialectic, having considered Hegel’s use of the dialectic and its place in his project, 
having considered the responses to Hegel’s dialectic by Marx, and various of the 
French Twentieth Century philosophical traditions and a selection of the Analytic 
tradition, we are now in a position to establish the tasks of the rest of the thesis. 
 
Thesis Trajectory 
In Chapter Two, the aim is to establish Nancy’s distinctive reading of Hegel. I will 
begin by delineating of the scope of Nancy's philosophical project and the place 
of his interest in Hegel within it, as well as considering Nancy’s Anglophone 
reception. I will next offer readings of Nancy’s two texts on Hegel, The Speculative 
Remark from 1973 and The Restlessness of the Negative from 1997. I will then 
show how the key notions I find in these texts relate to the problematic of 
relational being set up in this chapter, consolidating the problematic and guiding 
the readings of Nancy and Hegel that follow. I will also contextualise this 
problematic by considering commentary on its handling by Hegel from Catherine 
Malabou, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. These readings of the Nancean 
texts and the contrasting readings used for clarification, will be consolidated into 
the guiding thought that for Nancy, Sense and Identity are understood as the 
situation of multiple significations held together in restless movement, a 
problematic situation which has no presence. Taking contributions from various 
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of Nancy’s Anglophone commentators, this thought will be applied to the original 
task of reading Elements of the Philosophy of Right and The Phenomenology of 
Spirit for the expositions they offer on Relational Being, and will be shown to 
clarify the task as one of reading Elements of the Philosophy of Right for an account 
of The State in Unrest and The Phenomenology of Spirit for an account of a Self 
that does not Complete. 
 
In Chapter Three, the aim is to follow the clue (or the challenge) given by Nancy 
and to read Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right for what it exposes about 
the situation of simultaneous connection and separation and what it means to be 
a singular being, a situation that I provisionally termed relational being. To 
contrast with this reading, I will offer a reading of Nancy’s The Inoperative 
Community from 1986, which gives an account of the specific type of relational 
being that is human beings in a social group with a distinct identity. This is the 
same situation I shall argue, that Hegel depicts in his description of the 
participants in The State in Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The aim will to be 
to contrast two accounts of a particular kind of relational being, one structured 
dialectically and one offered via a non-dialectical exposition. To aid this I will also 
consider contributions from various of Nancy’s Anglophone commentators. In 
conclusion, I will argue that for Nancy, Community is a relation to be experienced 
not a work to be achieved like Hegel’s State, and therefore the situation of The 
State in unrest, The State unable to complete, is the very same situation that 
Nancy terms Community. Additionally, I will assert that for Nancy, Hegel only 
unintentionally exposes the situation of simultaneous separation and connection 
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that is the Relational Being of Community, or group identity based on restless 
negativity, and that a consideration of singular identity based on restless 
negativity will become the focus of the following chapter. 
 
In Chapter Four, the aim is to follow the other clue or the challenge given by Nancy 
and to read Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit for what it also exposes about 
Singularity. To contrast with this reading I will offer a reading of Nancy’s Being 
Singular Plural from 1996 which gives an account of the specific type of relational 
being that is between one being and another, the same situation I shall argue, that 
Hegel depicts in his description of the coming –to-be of Self-Consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The aim will once again be to contrast two accounts of a 
particular kind of relational being, one structured dialectically and one offered via 
a non-dialectical exposition. To aid this I will also once again consider 
contributions from various of Nancy’s Anglophone commentators. In conclusion, 
I will argue that for Nancy, as Singularity is Being Singular Plural and therefore co-
essential with other singularities it is indissociable from the situation of 
Community. Therefore, as Community was argued to be relation to be 
experienced not a work to be achieved, Singularity must also be understood as a 
relation to be experienced not a work to be achieved. I will also assert that as 
Hegel’s account of Self-Consciousness requires that Self-Consciousness completes 
itself and overcomes its own internal contradiction, a self which does not 
complete is, therefore, the same situation as Nancy’s Being Singular Plural.  
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In Chapter Five, I will summarise the previous chapters and consolidate the 
explication so far, offering a consideration of the outcomes. I will argue that for 
Nancy, the situations that Hegel calls Self-Consciousness and The State are better 
understood as Singularity and Community respectively, both of which are 
relations to be experienced not works to be achieved, and are the same relation, 
the same situation of Being. Hegel’s project of dialectical assimilation, I will argue, 
can be seen, therefore, as one that tries to convert this problematic multiple non-
presentable Being into a singular identity which does have presence. I will next 
offer a reading Nancy’s 1996 essay, The Surprise of The Event. Following this 
reading, which I will use to argue that Hegel misses what Nancy calls the very 
“event-ness” of the situations of Community and Singularity with the 
consequence that he ends up with sundered instance or moments rather than 
movement he wishes for. Finally, before considering further trajectories for study 
that arise from this thesis, I will argue that Nancy’s response to the problem of 
trying to preserve the event-ness of event is to provoke a situation of 
simultaneous separation and connection, or to give it for Nancy its proper name, 
wonder. 
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Chapter Two  
Nancy on Hegel’s Philosophy 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Problematic 
In this chapter, I will offer a reading of Nancy’s texts on Hegel’s thought, The 
Speculative Remark (1975) and The Restlessness of the Negative (1997), which will 
draw out the themes of the multiple significations of sense and the restless 
movement of identity.  I shall argue that for Nancy, both sense and identity are 
those in which multiple significations are held together in restless movement. 
 
At the close of the previous chapter I identified the initial problematic of the thesis 
as the question of relational being, which, I defined provisionally as being 
concerned with what it means to be a singular being and by extension what sort 
of being it would be that would be other than singular, in a situation of 
simultaneous connection and separation. While the later chapters will follow 
Nancy’s hints that we could explore this further by reading Hegel’s Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right and the Phenomenology of Spirit, in this chapter the aim is to 
prepare for this by establishing Nancy’s distinctive reading of Hegel in the texts 
The Speculative Remark and The Restlessness of the Negative.  
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I shall begin with a consideration of Nancy’s project and the place of his interest 
in Hegel within it. I shall also consider the Anglophone reception of Nancy’s work, 
paying particular attention to suggested readings strategies. Next I shall offer an 
explication of Nancy’s text, The Speculative Remark. To clarify this reading, I will 
consider it alongside Catherine Malabou’s notion of Plasticity as a response to 
Hegel's notion of the Speculative in her text, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, 
Temporality and Dialectic (2005). Following this I shall then move to an explication 
of Nancy’s text The Restlessness of the Negative. To further clarify this reading, I 
will consider it alongside Jacques Derrida on semiological difference in "The Pit 
and The Pyramid"(1982) and Michel Foucault on historical difference in 
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History"(1984) both as responses to Hegel on identity and 
difference. I will also consider contributions on the work of Derrida and Foucault 
as offered by Judith Butler and Bruce Baugh. 
 
Finally, in conclusion, I shall summarise and consolidate my explications of Nancy’s 
texts and those of Malabou, Derrida and Foucault, drawing out the themes of the 
multiple significations of the event of sense and the restlessness movement of 
relation. I will then use the contributions of Victoria Fairfield and Emilia Angelova 
to show how the task of the thesis will become one of reading Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right for an account of The State in Unrest and The Phenomenology 
of Spirit for an account of a Self that does not Complete.  
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2.2 A History of Nancy 
 
Nancy was born in Caudéon near Bordeaux, France in 1940. He gained his licence 
de philosophie (analogous to a Bachelor’s degree) in 1962, his diplôme d’études 
supérieures de philosophie (analogous to a Master’s degree) in 1963 and his 
agrégation (required to teach in the French public education system) in 1964, all 
at the Sorbonne. Nancy’s master’s thesis was supervised or directed by Paul 
Ricouer, (whose assistant at this period was Jacques Derrida) and was entitled "La 
Religion de Hegel”. Nancy was also associated around this time with a group of 
Christian students lead by the Jesuit philosopher Georges Morel in discussions on 
Hegel. Following his time at the Sorbonne, Nancy taught in the French town of 
Colmar before taking up a post at the Institute de philosophie at the Université de 
Strasbourg where he obtained his Doctorat de troisième cycle in 1973, again 
supervised by Paul Ricouer and entitled, “Le Discours de analogue de Kant.” 1 In 
1987, Nancy was also awarded a Doctorat d'Etat, the French doctorate given in 
recognition for published work, for Experience de la liberté, his text focussing on 
freedom as thought by Kant, Schelling and Heidegger. In this work, he was 
supervised by Gérard Granel and members of the jury included Jacques Derrida 
and Jean-François Lyotard. A holder of visiting guest lectureships, in amongst 
other places, The Free University of Berlin, and Berkeley, Nancy nevertheless 
stayed at primarily attached to Strasbourg until his academic retirement in 2004, 
                                                          
1 Doctorat de troisième cycle, is a three-year PhD degree introduced into the French academic 
system to align with the procedures followed in other countries, particularly America and the UK. 
For a brief biography of Nancy and a helpful guide to French academic culture see Alan.D Schrift. 
Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 
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and therefore, at least geographically, separate from the centralised Parisian 
intellectual scene.2  
 
Nancy’s philosophical interests are both broad in scope and prolific in output, his 
writing did not stop during his grave health crises in the 1990s (a heart transplant, 
the recovery of which was aggravated by cancer) and continues beyond his 
academic retirement to the present day. Significant works in Nancy’s output 
representing his major themes are as follows; “The Political”, (La retrait du 
politique, 1983 with Lacoue-Labarthe), Community, (La communauté désoeuvrée, 
1986), The Body (Corpus, 1992), Art (Les Muses, 1992), Ontology (Être singulier 
pluriel, 1996), The Deconstruction of Christianity (Adoration, 2010) and Sexuality, 
(Corpus II, 2012). Most recently Nancy has returned to the themes that 
preoccupied him earlier in his career, with the publication of the book La 
Communauté désavouée, a follow up to La communauté désoeuvrée and an article 
for the journal Angelaki entitled “The Political and/or Politics”, both in 2014. 
Thinkers Nancy has given exclusive focus to in published book length works, 
include Hegel (Le Remarque Spéculative, 1973 and L’inquiétude de négatif in 
1997), Kant, (Le discours de la syncope. I. Logodeadulus, 1973) and Descartes (Ego 
Sum, 1979). With his frequent early collaborator, Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, he also 
published a text on Lacan, (La titre de la lettre, 1973). Many other works are 
focussed on particular philosophical concepts Nancy wishes to re-think, the re-
thinking of which involves a deep engagement with a multitude of thinkers 
                                                          
2 Morin, M-E. Jean-Luc Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) and Devisch, I. Jean-Luc Nancy and the 
Question of Community, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
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associated with, or with whom Nancy wishes to associate, the concept in hand, 
such as the consideration of freedom in the thought of Kant, Schelling and 
Heidegger in Experience de la liberté, 1988.  Much of Nancy’s copious writing on 
Heidegger’s thought takes this form, casting Heidegger as a kind of frequent 
reference amongst a chorus of other thinkers, a role he also affords to Derrida and 
of course Hegel.  
 
Nancy’s focus on Hegel in published works begins as previously mentioned with 
the publication of one of his earliest books, Le Remarque Speculative in 1973. In 
the intervening period between the appearance this text and the publication of 
L’inquiétude de négatif in 1997, Nancy also published several essays and articles 
concerned with various aspects of Hegel’s philosophy.  “Jurisdiction of the 
Hegelian Monarch” appeared in the journal Social Research in 1982 and is 
concerned with the Monarch or Sovereign in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right. “Identity and Trembling” appeared in the journal Hypnoses in 1984 and 
is concerned with Hegel’s structure of self-consciousness when applied to 
hypnotism. “L’amour en éclats” appeared in Alea magazine in 1986 and is 
concerned with philosophies of love and their adherence to a Hegelian dialectic 
structure. “Surprise de l’événement” appears in the collection published as Being 
Singular Plural in 1996 with no prior appearance that I can find, and is concerned 
with the notion of event in Hegel’s philosophy. In this same period, Nancy 
references Hegel, frequently in other works (it is hard to find a work by Nancy 
without at least one Hegelian reference in the index) but usually as part of a 
general historical philosophical context when considering specific issues or 
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themes. The only other work in the period between the publications of Le 
Remarque Spéculative and L’inquiétude de négatif and which comes close to 
approaching the single author study found in them, is Les Muses which appeared 
in 1994. This text is concerned with the question “why are there several arts and 
not just one?” and Nancy considers this question in several essays with a particular 
focus on Hegel’s Aesthetics but amongst other philosophies of art and aesthetics. 
Nancy’s career has also included frequent collaboration, most notably with 
Phillipe Lacoue-Larbathe at the beginning of his career, publishing the previously 
mentioned text on Lacan and La retrait du politique, as well as L'absolu littéraire: 
Théorie de la littérature du romantisme allemande, in 1978. The pair also 
organised the famous Les fins de homme conference on Derrida’s work in Cerisy-
la-Salle in 1980. Following this, at Derrida’s suggestion, they set up the Centre de 
recherches philosophiques sur le politique to further consider questions arising 
from the conference on the nature of the political. Nancy’s association with 
Derrida is also a long one, not only was Derrida assistant to Paul Ricouer during 
the supervision on Nancy’s master’s thesis but he was also on the jury panel for 
Nancy’s Doctorat d'Etat (L'expérience de la liberté, 1988). Whilst there have been 
many friendly skirmishes between the two thinkers perhaps the most well-known 
written evidence of the fond interaction between the two is Derrida ‘s Le toucher: 
Jean-Luc Nancy in 2000 which examines philosophical thought on touch with a 
strong focus on the work of Nancy. The English translation of this text carries a 
piece written by Nancy the day after Derrida’s death. Disentangling the thought 
of Nancy and Derrida is complex and certainly an endeavour that could easily fill 
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a separate thesis. For Marie-Eve Morin, one way to delineate this difference is to 
consider the two thinkers on community: 
In a gesture similar to Heidegger's, who crossed out Being in an attempt to remove it from 
its metaphysical interpretation as presence, as essence, it is also necessary, for both 
thinkers, to put community under erasure, and to think a community that is not an essence, 
not an identifiable totality which receives its meaning and determination from a 
transcendental signified.3 
 
For Derrida that erasure is total, even the term must go, but for Nancy the term 
itself and its associated concretions of meaning are valuable, the “erasure” must 
take the form of an interruption rather than an obliteration. Nancy’s work has also 
inspired, or perhaps more accurately provoked, another thinker into a literary 
response. Following the publication of La Communauté désoeuvrée in 1983, 
Maurice Blanchot produced the La Communauté inavouable in which he considers 
community using Nancy’s text as a starting point and sets out the thought that 
community is not something that can affirmed or avowed. Typically, Nancy replied 
to both Derrida and Blanchot in print, the dialogues with his interlocutors clearly 
still continuing sometimes after many years and sometimes even after death, the 
various translations of texts affording opportunities to keep the conversation 
going. Nancy replied to Blanchot in an essay entitled La Communauté affrontée 
which appears in the 2001 Italian translation of Blanchot’s text according to Morin 
(Morin JLN, p. 15) and more recently in the book La Communauté désavouée 
which appeared in 2014. In 2013, nearly a decade after Derrida’s death, Nancy 
addressed concerns Derrida had expressed in Le toucher over term Fraternity, in 
an article in the journal Angelaki.4 Nancy has also written on and collaborated 
                                                          
3 Morin, M-E. “Putting Community Under Erasure: Derrida and Nancy on the Plurality of 
Singularities”, Culture Machine, Vol 8 (2006) www.culturemachine.net 
4 Nancy, J-L.” Fraternity” in Angelaki, 18: 3, Sep 2013, pp.119-123. Trans. Sarah Clift. 
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with, various film makers and other artists, such his collaborations with 
choreographer Mathilde Monnier (several texts and a “dance conference” in 2002 
entitled Allitérations) and his text on Iranian film maker Abbas Kirsotami 
(L’evidence du film, 2010). 
 
From a traditional start of studies of canonical philosophical thinkers, Nancy’s 
thought has progressed, via a focus on “the political” whilst not himself being a 
political agent (Morin notes that Nancy was not involved in the events of May 
1968), into a veritable of explosion of diversity in terms of topics, including many 
outside the more traditional philosophical purview. Nancy has managed to occupy 
a space somewhat on the outside of the French intellectual scene yet has 
remained intimately involved in conversations and interactions with major 
thinkers spanning decades. If there is one thought that could connect this excess 
and divergence of thought, that could sum up Nancy’s philosophical project, it is 
Nancy’s own thought of connection par excellence, the thought of Being Singular 
Plural. Morin describes this “axiomatic” thought as follows: 
the singular plural means that there are singularities whose identity or selfhood can only 
be found in their “relation” to other singularities; what exists finds itself in being exposed 
to or being in contact with other singularities in such a way that nothing exists or makes 
sense on its own.5 
 
For Nancy, all being is singular plural; to be is to be singular in relation to plurality. 
To have meaning is, and is only, to have meaning in relation. What characterises 
Nancy’s approach to his divergent corpus, is a commitment to taking an existing 
                                                          
5 Morin, M-E. Jean-Luc Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p. 2 
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concept and exposing the relations that are at play in its meaning, whilst re-casting 
this meaning as an event of sense.  
 
The Anglophone Reception of Nancy’s Philosophy 
The 1990s saw the English language translations of La communauté désoeuvrée 
(1991) and La retrait du politique (1997) written and published in French the 
previous decade and in 1996  Les Muses, published in French in 1994. Stanford 
University Press also brought together and translated a collection of essays which 
had appeared separately elsewhere entitled The Birth to Presence, (1993). 6 Also 
in 1993, the Journal Paragraph produced a special issue on Nancy, in which 
appeared Derrida’s essay, “Le toucher: Jean-Luc Nancy”, later to be published as 
a book length work.7 Also published this decade were a monograph on the theme 
of Difference which included consideration of Nancy’s work, and a more general 
collection of introductory essays on Nancy’s thought.8 The 2000s saw the English 
translations of Être singulier pluriel, 2000,  published in French in 1996 and several 
more texts, most notably Nancy’s two texts on Hegel, Le Remarque Spéculative in 
2001 (French publication 1973) and L’inquiétude de négatif in 2002 (French 
publication 1997) and Corpus in 2008 (French publication 2000) . The quantity of 
Anglophone secondary literature at this time, also increased with two 
monographs on Nancy’s work on the themes of Futurity  and The Fragment and a 
                                                          
6 Nancy JL, The Birth to Presence, ed. Brian Holmes, trans. Brian Holmes and others, (California: 
Stanford University Press, 1993) 
7 Paragraph, Vol 16, Issue 2, July 1993. Ed. Peggy Kamuf 
8 On Jean-Luc Nancy: The Sense of Philosophy ed. Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks, Colin Thomas, 
(London: Routledge, 1997) and May, T. Reconsidering Difference. Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, 
Deleuze. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 
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collection of essays on The Political in Nancy’s work.9 Nancy’s thought was 
considered alongside other thinkers on the themes of Futurity, Aesthetics and 
Phenomenology/Deconstruction.10 The 2010s have seen the translations of works 
both current, as Anglophone interest by this time is such that the gap between 
original French publication and English translation has dramatically reduced, as 
well as works from Nancy’s rich back catalogue. Notable translations this decade 
have included L'Adoration in 2012, Corpus II in 2013 and La Communauté 
désavouée in 2016, all appearing in English a year after they were written and 
published in French. A long awaited English translation of Ego Sum, Nancy’s text 
on Descartes from 1979, also made an appearance in 2016. The last decade has 
correspondingly seen something of an explosion of Anglophone secondary 
literature. Book length texts devoted solely to Nancy’s work, have appeared this 
decade on the themes of, Legality, Religion, Ontology/Sense and Nancy’s specific 
brand of ontology the thought of Being Singular Plural, Otherness, Community, 
The Political, and Visual Culture.11 Nancy’s thought has been considered alongside 
                                                          
9 Hutchens, B.C. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy, (Chesham: Acumen, 2005); James, 
I. The Fragmentary Demand, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Armstrong, P. 
Reticulations: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Networks of the Political, (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009).  
10 Martinon, J. On Futurity: Malabou, Nancy and Derrida, (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2007); Ross, A. 
The Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy: Presentation in Kant, Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Watkin, Christopher. Phenomenology or 
Deconstruction? The Question of Ontology in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc 
Nancy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
11 Jean-Luc Nancy: Justice, Legality and World ed. Ben Hutchens, (London: Continuum, 2011); RE-
Treating Religion: Deconstructing Christianity with Jean-Luc Nancy ed. Ignaas Devisch, Laurens 
ten Kate, Aukje Van Rooden, Alena Alexandrova, Jean-Luc Nancy, (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2011); Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking: Expositions of World, Ontology, Politics, and 
Sense, ed. Peter Gratton and Marie-Eve Morin, (New York: SUNY press, 2012); Morin, M-E. Jean-
Luc Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012);  Rugo, D. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Thinking of Otherness, 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Devisch, I. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Question of Community, 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Nancy and the Political, ed. Sanja Dejanovic, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2015); Nancy and Visual Culture, ed. Carrie Giunta and Adrienne Jones, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 
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other thinkers, on the themes of Atheism, as well as been the subject of journal 
special issues with the themes of Film and Visual Culture.12 A more general un-
themed collection of essays on Nancy was published as well as dictionary of 
Nancy’s most well used terms.13 
 
Whilst most of the monographs devoted solely to Nancy acknowledge the 
influence of Hegel’s thought on Nancy, at the very least observing that there are 
two texts in Nancy’s oeuvre devoted explicitly to Hegel, they all (including the 
previously mentioned texts by Blanchot and Derrida) decline the project of 
developing an extended analysis of Nancy’s relationship with the thought of 
Hegel. There is also a vast and overwhelming array of journal articles, papers and 
book chapters devoted to Nancean thought on a plethora of topics, but again, 
there is little which considers the thought of Nancy and Hegel together and none 
which focus on a comparison of the two thinkers on the specific topics of 
community and singularity.14 Of the very small minority which do consider the two 
                                                          
12 Watkin, Christopher. Difficult Atheism: Post-theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Film Philosophy, 
Vol 12, No 1, 2008. Ed. Douglas Morrey; Journal of Visual Culture, Volume 9, Issue 1 April, 2010. 
Ed. Louis Kaplan and John Paul Ricco. 
13 Nancy Now, ed. Verena Conley and Irving Goh, (Cambridge: Polity, 2014); The Nancy 
Dictionary, ed. Peter Gratton and Marie-Eve Morin, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2015). 
14 This thesis restricts itself to a consideration of the Anglophone reception of Nancy’s work, 
however in the midst of a final days of the preparation of this thesis I received an email informing 
me of the existence of an as yet untranslated essay by Jean-Francois Kervégan, entitled "Un 
hégéianisme sans profoundeur" which was originally given as a paper at a symposium at Collège 
international de philosophie, in Paris in 2002, and which Kervégan wishes to show that a certain 
reading of Hegel can help us think what it is that Nancy wishes us to think about community: “Je 
voudrais simplement montrer que Hegel, lu d’une certaine manière, peut nous aider à penser ce 
que Nancy nous invite à penser.” Kervégan, Jean-Francois. "Un hégéianisme sans profoundeur" in 
Sens en tous sens; autour des travaux de Jean-Luc Nancy,” (Paris; Galilée, 2004), p.25. Whilst 
translating the essay and also opening up the consideration the reception of Nancy’s work is 
sadly not possible at this time, it would undoubtedly be a rich and interesting area of study 
arising from this thesis. 
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thinkers, there are none which precisely coincide with the problematic sketched 
earlier, that of Nancy’s reading of relational being in Hegel’s thought when for 
Nancy that very thought occludes it. 
 
Morin is especially interested in Nancy’s focus on Hegel’s mode of presentation in 
The Speculative Remark, noting that: 
Nancy pays more attention to the way in which the system is presented than to its 
argumentative legitimacy. This emphasis allows him to “read” Aufhebung not merely as the 
governing method of a totalizing and self-enclosed thought, but as a movement that 
dissolves and restores, fractures and reweaves.15 
 
For Morin, it is important that Nancy’s method of reading allows him to read 
Hegel’s Aufhebung or sublation as both an intended operation of locking down 
and fixing meaning but also as the marker of the occasion of the play of meaning, 
neither fully closed down or nor utterly lost. This generous reading allows the 
intended logic to play out whilst observing what is actually at work in the structure 
and presentation of the text and which is interrupting and disturbing it.  
 
Hutchens lists Nancy’s two book length texts on Hegel and briefly considers 
Nancy’s essay “The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch” before concluding that 
“ultimately, Nancy presents captivating intuitions about singularity and sense, 
multiplicity and Praxis that represent compelling engagements with Hegel, yet he 
does not identify his own proposals with Hegelian thoughts beyond this critical 
requisitioning.”16 For Hutchens singularity/multiplicity, (and therefore Nancy’s 
                                                          
15 Morin, Ibid. p.10 
16 Hutchens, Ibid.p.27 
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thought of Being Singular Plural) sense and Praxis in Nancy always refer to an 
underlying engagement with Hegelian logic but as he rightly observes this is not a 
declared engagement. However, Hutchens declines to comment on whether this 
undeclared engagement could be considered a guiding intention across the 
entirety or the majority of Nancy’s work, commenting that: “Nancy’s work has not 
yet yielded its primary focus. After all, his erudition encompasses, Romanticism 
and techno music, phenomenology and communitarianism, Hegelian logic and 
contemporary cinema.”17  
 
The thinkers above have not depicted Nancy’s reading of Hegel as problematic, 
however in Simon Lumsden’s "Reason and the Restlessness of the Speculative: 
Jean-Luc Nancy's Reading of Hegel" it is clear that for him, Nancy’s reading of 
Hegel is limited. Lumsden is dissatisfied with a reading of the dialectic that neither 
wholly concludes nor wholly does not conclude, because for him “it is reason that 
reconciles differences and functions as the motor of thought’s self-correcting 
capacity [and this] self-correcting capacity of reason is however ignored by 
Nancy.”18 If we can understand the self-correcting capacity of reason to be the 
same as the return to self, described earlier, then it would seem a hard reading to 
claim that Nancy ignores this when it is re-interpreting this event that seems to 
comprise his entire philosophical project. Lumsden concentrates mostly on The 
Restlessness of the Negative, A Finite Thinking and The Experience of Freedom. 
Interestingly, the text that Lumsden does not consider is Being Singular Plural, 
                                                          
17 Hutchens, Ibid.p.4 
18 Lumsden, S. "Reason and the Restlessness of the Speculative: Jean-Luc Nancy's Reading of 
Hegel" in Critical Horizons, Volume 6, 2005 - Issue 1, p. 218. 
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which would have provided a more nuanced reading of this event, an event Nancy 
calls Sense. Lumsden acknowledges that for Nancy the term Sense has a particular 
meaning saying that it is “designed to conceive of a non-metaphysical process of 
making creation” but in the next breath claiming that is merely the chosen term 
Nancy uses for a concept. 19  For Nancy whilst the event of Sense may describe the 
event otherwise referred to as Concept, this would not in any way constitute an 
endorsement that the two terms are interchangeable. 
 
The secondary literature which does not focus specifically on Nancy’s readings of 
Hegel can however offer some useful insight on reading Nancy, on any topic. Rugo 
points out that, “Nancy’s approach […] rarely relies on a historical or literal 
reading; it is rather a reading that aims at appropriating the underlying ground of 
existential analysis.”20 For Rugo then, it is important to read Nancy for how he 
himself reads, that is, for un underlying existential analysis, or perhaps an 
undeclared engagement as Hutchens mentioned previously. Rugo goes further, 
“one should pay attention to the fact that Nancy’s writing responds to the same 
structure of plural sense and incommensurability that his work attempts to 
advance as the very core of its conceptual agenda.”21 For Rugo the structure of 
Nancy’s writing is the same as or is demonstrative of, what Nancy is trying to say 
about being in this undeclared engagement, that it is plural and multiple and is 
never only singular. Nancy’s texts therefore are not just about Being Singular 
                                                          
19 Lumsden, Ibid. p. 217 
20 Rugo, Ibid.p.2 
21 Rugo, Ibid.p.3 
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Plural, they are themselves Singular Plural, a singular voice speaking many 
meanings.  
 
To comprehend Nancy’s philosophy presents therefore a complex demand as 
James observes:  
Nancy’s philosophy, most evidently his thinking of the “singular plural”, turns persistently 
and insistently around the demand imposed by a thinking of being in which any possibility 
of unity and identity has withdrawn, and where the multiple demands to be thought 
without reference to any overarching unity or totality.22 
 
Therefore, James warns us, “to read his work in terms of a system, or to offer a 
summary presentation or résumé of the work in its entirety, would be to miss the 
way in which it functions as thought.”23 To attempt to think the multiple without 
reference to unity would require a reading which did not seek to identify a system 
or to totalize but which would endeavour to keep in play each brilliant, shattering 
burst of meaning, a reading which takes the form of that which it is reading, as a 
clue to how to proceed.  
 
Several insights have now emerged which pertain to the initial problematic which 
was originally defined as reading Hegel's Elements of The Philosophy of Right and 
The Phenomenology of Spirit the expositions they offer of relational Being despite, 
for Nancy, their dialectical structure. Firstly, with regards to reading Nancy, we 
should be aware that there is an undeclared engagement with Hegel taking place 
(Hutchens), that the structure of Nancy’s writing follows the non-dialectical 
                                                          
22 James, Ibid. p.3 
23 James, Ibid. p.4 
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structure of how he believes Sense functions (Rugo) and accordingly we must not 
read him looking for a system (James). We must also watch for the way Nancy 
himself reads Hegel in such a way that the overlying logic is allowed to function 
whilst the underlying disruption is none the less observed (Morin). Finally, in order 
not to fall prey to the trap of thinking that Nancy simply fails to provide an account 
of what that self is as a result of its interaction with another (Lumsden) we must 
pay particular attention to Nancy’s specific notion of the event of Sense in which 
meaning and identity is created. With these insights in mind it is now possible to 
proceed to a consideration of Nancy’s two texts on Hegel’s thought, The 
Speculative Remark and The Restlessness of the Negative. 
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2.3 The Speculative Remark  
 
Introduction 
In the introduction to La titre de la lettre, Nancy’s text concerned with Lacan and 
co-authored with Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, they state that: 
The following pages only appear in the form of "book" because they exceed the limits of 
publication in a journal. Without a doubt, it is inevitable that this presentation [...] runs at 
least the risk of producing one of the effects that our culture attaches to a "book" [...] a kind 
of binding effect [...] and that might lead one to think that this had the intention of being 
"a book on Lacan.”24 
 
The book length works in Nancy’s oeuvre are characterised by a constant attempt 
to avoid producing “a book”, that is a larger length text with an argument set out 
over chapters, on a given theme or thinker and that would offer a definitive 
encapsulation of that theme or thinker. Instead, the most frequent form Nancy 
offers, is that of collections of essays, oral presentation transcripts or other short 
forms of writing that have appeared separately. Of those which do present a 
longer work divided into chapters, the chapters themselves frequently consist of 
linked mediations rather than arguments and Nancy himself points out that these 
chapters need not necessarily be read in order.25  As will become clearer as 
Nancy’s distinctive notion of sense emerges in the following reading, for Nancy it 
is imperative to prevent totalisation. The Speculative Remark is one of the 
seemingly more systematic works and presents us with six chapters, a preamble 
                                                          
24 Nancy, JL and Lacoue-Labarthe P. The Title of the Letter, A reading of Lacan, trans François 
Raffoul and David Pettigrew, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), p.1 
25 In the English language translation of The Experience of Freedom, the order of the first three 
chapters are rearranged from that of the French publication, apparently un-problematically and 
with the approval of Nancy.  See Translator’s Note in Nancy, J.L. The Experience of Freedom, 
trans. Bridget MacDonald, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) 
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and an epilogue instead of an introduction and a conclusion, and a “Remark”, a 
two page section of prose not accounted for in the chapter structure.  
 
Nancy states that an alternative title for The Speculative Remark could have been 
“Essay on the Hegelian Concept of Aufheben”26 and apart from the petty 
inaccuracy that the text is certainly longer than an essay, at least in the more 
modern sense of a shorter piece of writing, the alternative title is otherwise 
unproblematic. What it doesn’t express however is Nancy’s focus on aufheben as 
presented in The Science of Logic rather than any other of Hegel’s works, and 
Nancy’s interest in Hegel’s presentation of aufheben in The Science of Logic in a 
remark, an appendix to the text not otherwise accounted for in its structure. 
Crucial for Nancy is that way Hegel finds himself forced to deal with aufheben in 
his own highly systematic text, and for Nancy this speaks more about the true 
nature of aufheben than what Hegel himself actually says or writes about it. The 
various chapters, preambles and remarks of The Speculative Remark, do not build 
an argument but offer exactly the kind of linked meditations mentioned 
previously, many of which repeat each other. Therefore, my approach will be to 
present the most salient of those, and whilst these will be presented in the order 
in which they occur I will not attempt to provide a trajectory of the chapters as 
such. 
 
                                                          
26 Nancy, JL. The Speculative Remark, trans. Céline Suprenant, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001), p. 1. Hereafter to referred to in the text as SR, followed by page number. 
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Aufheben, Remark, Speculative, Syllogism, Logic and Chance 
Considering Hegel’s remark on aufheben, which occurs in Book One, Section One 
of The Science of Logic, Nancy observes that a sleight of hand occurs in Hegel’s 
phrasing in the opening sentence of the remark and he quotes and comments: 
“‘To sublate [Aufheben] and the sublated [das Aufgehobene] constitute one of the 
most important concepts’: a plural works as a singular.” (SR, p.29). Two things, the 
act of sublating and that which has been sublated, have been condensed into a 
single thing, a concept of sublation. In merely naming the constituent parts (the 
process and the product) of the sublation, Hegel has in fact performed one. In a 
related point, Nancy observes that “Aufheben is the name of the suppression of 
The States that are sublated into moments.” (SR, p. 39).  Sublation, for Nancy, is 
the name of an event of the suppression of situations of difference in which the 
entities that differ are rendered as moments. 
 
Reflecting on the site of the treatment of aufheben in The Science of Logic (in his 
own unaccounted for Remark) Nancy notes that: 
In the Science of Logic the treatment of expressions takes place almost exclusively in the 
appended texts that the Remarks constitute (or occasionally, in texts whose status is 
somewhat comparable, such as the untitled introduction to the section on objectivity). (SR, 
p. 47). 
 
Expressions in this sense, that is Hegel’s sense, mean something like terms (Nancy 
gives unity and synthesis as examples of expressions dealt with in remarks) and 
for Nancy it is significant that explanation of these tends not to be not dealt with 
within Hegel’s triadically structured chapters, sections and paragraphs which are 
arranged to facilitate the reading the process of the dialectic. Instead these often 
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overdue explanations are frequently given in additions and other non-systematic 
discourses appended to the main text.  
 
Nancy notes Hegel’s self-described “delight” that the word Aufhebung (the 
product of the sublation) has a two-fold meaning and specifically that these two 
meanings oppose one another.27 Hegel is similarly delighted with all words which 
this “speculative meaning” and the excess of these kinds of words in the German 
language. For Nancy, it is noteworthy that “chance and happiness reign were one 
expected the analysis of accident or an excess of language” (SR, p. 55). For Nancy, 
analysis of this apparent linguistic quirk would show that it is not a case of 
language amusingly replicating logic but that the logic of the Aufhebung seems to 
have taken its shape, unwittingly, from the function of language in the case of 
words with this special “speculative meaning”.  
 
Moving his focus away from the Remark, Nancy considers Hegel’s use of syllogism 
later in Science of Logic, noting that, “the entire course of Hegelian syllogistics 
consists in suppressing successively all the determinations attributed to the 
syllogism as such […] the outcome of the syllogism is its own passage over into 
“the object” (SR, p. 81). For Nancy, Hegel’s aim is that, in the syllogism, the varying 
                                                          
27 The remark as cited in the Speculative Remark opens “To sublate” has a twofold meaning in 
the language: on the one hand it means to preserve [aufbewahren], to maintain [erhalten], and 
equally it means to cease, to put an end to [ein Ende Machen].” (SR, p.24). In the original French, 
Nancy’s citations from Hegel were his own translation and certain words and terms had their 
original German counterparts supplied in brackets. The English translator Céline Suprenant has 
matched these citations with the text of the A. V. Miller translation of The Science of Logic for the 
Humanities Press edition of 1989 (the remark appears on page 106 of that text). She has 
modified where necessary to “preserve Nancy’s gloss”, including supplying the original German 
that Nancy was so keen to preserve.  
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meanings attributable to the two statements will be bound together in their 
sublation into the conclusion, a conclusion which is always a fixed singular object 
and can be treated and spoken of as such. However, for Nancy, “the Aufheben is 
not a concept whose intelligibility a demonstrative play of propositions might lead 
to: Aufheben is to read propositions, to read a writing whose form “undergoes a 
change” and that indeed requires a “painful effort…” (SR, p. 85). For Nancy, the 
moment of sublation, in which the varying meanings attributable to terms, 
including opposing meanings, are held together in an event of sense, occurs in the 
reader in the act of reading, although this does not constitute a claim that is 
limited to the act of reading. For Nancy, therefore, aufheben is already 
experienced in Hegel’s text (in any text) before Hegel begins to expound it and 
attempt to capture it in a logic. 
 
Nancy reflects that the attempt to fashion a system based on the logic described 
above may well be doomed: 
having organised the speculative staging of the wreckage, and determined to present it in 
the most realist manner through its discourse and its words, Hegel suddenly would appear 
to have lost control of the staging, a "real" wreckage might have taken place. (SR, p.126) 
 
In Hegel’s staging of the wreckage (the presentation of the unacceptable 
contradictions that arise in the situations that are speculative) via his system 
designed to present in a realist manner all speculative situations by reading them 
backwards from the assumed outcome that is their sublation, the very staging 
itself ruptures for Nancy and Hegel is forced to append his texts with remarks, 
additions and re-writings. Aufheben is, for Nancy, the event of sense, the holding 
together of meaning (including but not limited to pairs of opposing meanings), it 
77 
 
is not a special moment in logic that can be reached or understood only by a 
special kind of logical deduction but is something which occurs itself in spite of 
this logic, making itself most manifest in the wreckage of this logic.  
 
For Nancy, the role of chance will prove helpful in illuminating his particular 
understanding of aufheben or sublation: 
By giving oneself over to the chance of happy finds in language […] one always risks letting 
oneself be caught in unawares by a Witz, and the delight that speculative thought at times 
experiences always risks being carried away in some voluptuous debauchery.” (SR, p. 140) 
 
To be caught unawares in a Witz, a joke, pun or other linguistic situation with an 
excess of meaning, (including opposing meanings) is precisely to experience 
aufheben, it is to experience sublation in the only way for Nancy that it actually 
exists, as an experience. Avoiding the excessive debauchery of an unplanned Witz 
whilst none the less making clear what one is would seem to be Hegel’s entire 
project, a project which none the less has “continually broken here and there, 
haphazardly, in additions or in remarks, the course of its own meaning.”(SR, p.142) 
The difficulty in following the course of the meaning of Hegel’s project (as opposed 
to comprehending a description of its end destination) is well known, as the 
varying opposing factions of Hegelian scholarship has demonstrated almost since 
Hegel’s work first appeared and as was discussed in the Introduction. For Nancy, 
however the difficulty in following the course, the unavoidable wreckage that 
occurs in the attempt, is the most fruitful moment in which to experience 
aufheben. 
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The English language edition of The Speculative Remark appeared in 2001 and 
Nancy added a note at the end regarding its relation to The Restlessness of the 
Negative which had appeared in French a few years earlier and was to appear in 
English the following year. In it he notes that he was already, twenty-eight years 
earlier, preoccupied with unrest in relation to Hegel but that it had taken someone 
else’s reading of his text to point this out: 
the rapid and incessant movement that goes simultaneously for and against the 
“proposition” in order to achieve “speculation” and, more generally, goes for and against 
language in order to reach thought, […] troubles the sovereign power of the Aufhebung […] 
prevents absolute knowledge from absolutizing itself (SR. p.148) 
 
For Nancy, what Hegel wants as a progressive movement from one proposition to 
another and then on to their sublation, (and similarly a progressive movement 
from one possible meaning of a word and another and on to their sublation) is in 
fact a restless repetition back and forth between these moments or significations 
The sovereign power of the sublation that Hegel wants, is therefore troubled, 
agitated and threatened by this restlessness for Nancy and Absolute Knowledge 
as a final situation in which there will be no opposition between the concept and 
the world and no requirement for further sublations or restless movement, will 
not come to pass, in that form. 
 
Having explicated Nancy’s meditations offered in The Speculative Remark, the 
following picture has emerged. For Nancy, something inadvertent occurs in the 
phrasing of Hegel’s remark that means that the Aufhebung will be a site of 
suppression and for Nancy the fact that this happens in a remark appended to the 
main text is significant. Nancy also finds it significant that Hegel considers 
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speculative words as chance linguistic quirks and appears not investigate this as 
such. For Nancy, Hegel’s syllogism suppresses multiple significations, however in 
doing so it also highlights them, happening most fruitfully in unplanned moments 
in a text. Nancy acknowledges a certain foreshadowing of the theme of 
restlessness which he picks up in his later text The Restlessness of the Negative. In 
order to consolidate the  reading of The Speculative Remark, I will offer next a 
reading of Catherine Malabou’s The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and 
Dialectic, which also offers Plasticity as a more nuanced reading of Hegel’s 
Aufhebung. 
 
Malabou’s Plasticity  
Catherine Malabou introduces her notion of plasticity in The Future of Hegel: 
Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, the published version of her doctoral thesis, 
which could also have been alternatively titled An Essay on the Hegelian Concept 
of Aufheben relatively unproblematically. In the text, Malabou’s focus is the 
question of whether the philosophy of Hegel has a future, in the sense of whether 
it can account for future conceptually and whether Hegel’s philosophy is of use in 
the future. Malabou takes as her starting point an observation she attributes to 
Heidegger that in Hegel’s philosophy the future, and for that matter the past, 
"necessarily appear as either a present time which is just past, or a present which 
is yet to come".28 Malabou makes it clear however that, “it is not my purpose here 
to stage a confrontation between the Hegelian and Heideggerian conceptions of 
                                                          
28 Malabou, C. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, trans Lisabeth During, 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2004), p.3 
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time.”29 For Malabou, it is Hegel’s occasional references to the notion of plasticity 
that reveal his understanding of futurity as  itself, not just a projected present. 
Therefore, in what she admits will be a transformative movement, Malabou will 
look for instances of plasticity both as explicitly mentioned in Hegel’s work and 
also as what she calls as the “’unforeseen in Hegelian philosophy.”30  
 
For Malabou, “plasticity’s native land is the field of art,” as the form giving that 
occurs in sculpting and the form receiving that is undergone by a given material 
that becomes a sculpture, characterizes perfectly the two senses of plasticity. 31 
She notes that English, French and German substantives, ‘plasticity’, plasticité and 
Plastizität, are all derived from the Greek root plassein, which mean to model or 
mould. She notes that as an adjective, plastic has two senses, it describes 
something that is malleable and can take form but it also describes the power to 
mould and give form. For Malabou, what is of interest is not just that the one term 
can service the apparent polar opposites of form giving and form receiving but 
that it can stretch even further and she notes that plastic has also come into use 
as a descriptor of a certain kind of explosive material.  For Malabou the word 
plastic is itself plastic, “the word draws itself to extremes, both to those concrete 
shapes in which form is crystallized (sculpture) and to the annihilation of all form 
(the bomb).”32 For Malabou, plastic is a term to describe, in a variety of 
applications, the quality of being able to encompass contradictory extremes. 
                                                          
29 Malabou, Ibid. p. 4.  
30 Malabou, Ibid. p. 7 
31 Malabou, Ibid. p. 8 
32 Malabou, Ibid. p. 9 
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Something that is plastic will have what Malabou calls a “hetero-affected” 
structure, it will be some kind of whole whose internal structure contains 
otherwise mutually exclusive or mutually unknowable components. Plastic 
becomes for Malabou, not just a description of sculpture and sculpting but also a 
way of thinking, that is found originally in the thought of Hegel.  
 
For Malabou there are three important uses of the term plasticity in Hegel’s 
thought and  these all occur in texts appearing after The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
The first use occurs in the Lectures on Aesthetics; the published compilation of 
lectures given on art in Heidelberg and Berlin between 1818 and 1829 and the 
term is used to describe both the giving and receiving of form in exactly the way 
outlined so far. The second use occurs in the same text but also in the Lectures on 
the Philosophy of History, another compilation of lectures given between 1821 
and 1831 in Berlin. In each text, Malabou notes, that for Hegel, “’plasticity’, 
describes the nature of those Greek figures who represent an individuality he 
names as ‘exemplary’ and ‘substantial.’”33 These “plastic individualities” such as 
Socrates and Xenophon, are so called by Hegel, as Malabou explains, because they 
receive spirit bodily and then give it form by fashioning their own morality. The 
third use occurs in the various versions of The Science of Logic, which were later 
condensed and refined into the third book of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences entitled The Philosophy of Mind. Malabou explains that for 
Hegel, “the philosophical reader and interlocutor are of course receptive to the 
                                                          
33 Malabou, Ibid. p. 9 
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form, but they in turn are led to construct and form what they hear or read.”34 
The practice of taking up the form of the concept on offer but in doing so shaping 
it oneself is then inherent to philosophy and is itself plastic. It is this third use of 
plasticity in the Encyclopaedia that Malabou makes the main object of The Future 
of Hegel and which is of course of most interest in connection with Nancy’s The 
Speculative Remark. 
 
For Malabou the situation that Hegel wants as the product of the aufheben or 
sublation, is better thought of as plasticity. For Malabou, “plasticity is a name for 
the originary unity of acting and being acted upon, of spontaneity and receptivity. 
A medium for the differentiation of opposites, plasticity holds the extremes 
together in their reciprocal action.”35 Plasticity is that which holds together 
extremes but preserves the mutual exclusivity of the parts. The extremes have not 
come together and been synthesised into a whole by plasticity, instead plasticity 
describes an originary unity of whole and parts that has never been anything else. 
The subject, for Malabou, becomes something which is not the result of the 
sublation but is something that has always been a whole with contradictory parts. 
The subject is hetero-affected and as such is that which is able to contain the 
contradictory concepts of past and present and project itself into the future; it can 
speculate. 
 
                                                          
34 Malabou, Ibid. p. 10 
35 Malabou, Ibid. p. 186 
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For Malabou, plasticity is then, a method of thinking and just as Hegel seems to 
find no limit to what is explainable by dialectics, so Malabou is able to find 
plasticity described where ever dialectic process is described. However, for 
Malabou the fact that plasticity is so rarely named, is testament to its unique 
quality and she says: 
The scarcity of references to the concept of plasticity is thus evidence of its distinct mode 
of presence, which is that of originary synthesis, maintained only in the interval between 
presence and absence.36 
 
Plasticity, then, is itself plastic, it is the middle term or rather the original unity of 
presence and absence. It is the unseen in Hegel for Malabou, as it is what is both 
explicit and implicit in his text, it is the situation mis-labeled as and mis-articulated 
as the process of the dialectic. This reading is not one which would refute 
dialectics and intend it violence, but is instead one which articulates in a deeper 
manner that which dialectics sought to explain. It is a reading which allows a 
reading of Hegel at face value and one which at the same time “ventriloquizes” 
his text but without necessarily taking an opposing position to it. 37   
 
Malabou’s notion of plasticity would appear at first glance to have much in 
common with Nancy’s notion of the event of sense and indeed the approach of 
both thinkers to reading Philosophy, and to reading Hegel in particular, would also 
seem to be broadly in sympathy. For Malabou, to read a philosopher’s account of 
a concept is unavoidably to participate in the construction of the concept. 
                                                          
36 Malabou, Ibid. p. 18 
37 In an essay co-authored with Judith Butler, Malabou refers to reading the work of a 
philosopher as a ventriloquizing them. Malabou, C. and Butler, J. “You Be My Body for Me: Body, 
Shape, and Plasticity in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”, in A Companion to Hegel, ed. Stephen 
Houlgate and Michael Baur, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). p.611 
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Therefore, “the concept of plasticity itself must be put into play.”38 Her text then 
would be one that will allow plasticity to function in both its senses and to be read 
as form giving as well as form receiving. This kind of reading that would allow 
significations to remain in play and not be fixed via sublation into a concept would 
seem to be exactly the kind of reading Nancy has in mind and as he remarks in the 
Preamble to The Speculative Remark; “To read Hegel’s text is thus, if not to rewrite 
it, at least to repeat its exposition plastically.” (SR, p. 7). For both thinkers then 
there would seem to be an intent to avoid the fixing of differing significations into 
a concept, that is to think outside the logic of the aufheben. For Malabou though, 
the differing significations are hetero-affected, their unity is not a result of the 
Aufhebung or sublation but is their originary state of being. However, as they are 
hetero-affected the differing significations are in pairs. To ventriloquize Nancy for 
a moment, Malabou valuably stages a reading of Hegel’s Aufhebung in which the 
relation of different things is understood as originary rather than the result of 
process but one in which opposing relations are still always between binary 
pairings.  This focus on pairs of opposites comes of course from the fact that 
Malabou derives her notion of plasticity from Hegel whose logic is founded, for 
Nancy, on the observation of specific words with a pair of meanings which are in 
opposition.  
  
                                                          
38 Malabou, Ibid.p.7 
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2.4 The Restlessness of the Negative  
 
Introduction  
The Restlessness of the Negative was published (in French) in 1997, a full twenty-
four years after The Speculative Remark. Nancy says in his added note to the 
English language edition of The Speculative Remark, that the book was typical of 
its epoch in that it featured “an immoderate taste for exploiting all the resources 
of language” and that this epoch was one that “was discovering that one does not 
philosophize outside language and that the body of the latter is also the flesh of 
thought” (SR, p. 148). Nancy’s use of puns and other speculative words and indeed 
his practice of not re-naming concepts but rehabilitating them while still allowing 
his new and the many acquired old meanings to still be at play, has in fact stayed 
with him his entire career. The Restlessness of the Negative, with its eleven 
chapters or sections, each a meditation on a single word, term or expression, 
associated (more or less opaquely) with Hegel’s philosophy, is no exception. These 
sections, however, do not offer a progressive trajectory, unlike The Speculative 
Remark which for all of the attempt not to offer us a book on Hegel, did none the 
less give a loose structure which Nancy could interrupt with Remarks and other 
devices. The Restlessness of the Negative on the other hand, is nothing but 
remark, nothing but interruptive devices, there is not even a scene setting (or 
scene disturbing) introductory move nor is there the closure of an epilogue or 
conclusion. As became increasingly more typical in Nancy’s writing following The 
Speculative Remark, the text offers us, less what Nancy claims Hegel has written 
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about each word in the title of a given meditation but more the multiplicity of 
what it has made Nancy think. Although there is no introduction as such,  Nancy 
does state in the first section that, “we do not claim here to restore Hegel, nor do 
we expound a “Hegelianism”: we read Hegel or we think him such as he has 
already been reread or rethought up to us.”39 Therefore we are not offered 
arguments for or against, or even analysis of specific problems, but instead 
witness an act of speculation in two of the many available dictionary senses; a 
reflection or conjecture and the taking of a risk in search of profit.40 In the 
instances in which Nancy attributes a notion to Hegel, there is no distinction made 
between instances in which Nancy is claiming that Hegel himself claims such and 
such a thing or, instances in which Nancy has found a contrary meaning in Hegel’s 
words that Hegel may not have intended or fully realised, both are attributed to 
Hegel resulting in sometimes surprising statements such as the claim that Hegel is 
the opposite of a totalitarian thinker in the second section. In this way, Nancy’s 
reading of Hegel allows at least two different Hegel’s to exist in the discourse and 
risks his reader’s restless movement between the two, in this way it is a reading 
and a writing of Hegel that is truly speculative, requiring a “painful effort” (SR, p. 
132). My approach shall be as before in that I will not offer a trajectory that would 
unite and order the chapters but the salient points about the problematic at hand. 
                                                          
39 Nancy, JL. The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller, (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002) p.7. Hereafter referred to in the text as RN, followed by 
page number. 
40 The Oxford English Dictionary lists five main definitions with several variations of these in the 
entry for speculate. Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 171 
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Restlessness, Becoming, Logic, Trembling, Sense and We 
Nancy states that “Hegel is the inaugural thinker of the contemporary world.” (RN, 
p. 3). This world is one of individuals separate and alone, with the securities of 
religious community and a totality of knowledge no longer available. These 
individuals are forever on the quest to find themselves but for Nancy, “”self” 
cannot precede itself, because “self” is precisely the form and movement of a 
relation to self.” (RN, p. 4) Self for Nancy is not something that could be lost, to be 
found further up along the path ahead of us but is the very movement of self-
relating to self, the opposite of a destination. However, for Nancy, the description 
of the restlessness of the movement of self-relating to self in Hegel is an accurate 
description of experience, even if this description is then slotted into Hegel’s 
dialectical progress of history and larger system.  
 
Nancy states that in the following ways; “absence of beginning and absence of 
end, absence of foundation and absence of completion, Hegel is the opposite of a 
‘totalitarian’ thinker.” (RN, p.9). For Nancy, Hegel’s thought is not totalitarian, it 
can access and describe perfectly a state of restlessness which has no beginning 
or end, foundation or completion, whatever the eventual use this description is 
put to. Nancy considers the frequently made accusation that Hegel presupposes 
“the absolute” and then pretends to find it, but counters that the absolute as 
Hegel describes it, is purely and simply the experience of being, the implication 
being that as an experience we all undergo it is impossible not to bring it to our 
thinking, sometimes even fooling ourselves that we have found it. For Nancy, 
“everything is in the absolute restlessness of becoming” (RN, p. 12).  For Nancy 
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then, Hegel’s description of becoming is identical to the restless movement of self 
in relation to itself that Nancy wants.  Even though Hegel wants to then slot this 
description of becoming into an onward progression leading to a final perfect 
situation of Absolute Knowledge, Nancy still values its accuracy as a description of 
experience. 
 
Nancy states that: 
with the name “logic” Hegel reclaims what has continuously constituted the logos of 
philosophy: […] logos signifies that no identity is given […] and that identity and unity are 
always […] the movement of self-identification and self-unification. (RN, p. 21)  
 
For Nancy, what Hegel’s logic allows us to see, whatever its intention, is in fact 
that identity is not simply available, that is, identity is always the endless, restless 
movement between that self and not-self. This movement is therefore a unity of 
sorts but it is a restless durationless unity (durationless because it neither fully 
exists nor fully does not exist) a glimpse or a snapshot of which is mistaken for a 
permanent fixed unity or a concept. In this way for Nancy, thought as that which 
posits the passage or movement between itself and another thing, is in fact the 
absolute, here and now. The absolute is not the final destination of a refined and 
evolved thinking to be reached only after many dialectical repetitions but is the 
medium of the movement between self and not-self, it is thought itself.  
 
Nancy considers the self as found in its relation to the other (because Nancy is 
referring to Hegel’s conception of self he talks about the, singular, other here) and 
makes the connection with trembling in Hegel’s philosophy: “this being-self-
through-the-other, gives itself as that by which ‘substance ….is made to tremble.’” 
89 
 
(RN, p.43) 41 For Nancy, the presentation of the self as that which is in the passage 
between itself and the other is not a unified whole as Hegel would have it, but a 
trembling between the poles of self and other. Nancy elaborates: 
Trembling is like the unity of pain and joy, - like a unity that would not be a unity and could 
in no way be one, and that would be one, would resemble itself, only to the extent that it 
would only be vibration differing from itself. The self has its unity in trembling of itself. (RN, 
p. 44) 
 
The apparent unity of the self that Hegel sees is in fact the occurrence of the 
trembling, as if actually seeing a trail of movement between self and not self, 
captured like a blur in a photograph. 42 For Hegel, however this blur is a third entity 
that has the same presence, the same reality as the self and the other, it is the 
concept that would unite the opposing beings. For Nancy, we “could register in 
Hegel a whole series of tremblings […] we would also have to notice that Hegel 
does not properly give the concept of this image. It comes to him in those places 
where categories fail and themselves tremble.” (RN, p. 44). For Nancy, everywhere 
Hegel finds or creates a concept there is a misunderstood trembling, and 
everywhere that Hegel’s own text itself fails and trembles (where remarks and 
additions are forced to deal with overflow and themselves disrupt the triadic 
structure) there is trembling resisting concept. 
                                                          
41 Hegel citation from Hegel, G.W.F Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Part III of the Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). P. 94 
42 Nancy does not reference Kierkegaard so it is not possible to be sure if he is referring to 
Kierkegaardian trembling here. Trembling as a theme also crops up Nancy’s essay on Hegel on 
hypnotism “Identity and Trembling” but again Nancy does not reference Kierkegaardian 
trembling. Finally, a further possible unacknowledged possible Kierkegaardian reference occurs 
in Being Singular Plural in the use of the notion of the “leap”; this reference and the possibility of 
opening up a consideration of Nancy’s unacknowledged relationship to Kierkegaard is discussed 
in the conclusion. 
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Nancy observes that as Hegel points out there are two possible significations of 
the word sense, one pertaining to the organs by which we access the world and 
the data they supply and one pertaining to having a general notion or overview of 
something. Nancy continues that; “the sense of the word sense is […] in the 
passage of each one of the two significations into the other. This passage will not 
allow itself to be grasped as a third independent situation.” (RN, p. 46) The word 
sense will always have two meanings and we will always understand in it its play 
between the two, but this play, this passage is not a thing that is separate to these 
two senses that can be considered as a third term with equal presence as we saw 
above. This play is mediation and as such it is beyond number. Nancy continues: 
The decisive concept at the heart of mediation […] is designated by a term [Aufhebung, that 
has] the remarkable property of conjoining two opposite senses, and of thus being itself, in 
itself and ultimately upon itself, the operation of the mediation of sense in general.” (RN, 
p.51) 
 
For Nancy, the remarkable property of the term Aufhebung is not a strange and 
unexpected delight that occurs in this and a few other remarkable words, as Hegel 
has it, but in fact the very operation of sense that occurs in every word but which 
is more noticeable here because it mediates words with opposing meanings. In 
this way for Nancy, “the dialectic is only an operation, and sublation is only this 
strange autosupressive category, to the extent that one isolates in the analysis the 
formal or operative moment.” (RN, p. 52) The dialectic, Hegel’s chain of sublated 
opposites, each third term becoming the first of the next triad, is in fact not a chain 
at all but for Nancy is the result of a logic which freezes or isolates the operation 
of sense at the very moment of its operation and mistakenly takes it for a third 
term.  
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For Nancy, “the absolute is between us. It is there in itself and for itself, and, one 
might say, the self is between us.” (RN, p. 78) For Nancy, the absolute is not a 
distant state of perfected knowledge to be reached at the end of a chain of 
dialectical operations but what is right now between us. It is that there is 
understanding or sense between us and that there is us, that we are in relation. 
The Self is movement back and forth along the passage between possible 
significations and between itself and what it is not. It is not a destination reached 
by journey out of myself through the other and back into myself, or rather it is 
that journey but constantly repeated with no final destination. Furthermore, at 
the same time that journey is being undertaken from the opposite direction by 
the other (and in fact by multiple others). I am the unrest between myself and 
others and for Nancy I am nothing else. For Nancy, Hegel in some way knows this, 
the unrest of the self is described everywhere in his work, but never left as unrest. 
Instead this movement is always frozen in a dialectical snapshot and slotted into 
the great dialectical chain of history. 
 
Having explicated Nancy’s meditations offered in The Restlessness of the Negative, 
the following picture has emerged. For Nancy, Hegel, is the inaugural thinker of 
the contemporary world of the restless self and despite his totalising system, is 
not a totalitarian thinker. This is because for Nancy what Hegel’s thought offers us 
is a description of restless becoming and it exposes, however unintentionally that 
identity is not given. For Nancy, Hegel mistakes the “trembling” between Self and 
what is not Self for a third thing, an object. For Nancy, the play between meanings 
is an event of sense and again for Nancy Hegel mistakes this play, this passage is 
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mistaken for a third thing or an object. For Nancy the situation he calls “the  we 
or the between us” is what Hegel wants in Absolute Knowledge but here and now. 
In order to consolidate these readings it will be instructive to consider two other 
thinkers from the French Twentieth Century Philosophical scene, Derrida and 
Foucault, considering Derrida’s Semiology and Foucault’s Genealogy as Hegelian 
critique.  
 
Derrida’s Semiology and Foucault’s Genealogy as Hegelian Critique  
In “The Pit and The Pyramid: Introduction to Hegelian Semiology”, Derrida 
describes  
a typical movement of the Hegelian text […] the juxtaposition of an empirical content with 
a henceforth abstract form, an exterior form superimposed on that which it should 
organize. This is manifest particularly in unnoticed contradictions, contradictions without 
concepts and not reducible to the speculative movement of contradiction.43  
 
For Derrida, then, Hegel’s attempt to think difference ends in imposing a form on 
what it should be organising and investigating. Judith Butler picks up this point in 
Subjects of Desire, stating that Derrida “accepts the Hegelian project to think 
difference itself, but wants to argue that Hegel’s own method for achieving that 
goal effectively precludes its realization.”44  Like Nancy, Derrida sees Hegel’s 
presuppositions as guiding and forming and nowhere is this more clear than 
where contradictions occur in Hegel’s texts which are not resolved or sublated, 
either because Hegel has apparently not noticed them or because they are 
unsublatable. 
                                                          
43 Derrida, J. “The Pit and The Pyramid” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1982), p. 102. 
44 Butler, J. Subjects of Desire, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 178 
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For Derrida, “the theory of the signs belongs to the third moment […] the sign, 
then, will be an agency or essential structure of the Idea’s return to self-
presence.”45 The sign as the name of the signifier and the signified is a sublation, 
an Aufhebung and for Derrida the sign will therefore be an imposition not a 
finding. The need for a third term to name the play or difference between the 
signified and the signifier arises for Derrida from an assumption made not just by 
Hegel: “In determining Being as presence (presence in the form of the object, or 
self presence under the rubric of consciousness), metaphysics could treat the sign 
only as a transition.”46 The play or difference between sign and signifier does not 
have presence and as Being or identity has presence as a prerequisite, a third term 
is needed to convert this play or difference in order to be able to think it.  
 
Both Nancy and Derrida’s projects can be said to be characterised by an intent to 
think the non-presence of that which Hegel wishes to sublate and convert into 
something with presence, an intent to think the being of non-being. However, 
while Nancy lets the wreckage lie and risk that when we read him we miss those 
occasions where he has allowed significations to be in play, Derrida appears less 
reticent. As Bruce Baugh points out, “very much like the surrealists, Derrida 
champions a process of infinite self-negation and infinite becoming-other.”47 
Derrida prefers to disrupt and prevent a third moment of the dialectic by 
championing infinite self-negation through a more active programme of 
                                                          
45 Derrida, J. Ibid. p. 74 
46 Derrida, J. Ibid. p. 71 
47 Baugh, Bruce. French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 
p. 134 
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signposting significations in play, most notably with his term différance and with 
disruptive presentations such as the double columns of separate texts in works 
such as Glas or the essay “Tympan”.  
 
In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” Foucault describes his notion of genealogy and 
whilst he does not explicitly name Hegel the essay is frequently read as critique of 
Hegel’s thought.48 For Bruce Baugh, in the essay, Foucault “eschews Hegelian 
History in favour of a genealogy that analyses the configurations of power that 
result from the haphazard play of forces.”49 It is the play and multiplicity that 
Foucault wishes to draw attention to and preserve that will prove useful here.  
In the essay, Foucault declares that,  
Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the 
philosopher might compare itself to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the 
contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite 
teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for “origins.50 
 
For Foucault, borrowing heavily from Nietzsche, genealogy is not opposed to 
history as such, that is it is not opposed to the reading of events chronologically, 
but what it is opposed to is the imposition of ideas and schemas that are external 
or post hoc to what has been found by the historian or the person performing the 
genealogy.  
 
 
                                                          
48 “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” first appeared in Hommage à Jean Hyppolite in 1972. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, Hippolyte’s reading of Hegel had a profound effect on Foucault. 
49 Baugh, Ibid, p. 167 
50 Foucault, M. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in The Foucault Reader, trans. Donald. Bouchard 
and Sherry Simon, (London: Penguin, 1984) p. 77 
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For Foucault, despite the name he gives to his technique, 
Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a 
people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of decent is to maintain passing 
events in their proper dispersion.51  
 
For Foucault, the genealogist would be the observer of passing events who would 
keep them held in their dispersal rather than ordering them according a structure 
such as the dialectical view of history in which humanity passes through epochs 
each of which resolves the contradictions of the previous one, finally evolving into 
a perfected state of Absolute Knowledge.  
 
As critical to Foucault as the dispersal of events, is the recognition of the 
multiplicity of their beginnings. According to Butler, Foucault “takes issue with 
narratives of historical experience that presume that the multiplicity of present 
historical phenomena can be derived from a single origin.”52  For Foucault himself, 
“what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of 
their origin; it is the dissension of things.”53 For Foucault, the idea that things or 
historical events begin from a single point does not reflect what we find when we 
look at the actual beginnings of things. Even a seemingly easily definable 
beginning, such as the popularly held idea the First World War began with 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (an event we can pin down to an exact 
time and place) is an imposition of the desire for a singular origin onto what is in 
                                                          
51 Foucault, Ibid. p.81 
52 Butler, Ibid, p.185 
53 Foucault, Ibid, p.79 
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fact a multiplicity of events and factors. A dialectical ordering of history 
presupposes a beginning point against which an opposition can occur. 
Foucault’s project, can similarly to Nancy and Derrida’s, be characterised as one 
which would seek to show the multiplicity, difference or non-being of that which 
Hegel would seek to show as singular, self-identical presence. Foucault, like 
Derrida, also proposes a method to highlight difference and offers Genealogy as a 
way to read difference in the chronological ordering of events. Nancy’s project by 
contrast is notable for its general reluctance to use neologisms with the notable 
exception of Being Singular Plural, frequently working with a concept in play 
without fully stripping it of its previous problematic significations, or to propose 
methods, instead preferring to evoke an experience which reflects the method.  
In his attempts to show multiplicity, difference and non-being, Nancy seems keen 
to avoid a potential trap which Bruce Baugh outlines in discussing Derrida on 
Foucault and Levinas, 
Neither Levinas nor Foucault, can say what he wants to say, and in fact in trying to say it 
they just say the opposite of what they intended. This dialectical reversal is very familiar to 
readers of Hegel, and an indication of the extent of the debt that Derridean deconstruction 
owes to Hegelian dialectics.”54 
 
In trying to signpost difference, there is always a risk of inadvertently taking up an 
anti-position to Hegel and supplying what would be the anti-thesis to Hegel’s 
thesis, in this way critique of Hegel always risks being swept up in the dialectical 
process itself. Nancy’s project can then be read as being concerned with a 
                                                          
54 Baugh, Ibid, p. 121 
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minimisation of this risk, employing a generous reticence in what seems like a 
more passive offering the exposure of multiplicity and difference. 55 
  
                                                          
55 Nancy uses this expression in the essay “Shattered Love” explicated in the previous chapter in 
which Nancy says that what is required to think Love in all its shatters is a generous reticence, 
generous because it would allow all meanings of the word to function and reticent because it 
would not seek to convert the multiplicity into a singular meaning. Nancy, Jean-Luc. “Shattered 
Love” in The Inoperative Community, trans. Lisa Garbus and Simona Sawhney ,(Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 82 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
Reflections 
Having explicated Nancy’s two texts on Hegel’s thought, The Speculative Remark 
and The Restlessness of the Negative, and also considered alongside these, 
Malabou on Plasticity and Derrida and Foucault on Semiological and Historical 
Difference, I will next draw out the themes of the multiple significations of the 
event of sense and the restlessness movement of relation.  
 
In the explication of The Speculative Remark, the following main points were 
highlighted. For Nancy, a sleight of hand takes place in Hegel’s phrasing in the 
Remark leading Nancy to state that the Aufhebung is a site of suppression. For 
Nancy, Hegel’s dealing with the Aufhebung in a remark is significant, as is Hegel’s 
decision to regard words that are speculative as chance linguistic quirks and not 
to investigate this as such. Nancy regards Hegel’s use of the syllogism as 
inappropriate as it aims to suppress multiple significations into single objects. For 
Nancy, however, the wreckage this attempt fruitfully points to, is or are the 
multiple significations it tries to suppress. Chance plays a key role and for Nancy 
meaning most often happens in unplanned and unexpected moments. Finally, 
Nancy acknowledges the foreshadowing of his concern with restlessness in 
Hegel’s thought. For Nancy, Hegel’s Aufhebung, in its attempt to resolve 
problematic opposing pairs in fact exposes the multiple significations at play in an 
event of sense. Malabou’s notion of plasticity offers a reading of the Aufhebung 
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in which the unity is originary rather than given as a result of an operation and 
would appear to be in sympathy with Nancy on the inappropriateness of the 
Aufhebung, but crucially Malabou offers a reading of relation as between a binary 
pair. For Hegel, meaning comes from the resolving of binary difference in a logical 
operation whereas for Nancy meaning itself is the exposing, most fruitfully when 
occurring by chance and therefore always undeclared, of difference, or multiple 
significations in relation. 
 
In the explication of The Restlessness of The Negative, the following main points 
were highlighted. For Nancy, Hegel is the inaugural thinker of the contemporary 
world in which the self is on an endless quest to find itself. For Nancy, Hegel is the 
opposite of a totalitarian thinker, despite his totalising system because within it 
Hegel does offer for Nancy a description of the restlessness of becoming. For 
Nancy, Hegel, whatever his intentions does illuminate for us that identity is not 
given. For Nancy, self is in fact a trembling between self and what is not self, and 
this passage is mistaken by Hegel and generally, for an actual object. For Nancy, 
the play between the various possible meanings of sense demonstrates an event 
of sense-making, what Hegel calls an Aufhebung, itself. For Nancy, “we” or that 
there is a between us is the very occurrence, here and now of what Hegel wants 
in Absolute Knowledge. For Nancy, identity is not given and this is exposed for us 
by Hegel’s project which mistakes the restless trembling between self at not self 
for a singular object. Derrida recognises that Hegel’s system cannot account for 
this trembling or play between significations as it has no presence and therefore 
must convert it into a third term which it can speak of, giving Hegel’s theory of the 
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sign as an example. Foucault also recognises that Hegel imposes a structure onto 
that which he is investigating and proposes Genealogy as method to keep the 
various events of history in play in their dispersal, just as Derrida proposes 
methods to preserve Semiological difference such as his term différance. Nancy’s 
highlighting of difference and multiplicity is by comparison more passive, 
employing a generous reticence. 
 
These points are picked up by Victoria Fairfield and Emilia Angelova and point us 
towards the proposed readings of the following chapters. In "The re- in 
recognition: Hegelian returns" Victoria Farefield considers Nancy’s reading of 
Hegel’s dialectical logic (among others) and her focus is the moment in which Self-
Consciousness returns to itself following its interaction of the other, the moment 
in which Self-Consciousness completes its own dialectic as laid out by Hegel in The 
Phenomenology. For Farefield,  
Nancy’s appropriation of the Hegelian dialectic as a means to rethink the relation between 
individual and community does not reproduce a structure of binary oppositions between 
self and other, identity and difference, but rather makes such a structure impossible to 
sustain.56  
 
For Farefield, Nancy’s non-binary reading of the dialectic is one in which there is 
no return to self or completion of the dialectic of self. However, neither is there 
the expected binary opposite of a return to self which would be abandonment to 
that which is wholly not self. Self for Farefield’s Nancy is that which is neither 
returned to nor not returned to. In “Nancy and Hegel: Freedom, Democracy and 
                                                          
56 Victoria Farefield "The re- in recognition: Hegelian returns" in Distinktion: Journal of Social 
Theory Volume 13, Issue 1, 2012, p. 132. 
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the Loss of the Power to Signify”, Emilia Angelova considers how Nancy’s reading 
of Hegel confirms for him, a loss of the power to signify and the implications of 
this with regard to the notions of Freedom and Democracy.  
In an unorthodox Hegel, for whom the system does not complete itself in the present, 
because it depends on loss as its operative ground, Nancy reads loss and the negativity of 
spirit as mutually co-constitutive, co-ontological and thus as an unrest, since it can never 
close itself" 57  
 
For Angelova, what Nancy reads in Hegel (which is not the same as Nancy making 
a claim about what Hegel says) is a system that does not in fact complete, where 
the possibility of signification is lost. For Angelova’s Nancy, the negativity which 
prevents the completion of the dialectic (or the progression of spirit) is 
characterised by its perpetual unrest. Therefore, the challenge laid down by these 
two pieces would be to read The Phenomenology of Spirit for an account of Self 
that does not complete and Elements of The Philosophy of Right for an account of 
The State which remains in unrest. 
 
Nancy’s underlying concern with relational being, that is being understood as 
always in relation and always in unrest, is behind his characteristic readings of 
Hegel in The Speculative Remark and The Restlessness of the Negative. In The 
Speculative Remark Nancy’s concern with relational being focuses his attention on 
the multiple significations of sense that Hegel’s Aufhebung suppresses, as to 
understand that sense is an event of multiple significations requires an 
understanding of being as always in relation to multiple other beings. In The 
                                                          
57 Angelova, E, “Nancy and Hegel: Freedom, Democracy and the Loss of the Power to Signify.” in 
Nancy and The Political, ed Sanja Dejanovic, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p.68 
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Restlessness of the Negative, Nancy’s concern with relational being focuses his 
attention towards practices which will best expose the multiple significations of 
sense given the problem that relational being does not have presence as it is a 
restless trembling or movement. For Nancy, being as that which is relational, casts 
both sense and identity as those in which multiple significations are held together 
in a ceaseless restless movement which does not have presence and it this 
distinctive understanding of relation that must be borne in mind in the following 
chapters in which Nancy’s thought will considered alongside Hegel on The State 
and Self-Consciousness. 
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Chapter Three 
Nancy and Hegel on Community 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Problematic 
In this chapter, I shall offer a reading of Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
which exposes an account of The State in unrest, which I shall argue, is the very 
situation that Nancy terms Community in his essay “The Inoperative Community”. 
In the previous chapter I established Nancy’s distinctive reading of Hegel in the 
texts The Speculative Remark and The Restlessness of the Negative, offering 
readings in which l drew out that for Nancy Sense and Identity is understood as 
the situation of  multiple significations held together in restless movement, a 
problematic situation that has no presence.  
 
Following the clue that arose from the reading of “Shattered Love” in the 
Introduction (that Elements of The Philosophy of Right and The Phenomenology of 
Spirit could be read for the expositions they offer of Relational Being), a new 
challenge emerged. The challenge for the thesis thus became the task of reading 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right for an account of The State which remains in 
unrest and The Phenomenology of Spirit for an account of Self that does not 
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complete. Providing an account of The State which remains in unrest, will 
therefore be the task of this chapter but finding it will be problematic as for Nancy 
it will be exposed in Hegel’s text rather than given. However, a State which 
remains in unrest, I shall argue, is precisely what Relational Being looks like in a 
given group, a situation Nancy terms Community. 
 
What complicates this task is that not only will this account of The State remaining 
in unrest not be given in Hegel’s text, (he is precisely trying to show us how The 
State is in fact complete) but an account of how to expose it will also not be given 
in Nancy’s work as such. There is also nothing in the secondary literature on Hegel 
or Nancy with a direct focus on this task. However, a clue as to how to proceed 
can be found in Peter Fenves foreword to Nancy’s The Experience of Freedom.1 In 
his foreword, Peter Fenves asks us to consider Nancy’s exposition of freedom as a 
palimpsest in which Kant and Hume’s attempts to think freedom are clearly visible 
through Nancy’s text. A palimpsest is created when the original hand lettered text 
of a book or scroll is scrubbed out or otherwise removed and new text is written 
on the now blank pages, as in the reuse of medieval books and scrolls. Sometimes 
these underlying texts are discovered when the codexes or manuscripts are 
examined using modern techniques and in other cases trace chemicals in the ink 
of the original texts react and reassert the original text in a ghostly echo. Therefore 
the way forward will be to read Hegel’s text for an account of a State which 
                                                          
1Nancy, J.L. The Experience of Freedom, trans. Bridget MacDonald, Stanford: Stanford University 
press, 1993), p.20 
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remains in unrest, that asserts itself through the surface of Hegel’s text. To clarify 
this, I will then turn to Nancy’s essay, “The Jurisdiction of The Hegelian Monarch” 
which comments on the role of the Monarch or Sovereign in Hegel’s State, as this 
is the nearest we can get to an account that will even provisionally delineate the 
relation between Nancy’s community and The State in unrest. This then will be 
the second task of this chapter. 
 
I shall begin by explicating Hegel’s description of The State as it appears in 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, beginning with a condensed summary of the 
trajectory of Elements of the Philosophy of Right, and the place of the discussion 
of The State within it. Attending to Morin’s observation in the Introduction, 
regarding the way in which Nancy reads Hegel such that the overlying logic is 
allowed to function whilst the underlying disruption is none the less observed, I 
will draw out the places in the text in which Hegel’s logic and structure begin to 
unravel and reveal a State in unrest.2 
 
Next, I will explicate Nancy’s description of Community as it appears in his essay 
“The Inoperative Community”, beginning with a summary of the collection of the 
same name that the essay appears in and its relation to the other essays in it. 
Following the advice of Nancy’s commentators in the Introduction that in Nancy’s 
writing there is an undeclared engagement with Hegel taking place and that this 
writing is purposefully non-dialectical or non-systematic in structure which 
                                                          
2 Morin, M-E. Jean-Luc Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012),p.10 
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reflects the way Nancy believes Sense itself functions I shall draw out the 
undeclared engagement in “The Inoperative Community” with Hegel’s theory of 
The State, paying attention to the way in which Nancy’s non-dialectical text allows 
this engagement to be exposed.3 
 
Finally, in conclusion I will outline the relationship between Nancy’s account of 
Community and The State in unrest, drawing on Nancy’s essay “The Jurisdiction of 
The Hegelian Monarch” and contributions from Nancy’s commentators in the 
Anglophone reception, Roupa and Devisch. I will draw out how this relationship 
exposes Nancy’s concern with Relational Being as that in which both sense and 
identity are those in which multiple significations are held together in a ceaseless 
restless movement, pre-emptively sketching the crucial role of Nancy’s thought of 
Being Singular Plural to be discussed in the following chapter. 
  
                                                          
3 Rugo, D. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Thinking of Otherness, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) and 
Hutchens, B.C. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy, (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), p.27 
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3.2 The State in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
Hegel’s concept of The State is expounded in his text, Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right, which in short is concerned with freedom, which for Hegel is experienced 
in the fullest sense when living an Ethical Life as a participant in The State. 4 The 
progression to this fullest sense forms the trajectory of Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right, with the various parts and sections of the book describing stages which 
appear initially as the final destination and fullest sense of freedom but which are 
ultimately moved beyond.5 
 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right is one of Hegel’s later works, appearing in 1821 
after The Phenomenology of Spirit,  Science of Logic and at least the first edition 
of Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. The Phenomenology of Spirit and 
The Science of Logic were published as works of philosophy but the Encyclopaedia 
and Elements were both intended as guides for students undertaking Hegel’s 
lectures; the Encyclopaedia for his students in Heidelberg and Elements for Hegel’s 
students in his subsequent post in Berlin. However, the sharp relief of the complex 
structure of Hegel’s textbook, is somewhat blurred by his own numerous and 
                                                          
4 Hegel, G.W.F Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B.Nisbet, ed. Allan Wood, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), referred to in the text as EPR, with paragraph 
number denoted by §). In Hegel’s text many of his sections have the same name as the concept 
he is advancing in it that section. To differentiate which I am talking about I will refer the concept 
as The State and the book section as The State and will apply this to similar concept /title 
pairings. 
5 As is typical of Hegel’s large texts there is a notable tripartite structure to Elements, however 
this structure becomes increasingly more complex as the text progresses, please see Figure 1, 
Diagram of Structure of Elements of Philosophy of Right, in Appendix 1. 
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frequently lengthy additional remarks (known as the Anmerkungen) and those of 
some of his students (known as the Zusätze) made in each new publication of the 
text to the otherwise succinct short numbered paragraphs that the text is actually 
comprised of. The reader is immediately faced with the problem of whether to 
read each Anmerkungen as it appears or to try to grasp the original trajectory first 
before accommodating the interruptions, some of which run to several pages 
whereas the paragraphs they are appended to are rarely more that ten lines long. 
Added to this are the notes from Hegel’s students which can vary in relevanceand 
can be lengthy , all of which menas  that the challenge of maintaing the trajectory 
of the text becomes quite substantial.6  In order to contextualise the section in 
which Hegel’s discssion of The State appears, I will offer a summary of the three 
main divisons of the text and then a summary of the division in which it appears, 
namely, of Part 3 The Ethical Life. 
 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right is divided into three main divisions, Part 1, 
Abstract Right, Part 2, Morality and Part 3, The Ethical Life. Part 1, Abstract Right, 
is concerned with Free Will. In this conception, freedom means to be able to 
choose and self-determine and does not exist only when favourable external 
factors allow it, but is instead something which exists when we claim our right to 
it; we are free when we will freely whatever the situation. In this sense Free Will 
is entirely formal and abstract; despite this it is, however, still violable. Part 2, 
                                                          
6 Dudley Knowles does claim however that “no-one has demonstrated that these secondary 
sources are unreliable (which says something about Hegel’s style of lecturing as well as testifying 
to the assiduity of his students” Knowles, Dudley. Hegel and the Philosophy of Right, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. xvi 
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Morality, is concerned with Moral Will. This is what we will when we take 
responsibility for protecting the freedom of others alongside our own, when we 
will to promote the Free Will of others. However, for Hegel, if we will the freedom 
of others alongside our own, because we believe we should act only in accordance 
with what we would will to be universal law and therefore we are barred from 
wishing for freedom just for ourselves, all we have achieved is the empty 
formalism of duty for duty’s sake that Hegel attributes to Kant. Part 3, The Ethical 
Life is intended as the resolution of Abstract Right and Morality. However, this 
gargantuan third part dwarfs the two preceding parts and accounts for well over 
half the entire text of Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The Ethical Life is 
concerned with how we can will freely for ourselves and morally for others 
without contradiction and not from duty alone in full understanding that the two 
are in fact inseparable. For Hegel, there are three “moments” of Ethical Life and 
in the first two, which he calls The Family and Civil Society and which he describes 
in the sections of the same name, we achieve this only partially. However, we 
achieve the fullest expression of Ethical Life in the moment which Hegel calls The 
State and which he describes in the section of the same name.  
 
In the section of Part 3, The Ethical Life entitled The Family, Hegel expounds his 
concept of The Family by which Hegel means marriage (by which he means the 
legalised union of differently gendered humans.)7In marriage, we unify the 
                                                          
7 As Dudley Knowles points out the prime objective here is that marriage is shown as the 
“objective establishment” of the union of two committed partners, the only logical reason they 
have two be male and female is that Hegel believes men and women have different innate 
characteristics and wants these to be resolved in marriage too. Knowles, Dudley. Hegel and the 
Philosophy of Right, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
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welfare of our partner and ourselves and create a new sphere of shared freedom. 
In the section of Part 3, The Ethical Life entitled Civil Society, Hegel expounds his 
concept of Civil Society as that in which we unify the welfare of ourselves and 
others, in two ways through two different social institutions. Hegel calls the first 
one The Police (by which he means not just the public body charged with 
preventing and dealing with crime specifically, but also public authorities charged 
with what he calls other “needs” such as education) and the second The 
Corporations (by which Hegel mean something like a guild of tradesmen).  
However in the moments of both The Family and Civil Society, the unifying of our 
own welfare with that of others is driven by primarily by self-interest, benefits to 
others are purely secondary effects. In the section of Part 3, The Ethical Life 
entitled The State, Hegel expounds the concept that forms the resolution of these 
two moments, and provides what Hegel believes will be a non self-interested 
unifying of welfares, which will show why both the concept of and the section, The 
Ethical Life, is the resolution to Abstract Right and Morality. 
 
In order to summarise the trajectory of Elements, the full complexity of the 
structure has been necessarily condensed, however it is worth commenting that 
Abstract Right and Morality are also each divided into groupings of three 
numbered sections and in Abstract Right, two of these sections are subdivided 
into three lettered sub-sections. The trajectory of the entire text can be given by 
summarising the resolution of each part, which is essentially, what I have done 
above. However, as we shall see in Part 3, Section 3, Subsection A, The State, it 
will become increasingly hard to follow the structure of the concepts under 
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discussion. Already in Part 3 the resolution, which one would expect to be singular, 
has been shown to be in fact made up of three sections, which correspond to three 
more moments. One of these sections will in fact be further subdivided several 
more times before we reach the final point of (conceptual) resolution for all 
preceding parts, sections, myriad sub-sections and their corresponding moments. 
This final logical point, which it must be noted, is not at the end of text, will be the 
sub-section entitled The Power of The Sovereign. 
 
The State 
Until now we have had only a working description of what The State does; it allows 
us to will freely for ourselves and morally for others without contradiction and not 
from duty alone but in full understanding that the two are in fact inseparable. 
However, before preceding further into the complicated structure of Hegel’s 
explication of it, it will be useful to set out a working description of what The State 
is for Hegel. Stephen Houlgate explains that: 
The State is the union of fully autonomous, rights bearing individuals who consciously and 
willingly identify with one another simply on the basis of common membership of that 
union; that is simply on the basis of common citizenship.8  
 
The State therefore is a special union in which the members consciously and 
willingly identify with one another and thereby unify their welfare, not as a 
beneficial side effect from an action taken primarily out of self-interest but 
because they share common citizenship. For Hegel, The State as this special union 
                                                          
8 Houlgate, Stephen. An Introduction to Hegel; Freedom, Truth and History. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991), p. 207 
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is “the actuality of the Ethical Idea”9 and furthermore “it makes no difference what 
is or was the historical origin of The State in general (or rather of any particular 
state with its rights and determinations)” (EPR, remark to § 258).  For Hegel, this 
special union is not associated with a particular style of government or political 
doctrine but is what happens when a nation or country is constituted in such a 
way that citizens unify their welfare through their shared common citizenship, 
which for Hegel is the making manifest of the Ethical Idea, the attaining of the 
highest sphere of freedom. For Hegel this is made possible in The State (having 
failed or rather not fully completed in Civil Society and also in The Family), by the 
unifying power of The Sovereign. 
 
Hegel’s explication of The State is laid out in three lettered sub-sections but unlike 
previously, it is not clear that these three sections follow the established pattern, 
in which, the third subsection is the resolution of the preceding two which oppose 
one another.10 In sub-section A, Constitutional Law, Hegel expounds the structure 
of The State. In sub-section B International Law, Hegel considers the relations of 
The State with other states, specifically the mutual recognition of each other’s 
Sovereignty by a pair of States in the act of war. In sub-section C, World History, 
Hegel looks at the development of The State through different epochs.  B and C 
do not further subdivide but A Constitutional Law divides into two further 
subdivisions, I The Internal Constitution and II External Sovereignty, the latter of 
                                                          
9 Hegel, G.W.F Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B.Nisbet, ed. Allan Wood, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), § 257, hereafter referred to in the text as EPR, followed by 
paragraph number. 
10 Please see Appendix 1. Diagram of Structure of Elements of Philosophy of Right. 
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which is concerned with the State’s relation with other states and therefore covers 
much of the same ground as B International Law.  The Internal Constitution is then 
further divided into a The Power of The Sovereign, b The Executive Power and c 
The Legislative Power. The Executive and Legislative Powers describe powers that 
belong to the Sovereign but which are deputised to various administrative bodies 
to allow them to perform their functions. It is in The Power of The Sovereign, that 
Hegel believes he has finally given the description how the Sovereign provides the 
unity between Abstract Right and Morality, and resolves all the pairs of opposition 
we have encountered so far. 
 
The State, Section A. Constitutional Law, I The Internal Constitution, a The Power of the 
Sovereign 
For Hegel, “the constitution [of The State] is rational in so far as The State 
differentiates and determines activity within itself in accordance with the nature 
of the concept.” (EPR, § 272) This means that for Hegel constitution of The State 
should consist of three elements in a relation such that two of these elements are 
differing internal parts and the third is their resolution. For Hegel,  
 “The political state is therefore divided into three substantial elements: 
(a) The power to determine and establish the universal - the legislative power; 
(b) The subsumption of particular spheres and individual cases under the universal 
- the executive power; 
(c) Subjectivity as the ultimate decision of the will - the power of the Sovereign, in 
which the  different powers are united in an individual unity which is thus the apex and 
beginning of the whole, i.e. of constitutional monarchy.” (EPR §273) 
 
The Legislative power is concerned with the drawing up of the laws of The State 
for the benefit of citizenry and therefore this power establishes the universal 
good. The Executive power is concerned with execution of the legislature drawn 
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up by the Legislative power in order to bring together particular interests with the 
universal good. For example, the drawing up of and the enforcement of a speed 
limit restriction is done to benefit not just the particular interests of say, the 
people who lobbied for it in the first place or the particular people using a 
particular road it applies to, but to benefit anyone using roads in general. In this 
way, for Hegel, the particular is subsumed under the universal. What is crucial for 
Hegel however is that the Sovereign ratifies the law via their decision, both when 
the law  is drawn up and when the Sovereign lends their name for it to executed 
under as a result of their decision, thereby providing the unity between the 
universal and the particular. Whilst a government could also provide the 
ratification of, and the authority under which, to execute the law, for Hegel this 
must be done by the Sovereign so that the unity between the universal and the 
particular occurs in a single entity, via a single decision. In this way for Hegel the 
particular which was subsumed under the universal in the second step is also 
present, or as Hegel has it the universal is present in and for itself. The Sovereign 
then, is a truly exceptional being; specifically they are, and are the only being 
capable of being, a universal particular. For Hegel in this way the structure of The 
State will then reflect the structure of the concept, the Legislative and Executive 
powers are moments in the concept, as are the universal and the particular, and 
the Sovereign will be their synthesis; the special unifying power of the Sovereign 
is that of a sublation.  
 
For Hegel, this third moment in the power of the Sovereign has a further 
consequence: 
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The third moment in the power of the Sovereign concerns the universal in and for itself, 
which is present subjectively in the conscience of the monarch and objectively in the 
constitution and laws as a whole. To this extent the power of the Sovereign presupposes 
the other moments, just as it is presupposed by each of them” (EPR, §285) 
 
The universal in itself and for itself is present in the Sovereign in two ways, 
subjectively in their conscience which is used to make the decision and objectively 
in the laws they ratify which are then executed in their name. However, despite 
the temporal sequence expected, that a law must be ratified before it can be 
executed, and the fact that Hegel orders these moments numerically and 
explicates them in that numerical order, these moments each presuppose the 
other for Hegel; they are  coexistent. Until these three coexistent moments are 
present, then a national grouping is just that; it is only a State, that is, it only 
attains its Sovereignty, if the three moments of the power of the Sovereign are 
present. 
 
The State, Section B, International Law and C, World History  
For Hegel, “the nation state is the spirit in its substantial rationality and immediate 
actuality, and is therefore the absolute power on earth, each state is consequently 
a Sovereign and independent entity on relation to others” (EPR, §331). A State is 
an expression of the Ethical Idea and therefore an immediate and actual 
instantiation of Spirit. However, there is, on earth, more than one State. Two 
national groupings which have achieved their Sovereignty will recognise each 
other’s Sovereignty absolutely and for Hegel “the fact that States reciprocally 
recognise each other as such remains, even in war” (EPR, §338). When two States 
are drawn into conflict it is not because one does not recognise the other, 
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(whatever the quarrels about the legitimacy of particular territories), they are at 
war precisely because they recognise that each other’s absolute Sovereignty is 
what is in conflict and that one must submit to the other.11 
 
Just as Spirit can make itself present in more than one State at the same time, so, 
Hegel reveals, it has made itself present in different States in the past but in in 
varying degrees, each time more perfected: 
The States, nations and individuals involved [are] the unconscious instruments and organs 
of that inner activity in which the shapes which they themselves assume pass away, while 
the spirit in and for itself prepares and works its way towards the transition to its next and 
higher stage. (EPR, §344) 
 
Sprit then, develops itself via instantiations of The State. For Hegel there are four 
main epochs that mark a definitive stage in Spirit’s development via The State; 
“The world-historical realms are four in number: 1.the Oriental, 2. the Greek, 3. 
the Roman, 4. the Germanic.” (EPR, § 354)  In the Oriental epoch, Spirit is 
“submerged in its essence” (EPR, § 353) and is lost in its being, unaware of itself. 
In the Greek epoch Spirit becomes aware of itself, it has knowledge of itself and 
has moved from pure being to being-for-itself. In the Roman epoch this self-
knowledge is absorbed and Spirit becomes opposed to the objective world in 
which it was lost in the Oriental realm. In the Germanic epoch the opposition 
between Spirit as lost in the objective world and Spirit as the absorption of self-
knowledge is to be resolved, as the Spirit has “returned from infinite opposition” 
(EPR, §353) transformed and now has the ability to encompass the opposition. For 
                                                          
11 As we will see in the following chapter, this is essentially the same dynamic as  between the 
Lord and Bondsman in The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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Hegel, “the task of accomplishing this reconciliation is assigned to the Nordic 
principle of the Germanic peoples.”(EPR, § 358). With this exultant description of 
the potential for The State to exist in fullest expression in the Germanic world-
historical realm, the world-historical realm in which he was living, Hegel brings 
Elements of The Philosophy of Right to a triumphant end.  
 
At the end of his explication, Hegel’s State has come to us in glimpses. The State’s 
internal constitution has been given to us, that is, the parts which correspond to 
the pairs of opposites that are resolved in a concept have been given to us, but 
we know no more than when we began the section about what it would look like 
or how it would actually function. We have been told that The State exists when 
the three moments co-exist but not how that situation of co-existence comes into 
being. Whilst we have been given a long list of situations and examples in which 
we nearly achieve this greater sphere of freedom (in which we can act for 
ourselves and for others with no contradiction and in such a way is not revealed 
as underlying self-interest), we have been given no examples of it in action other 
than that we are told that the ability and the task to achieve it lies with the “Nordic 
principle of the Germanic peoples”.  
 
Hegel’s reluctance to provide a better description of The State can be explained 
by the fact that he feels it is simply not required. In the Introduction to Elements 
of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel says that “the concept of right, so far as its 
coming into being is concerned, falls outside the science of right; its deduction is 
presupposed here and is to be taken as given.” (EPR, § 2). For Hegel, the aim here 
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is to expound the science of right, therefore its concept, and the structure of the 
concept in general (including the process of its coming to be) are to be taken as 
given, as already deduced. The aim therefore is to describe how the perfect State 
would be constituted in line with this pre-given conceptual structure; 
considerations of how it would function and the presenting of examples, should 
there be any, are not really necessary to this description of what is essentially a 
fantasy state which displays the features of a pre-given principle. 12  
 
Unrest in The State 
If for Nancy identity is that which exists in a restless trembling between 
significations, then Hegel’s theory of State would seem to seek to set about an 
entirely different task of establishing the precise stable moment in which the 
identity of The State is conferred. The text itself is situated historically just prior 
to the moment in which the German peoples are about to realise The State 
according to Hegel’s account of World History.13 For Hegel, a national grouping 
                                                          
12 For Marx, Hegel’s theory of The State is “this abstract and extravagant thought about the 
modern state, whose reality remains in another world” which in fact reflects the fact the modern 
State “abstracts from actual man, or satisfies the whole man in an imaginary way.” Marx, K. “A 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” in Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right, trans. Joseph O’ Malley and Annette Jolin, ed. Joseph O’Malley, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), p. 137 
13Elements of the Philosophy of Right was written in 1820 as Hegel’s own state, Prussia, was 
recovering, consolidating, and planning for the future following a tumultuous few decades in 
which it had suffered a humiliating military defeat at the hands of its once great friend, the 
French Empire in 1806. Hegel had finally secured a salaried teaching position after an unsettled 
few years during which the Prussian education system was reformed in line with the principles of 
the French Empire. Like many thinkers at the time Hegel had openly admired Napoleon at the 
battle of Jena in 1806 (which famously claimed to have heard from his workroom as he worked 
on The Phenomenology). Finding himself in a university associated with the previous reforms in a 
state trying to regain its identity and unsure of what to reject and what to keep, having 
previously publicly admired Napoleon, Hegel’s choice to assign the forward facing task of a new 
perfect State to the Germanic peoples, while insisting on the lack of significance of specific 
political doctrine or history, seems pragmatic. See Haffner, Sebastian. The Rise and Fall of 
Prussia, trans. Ewald Osers, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), Koch, H.W. A History of 
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becomes a State when the three moments of The Executive Power, the Legislative 
Power and The Power of The Sovereign are present in its constitution, a situation 
which allows Ethical life to exist. An account of how these moments come to be 
or indeed pass out of being is not within in the purview of the Science of Right for 
Hegel, instead, he offers accounts of situations which do not meet the criteria in 
which the three moments are present and which occur earlier in the text, forming 
stages on the way in the logical progression.  
 
Hegel’s State is intended to reflect the structure of the concept in which three 
things exist in relationship in which one thing is the resolution of the two 
opposition of the two other things, and the structure Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right itself is set up to show a trajectory in which this happens over and over 
again resulting in a final stable moment of identity of The State. Hegel intends that 
The Executive Power and The Legislative Powers are moments in which the 
Sovereign’s power is deputised and that the Power of The Sovereign is the 
moment in which the Sovereign provides the unity between the three moments, 
supplying the sublating function of the concept. Bewilderingly however, Hegel 
tells us that these three essential moments in fact presuppose one another, 
forcing the conclusion that they arrive into being all at once, at the same time, 
(despite the fact the one is the resolution of the others and Hegel has ordered 
them numerically). This would run contrary to one of the given features of a 
                                                          
Prussia, (London: Longman, 1978), Feuchtwanger, E.J. Prussia, Myth and Reality: The Role of 
Prussia in German History, (London: Oswald Wolff, 1970). 
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moment, which is that they do not co-appear but appear sequentially.14 This sets 
up a kind of temporal dysphoria against the background of Hegel’s strict logical 
progression, a dysphoria which is further heightened by Hegel’s describing The 
State in the present tense whilst insisting it has not yet happened. Having reached 
Part 3, Section 3, A, I, a The Power of the Sovereign, we have found not the stable 
moment in which The State can arrive but instead an identity which is located 
between three moments, whose temporal existence is unresolved, an identity 
which cannot be said to be at rest. 
 
For Hegel it is necessary that the ultimate decision, which ratifies the law, is taken 
by a single person in whose name it is executed, but this single person could not 
be a president or prime minister or other elected official who would otherwise be 
a member of The State. This person needs to be someone, in fact the only one, 
who has a very specific relationship to The State; this person is not a member of 
The State, they are for Hegel, the embodiment of it. From this it follows that 
because a Sovereign is necessary to a State, then the members of The State as 
fellow members, are such only on account of the existence of the Sovereign. It is 
the sovereign who gives The State its identity or meaning as a State and the 
                                                          
14 The focus on the word moment requires checking that original German does not use a 
different term. As can be seen by comparing “The power of the sovereign contains the three 
moments of the totality within itself” (EPR §275) with the original German “Die fürstliche Gewalt 
enthält selbst die drei Momente der Totalität, (Hegel, G.W.F. Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Rechts, (Berlin: Acadamie Verlag, 1981) in fact the very same term is used. The German momente 
and the English moment come from the same Latin root and principally carry the same meaning, 
that of a usually small but indeterminate unit of time. However, in German, the term it also 
carries a meaning which translates to something more like element or feature. This could 
therefore mean either that when Hegel describes the moments of The State he is simply 
describing its features, elements or parts and not it’s events as such, or, that there is no 
difference between the features and the events of The State for Hegel.  
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members their identity and meaning as members of it. However, this means that 
the relationship of members of The State to one another is in fact mediated via 
the Sovereign; they can have no direct relation to each other. The only person in 
The State who has direct relation to its members, and in fact to the entirety, the 
multiplicity of the members all at once, is in fact, the Sovereign whose function is 
precisely that of the event of sense. The power of the Sovereign is precisely that 
of sublation but in giving sense to the multiplicity of members of The State it is not 
a binary pair that is sublated but a multiplicity. The Identity of The State as given 
in Hegel’s text therefore not only uncertainly suspended between three moments 
it is also a sublation which gives sense to a multiplicity rather than a binary pairing. 
What is revealed in this unrestful State and which is exposed in Hegel’s attempt 
to provide exactly that which would allow a stable fixed single identity State, is, 
surprisingly, an essential co-existence. As will be seen in the next section (and 
explored more fully in the final section) co-existence will be a central theme in 
Nancy’s account of Community. 
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3.3 Community in Nancy’s The Inoperative Community  
 
The Inoperative Community 
Nancy’s account of Community is given in his essay “The Inoperative Community” 
which appears in the collection of the same name. Traceable to the same urge to 
rethink the political that caused Nancy and his frequent collaborator at the time, 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe to convene the 1980 Les Fins de l’homme conference on 
Derrida and politics, the collection is broadly concerned with community, that is, 
the history of the thinking of the relation between groups and singular beings as 
essence.  
 
The collection appeared in 1986, approximately two years after the closure of the 
Centre de Recherches Philosophiques sur la Politique, which was set up following 
Les Fins de l’homme. The original French publication of the collection in 1986, 
consisted of three closely interlinked essays, “The Inoperative Community”, 
“Myth Interrupted” and ”Literary Communism” and a further two essays “Of 
Being-In-Common”  and “A Finite History”. These last two were replaced by the 
essays “Shattered Love” and “Of Divine Places” in the 1991 University of 
Minnesota edition, which I shall be using here.  The first three essays can be read 
as a whole, (indeed in the original French edition they are named parts 1, 2 and 3) 
and if read in the order they appear in the collection they appear to run on, one 
from the other, in terms of content. Stylistically they are very similar; there are no 
introductions, conclusions and arrangements of sections to progress an argument, 
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just paragraphs of widely varying length which offer reflections on the topic in 
hand occasionally interrupted and by default arranged into groupings by a 
typographic device of a line of three stars.15 
 
“The Inoperative Community” as will be more fully explicated shortly, is concerned 
with philosophies of community and their tendency to think community as that 
which is lost or broken and which must be reinstated or mended.  Community 
under this view is a specific state of affairs that can achieved or completed and is 
very much not here now, but is to come. For Nancy however, community is that 
which happens in the suspension of what he calls the communitarian project, that 
which happens as this project “unworks” itself. “Myth Interrupted” is concerned 
with myth, all myths, as being fundamentally the myth of community, the promise 
of communion. For Nancy myth interrupts itself by its own realisation that what it 
is telling is not true, that its narrative, as narrative, is mythic. For Nancy the 
interruption of myth is concomitant with the suspension of the communitarian 
project, the very circumstance in which community actually occurs. “Literary 
Communism” is concerned with the kind of writing that would permit myth to 
interrupt itself and community to happen, in contradistinction from the kind of 
writing that would aim to convey a message and thereby achieve the completion 
of communion. For Nancy the kind of writing that would do this is one that is 
                                                          
15 Nancy is frequent user of the three dot ellipsis in his prose. The three star device used here 
seems to perform much the same function for each essay as the three dot ellipsis would do in a 
sentence, it seems to denote something missing or not included, and so separates what is either 
side of but it also signifies that what is either side of the ellipsis is in some way connected. 
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offered or abandoned at what he calls the limit at which singular beings share one 
another. This limit is also the site of the occurrence of community. 
 
The other two essays offered in the English collection are less well connected in 
content and different in structure, both to each other and the original three, 
featuring either titled sections or numbered parts. “Shattered Love”, which was 
considered in the Introduction, is concerned with the notion that “thinking is 
love”16 and that we have misunderstood love because we have misunderstood 
thinking, in both cases because we have thought them dialectically. “Of Divine 
Places” is concerned with the notion that what thought encounters at its extreme, 
at its limit, is something which was once considered divine. These essays are 
included in the collection because they connect loosely and somewhat in the 
manner of a postscript, with what Nancy wants to say about community and 
thinking and also community and limits.  The other two essays offered in the 
original French collection are again different in tone to the first three; “Of Being-
in-Common” is concerned with what would constitute the task of an ontology of 
community and what is key for Nancy is that the question posed should be 
concerned with the community of being not the being of community. “Finite 
History” is concerned with the event of community, or the happening of being, 
which is always being-in-common. For Nancy we can only grasp this if we can think 
history as other than successive and causal, that is, if we can think it non-
metaphysically. Nancy calls this kind of history a finite history. 
                                                          
16 Nancy, Jean-Luc. “Shattered Love” in The Inoperative Community, trans. Lisa Garbus and 
Simona Sawhney, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 84 
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Community 
Written at the invitation of Jean-Christophe Bailly editor of Aléa magazine, where 
it first appeared 1983, the essay “The Inoperative Community” is generally 
considered as engagement with Bataille, but this engagement has become 
somewhat overshadowed by the subsequent engagement between Blanchot and 
Nancy over “The Inoperative Community”.17  Gregory Bird observes that 
descriptions of the debate between Nancy and Blanchot are usually “polarized 
into the debate between the Heideggerian tendency to prioritize the “with” and 
the Levinasian tendency to prioritize the “other”“18 when thinking community, 
with the former attributed to Nancy and the latter to Blanchot.  For Bird what is 
germane is that “Blanchot insinuates that because Nancy’s theory [of community] 
fails to move beyond the hypostasis in language it also fails to move beyond the 
Christian as well as the foundational sense.”19 Reading Nancy and Blanchot’s texts, 
the debate between Nancy and Blanchot is at times hard to pick out, for all the 
characterisation of it as a debate they seem to be largely in sympathy in their 
descriptions of how community has been thought thus far and the problems 
associated with thinking it. For Blanchot, Nancy fails to provide a sufficient 
account of how to overcome the difficulty of speaking of community (beyond 
                                                          
17 The engagement with Blanchot was covered in the Introduction. With regards to Bataille, in a 
subsequent shorter piece “La Communauté Affrontée”, Nancy explains that when the invitation 
to write on community arrived he was "finishing year long course dedicated to Bataille 
considered from a political angle [and was] researching, very precisely, the possibility of a 
hitherto unheard-of resource that would avoid fascism and communism as much as democratic 
or republic individualism".  Nancy JL, “The Confronted Community” trans. by Jason Kemp Winfree 
in The Obsessions of Georges Bataille: Community and Communication, ed. Andrew J. Mitchell 
and Jason Kemp Winfree (Albany: State University of New York Press 2009), p.21. 
18 Bird, Gregory. “Community beyond hypostasis, Nancy responds to Blanchot” in Angelaki, vol 
13, No 1, April 2008. P. 3 
19 Ibid, p. 8 
126 
 
merely diagnosing it) and therefore of speaking of oneself as part of a community, 
of avowing oneself to be part of a given community. However, as we shall see, and 
maybe this is why Nancy describes himself as stunned at the reproach he feels 
Blanchot has levelled at him, the difficulty of speaking of community is given much 
attention in The Inoperative Community as is the aim to offer an exposition of 
community rather than to offer anything too prescriptive that would risk being 
mistaken for a proposal of a new politics. 20   
 
As is typical of Nancy’s work, “The Inoperative Community” does not set out a 
sustained argument but provides a series of reflections on community, how it has 
been thought and how that thought misses for Nancy what community actually is. 
However, Nancy gives no new phrase or term to indicate when he is using the 
term community to denote what he thinks community is, nor does he give a new 
phrase or term to denote when he is referring to a previous and for him, incorrect 
understanding of community. The term is left very much in play as an interruptive 
device, frequently understandable only by its context making picking out an 
argument problematic. What will become clear however, is that whether using 
the term community to denote the previous connotations of the term that he 
wishes to move  away from, or whether setting out his new understanding of the 
term, community means for Nancy, the situation of singular beings in relation to 
a group. Also problematic is Nancy’s practice of, as previously mentioned, not 
                                                          
20 In La Communauté Affrontée, Nancy describes Blanchot’s response to “The Inoperative 
Community” as both a “resonance” and a ”reproach” by which he felt “stunned”. Winfree and 
Mitchell, Ibid, p. 23. 
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providing titled segments to guide his reader through an argument but creating 
varying sized groups of paragraphs by occasionally introducing a line of three stars 
to divide them. Whilst the paragraphs in each of the fifteen divisions seem to carry 
through a general thought that that links the paragraphs in each division, there is 
some repetition  across paragraphs and across divisions which prevents the order 
of their appearance being used to imply the progression of an argument. 
Therefore in order to convey the scope of Nancy’s thought on community but 
trying to avoid merely reproducing his text, I shall present his explication by 
offering a brief summary of the topics of the divisions and drawing out further 
those passages in which Nancy’s thought of community exposes itself. 
 
In division 1, Nancy introduces and misquotes the Sartrean trope that communism 
is the “unsurpassable horizon of our time.”21 In division 2, Nancy offers the 
thought that the singular being has been thought, “since Hegel at least” (IC.p.3) 
as an individual, that is, as nothing but one of the pieces which make up the whole 
that is community or one the pieces it breaks down into. In division 3, Nancy states 
that  
Singularity never takes place at the level of atoms […] rather it takes place at the level of 
the clinamen, which is unidentifiable”. It is linked to ecstasy: one could not properly say 
that the singular being is the subject of ecstasy, for ecstasy has no “subject” -but one must 
say that ecstasy (community) happens to the singular being. (IC, p.7) 
 
                                                          
21 Nancy, JL, “The Inoperative Community” in The Inoperative Community, trans.Peter Connor, 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p.1. Hereafter referred to in the text as IC 
followed by page number. In Search for a Method, Sartre actually states that Marxism is the 
unsurpassable horizon of our time. In her translation  of Sartre’s text Hazel Barnes renders this 
much referenced sentence as  “I consider Marxism the one philosophy of our time which we 
cannot go beyond”. Sartre, J.P. Search for a Method, trans .Hazel.E. Barnes, (New York: Vintage, 
1963), p.xxxiv 
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The clinamen is the name given by Lucretius to his notion of the swerve that atoms 
make when falling through space : 
When atoms move straight down through the void by their own weight, they deflect a bit 
in space at a quite uncertain time and in uncertain places, just enough that you could say 
that their motion has changed. But if they were not in the habit of swerving, they would all 
fall straight down through the depths of the void, like drops of rain, and no collision would 
occur, nor would any blow be produced among the atoms. In that case, nature would never 
have produced anything. 22 
 
For Nancy the value of this account is that the atom is an atom only in the event 
of the clinamen, when it is cast as an atom because now there are other atoms 
with which it has come into contact in the swerve. For Nancy to be singular is not 
to be originally singular, like the thought of the  individual, but rather it is to find 
oneself as singular in a situation, an ecstasy, with other beings, precisely because 
there are other beings.  
 
In division 4, Nancy states that communism cannot communicate this aspect of 
singularity and that philosophies of community have so far ignored this. In division 
5, Nancy tells us that so far, community “has been thought of on the basis of a lost 
community – one to be regained or reconstituted.” (IC, p. 9) The thinking that has 
taken place on community has been tinged with nostalgia and fuelled by the 
assumption that community is a thing gone and past and that furthermore, the 
task of thinking it behoves the task of reviving it. In division 6, Nancy asserts that 
this perceived loss is itself constitutive of a coming together and creating 
community. Furthermore, this kind of community is “indissociable” (IC, p. 14) from 
                                                          
22 Extract from Lucretius, On the Nature of Things in The Epicurus Reader, trans. and ed. Brad 
Inwood and L. P. Gerson, (Cambridge: Hackett, 1994), p. 65 
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death, as death is that in which community reveals itself as the living come 
together over the dead. In division 7, Nancy says of Bataille that he, 
is without doubt the one who experienced first, or most acutely, the modern experience of 
community as neither a work to be produced, nor a lost communion, but rather as space 
itself and the spacing of the experience of the outside, of the outside-of-self. (IC, p. 19) 
 
For Nancy, Bataille realises that community is in fact not a work to be achieved (a 
loss to be made whole) or gone forever in a communion that we no longer have 
or that has died. For Nancy what Bataille offers is a description of an experience 
of the spacing of oneself and what is outside that self, what occurs at the limit of 
oneself. For Nancy this is a description of the situation of a singular being as a 
singular being in relation to other beings. This situation Nancy calls, variously, 
ecstasy or community. However, whilst Nancy finds this description in Bataille, he 
acknowledges in division 8, that for Bataille, community and ecstasy remain as 
two separate “poles”. 
 
In division 9, Nancy asserts that only a discourse that exhausts itself “can indicate 
to the community the sovereignty of its sharing (that is to say neither present to it 
nor signify to it it’s communion)”(IC, p. 26). To communicate communion, that is, 
what occurs in ecstasy or community, a discourse must exhaust itself and leave its 
readers/witnesses to move beyond it. A discourse that completes a work, which 
it then can present or signify using a term, could not communicate the spacing is 
that communion for Nancy.23  In division 10, Nancy states that “A singular being 
                                                          
23  Nancy further considers discourses which aim to complete themselves in the essay “Literary 
Communism”. Nancy, JL, The Inoperative Community, various translators, ed Peter Connor, 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 
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appears, as finitude itself: at the end (or the beginning) with the contact of the 
skin (or the heart) of another singular being” and that “finitude co-appears or 
compears” (IC, p. 28). For Nancy, as singular being is revealed at the limit of a 
being, a limit the singular being realises only in encounter with another being, with 
other beings, then the limit or finitude of a being is always a co-appearance  or 
compearance. In division 11, Nancy tells us that,  
Community necessarily takes place in what Blanchot has called “unworking” referring to 
that which, before or beyond the work, withdraws from the work, and which no longer 
having to do either with production or with completion encounters interruption, 
fragmentation, suspension.” (IC, p. 31).24 
 
Community, or ecstasy, or singular beings knowing themselves as singular in 
encounters with other such singular beings, is a situation which takes place at the 
point of the interruption of a work or project. Community has habitually been 
thought of as lost because it occurs when there is loss, or more accurately an 
interruption, suspension or prevention of completion, however it occurs in the 
moment of this realisation, not in the success of resulting projects which aim to 
recapture what has been lost. 
 
In the short, interruptive, fragment that comprises division 12, Nancy reproduces 
a paragraph from The Experience of Freedom, his text on freedom in Kant, 
Schelling and Heidegger concluding that “the emotional element that gives an 
obsessive value to communal existence is death” (IC, p.34). This insert echoes the 
                                                          
24 Nancy borrows this term not just from Blanchot but also from Bataille as he acknowledges in 
footnote in which he says “there are two ways to escape the dialectic (that is to say mediation in 
a totality) –either by slipping away from it into immanence or by opening up its negativity to the 
point of rendering it “unworked” [désouvrée] as Bataille puts it” (IC, p. 156). I discuss Ignaas 
Devisch’s elaboration of this footnote in the conclusion to this chapter. 
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earlier assertion that loss and death provokes communion. In division, 13 Nancy 
states, “For Bataille community was first and finally the community of lovers” and 
that “in spite of Bataille, and yet with him, we should try to say the following; love 
does not expose the entire community.” (IC, p. 36). For Nancy what Bataille is 
really describing in his description of community is the rather more exclusive 
communion between, the ecstasy between, lovers, rather than the communion 
between a larger number or indeed between a singular being and multiplicity 
itself.25  
 
In division 14, Nancy explains that to get at what he wants exposed about 
community, that is the relation between singular beings and multiplicity in 
general, we must think of what he calls “the political” not as a “work of love or of 
death” (IC, p. 40) but beyond those limits. For Nancy, 
It [thinking the political] exposes these limits, it never passes beyond them, nor passes 
beyond community. But at every instance singular beings share their, limit share each other 
on their limits. They escape the relationships of society (“mother” and “son”, “author” and 
“reader”, “public figure” and “private figure”, “producer” and “consumer”), but they are in 
community, and are unworked. (IC, p. 41) 
 
To think the political means for Nancy, to think community, to think singular 
beings in communion with other singular beings and knowing themselves as such. 
This is a communion or relation beyond specific relationships as we know and 
name them but is instead a sharing of limits by singular beings. In this sharing, 
singular beings are unworked by one another, they are prevented from fully 
                                                          
25 The relation of lovers is taken up by Nancy in the essay “Shattered Love”. Nancy, JL, The 
Inoperative Community, various translators, ed Peter Connor, (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991) 
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completing the enclosure of the singular yet they are also prevented from 
completing total communion, they are in ecstasy, they are in community. 
 
Finally, in a postscript note added on the occasion of the English language 
publication of The Inoperative Community collection, Nancy takes the opportunity 
to address a comment in Blanchot’s text The Unavowable Community. Responding 
to Blanchot’s observation that a flaw in language leads us not to not consider what 
it is to be in common, when considering community, Nancy explains that; 
Nothing is more common to the members of a community, in principle, than a myth, or a 
group of myths. Myth and community are defined by each other, at least in part -but 
perhaps in totality- and this motivates a reflection on community according to myth (IC, p. 
42) 
 
For Nancy, what members of a community have in common is sense of collective 
identity, the narrative of which is myth.26 
 
Community and The State 
Having reached the end of Nancy’s essay, any mention of reading the essay as 
engagement with Hegel remains undeclared. Early in the piece in his discussion of 
the clinamen, Nancy asserts that he is after an understanding of singular being or 
singularity that would not be that of the individual as it has been though thus far 
and particularly by Hegel. Nancy goes on to remark that Hegel’s individual passes 
through experience with “staggering opinionatedness” (IC, p. 3) but does not 
develop this remark or give any indication that he will do so later in the essay. In 
                                                          
26 Nancy takes up the connection between myth and community in the essay “Myth 
Interrupted”. Nancy, JL, The Inoperative Community, various translators, ed Peter Connor, 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 
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order to read for an undeclared engagement, it will be necessary to consider the 
moments in which Nancy’s thought on community exposes itself as highlighted 
above to see how these could function as undeclared engagement on Hegel’s 
State. 
 
For Nancy, community is not a work to be achieved, but the very experience of 
loss of communion. He also observes that this experience has been taken to signify 
that community is broken and must be repaired or made whole. For Hegel, The 
State would occur in a discrete moment of culmination and completion as the 
resolution of a previous situation of opposition. In its final perfect instantiation it 
would also be the culmination of a history of previous incomplete attempts to 
achieve The State. Hegel’s projected perfect State would make an excellent 
example of the kind of project to achieve community as a work that Nancy has in 
mind and is allowing to potentially expose itself. 
 
For Nancy, singular beings know themselves as singular in encounters with other 
such singular beings in which they mutually realise and establish their finitude. 
Singular being is then for Nancy in fact always a co-appearance and this situation 
is precisely that of community or as Nancy sometimes prefers, ecstasy. As we saw 
earlier this encounter of simultaneous connection and separation takes place in 
the face of loss and the attempt to regain connection, being paradoxically 
achieved in the failure of the project. This achievement however is not a 
completion but what Nancy calls, after both Blanchot and Bataille, an unworking. 
Nancy invokes the mythic figure of “Penelope who reweaves the fabric of intimacy 
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without ever managing to complete it” (IC, p.10) to explain unworking as 
interruption of a project which is in turn begun again in the next instance or in the 
morning light like Penelope’s cloth. Community for Nancy, like Penelope’s 
weaving, is never fully completed, nor fully lost and gone. Hegel also invokes the 
figure of Penelope in Elements of The Philosophy of Right, in order to distinguish 
what he is doing from what he describes as a certain kind of philosophical outline, 
“if only because it is imagined that what philosophy puts forward is as ephemeral 
a product as Penelope’s weaving, which is begun a fresh every day.” (EPR, p.9). 
Hegel is clearly very keen to avoid a philosophical project with as troublesome an 
existence as the product (or lack of product) of Penelope’s loomwork and instead 
wants something more rigorous and in his own terms, real. Hegel therefore 
locates the event of the completion of his logical process in the physical body of a 
single individual, the Sovereign or Monarch and would of course be entirely 
unable accept a State whose existence was in an unworking between multiple 
beings. Nancy’s thought of community becomes therefore almost the exact 
inverse of Hegel’s State as a depiction of the relation between singular beings and 
groups, but as Nancy is keen to avoid setting up an opposition and risking implying 
a dialectical process he cannot declare any engagement but instead merely allows 
it to potentially expose itself. 
 
For Nancy, it is only possible to communicate communion, the experience of 
community, in a discourse which exhausts itself. In his text, Hegel very much tries 
to present a discourse which completes a work, not just in terms of its conceptual 
content but also its careful triadic structuring. However, at the intended 
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conceptual moment of the resolution of all the previous oppositions and the place 
in the text (Part 3, Section 3, A, I, a, The Power of The Sovereign) in which Hegel 
places this moment there appears to be a breach. This is the most heavily 
annotated section, with half of the eight paragraphs which make up the section 
accompanied by Hegel’s own extremely lengthy Anmerkungen or later remarks 
(as well as his students Zusätze), the reader can almost feel Hegel trying again and 
again to communicate what it is he wants to say about The State. 27 This is also the 
very location at which it is revealed that there is an essential co-existence at the 
heart of Hegel’s State. If for Nancy, the experience of community can occur in a 
text that exhausts itself and unworks itself, interrupting and preventing its own 
closure, then to read Hegel’s text is precisely to experience such an unworking.  
  
                                                          
27 In one instance, a succinct more technical ten line paragraph has a remark added to it that 
exceeds two pages in a more reflective prose style. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
Reflections 
At the beginning of this chapter I set out the intention of offering a reading of 
Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right which exposes an account of The State 
in unrest, which I promised to argue, is the very situation that Nancy terms 
Community in his essay “The Inoperative Community”. So far, I have explicated 
Hegel’s description of The State as it appears in Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right, beginning with a condensed summary of the trajectory of Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, and the place of the discussion of The State within it, drawing 
out the places in the text in which Hegel’s logic and structure begin to unravel and 
reveal a State in unrest. I have also explicated Nancy’s description of Community 
as it appears in his essay “The Inoperative Community”, beginning with a summary 
of the collection of the same name in which it appears, its relation to the other 
essays in it and drawing out the undeclared engagement in “The Inoperative 
Community” with Hegel’s theory of The State. What remains is to outline the 
relationship between Nancy’s account of Community and The State in unrest, 
drawing on Nancy’s essay “The Jurisdiction of The Hegelian Monarch” and various 
of Nancy’s commentators in the Anglophone reception and to draw out how this 
relationship exposes Nancy’s concern with Relational Being, pre-emptively 
sketching the crucial role of Nancy’s thought of Being Singular Plural to be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Having drawn out Nancy’s undeclared engagement with Hegel’s theory of The 
State the following points emerged. Nancy’s notion that community is not a work 
to be achieved can be read as an engagement with Hegel’s project as one which 
would try and achieve community in the form of The State. Nancy’s notion that 
Singular being is always in fact co-appearance in an unworking can be seen as an 
engagement with Hegel’s attempt to achieve and fix community by locating its 
completion  in the body of a single individual, the Sovereign. Nancy’s notion that 
only a discourse that exhausts itself can communicate the experience of 
community can be seen as an engagement with Hegel’s attempt to provide a 
completed discourse that could communicate the concept of community. 
However, what occurs on reading Hegel’s text is that whatever his intentions, an 
experience of an unworking is none the less communicated. Any engagement 
Nancy is involved in with Hegel’s text has to be undeclared, Nancy does not want 
to set up something that could become an opposition to Hegel’s text and instead 
all that can implied is that the engagement is potentially exposed in Nancy’s text. 
Nancy is less reticent in his essay “The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch.”28 
This essay appeared originally in 1981 in an annual collection of works by several 
thinkers involved with the Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique 
                                                          
28 The English translations of Hegel’s text generally refer to the Sovereign, Sovereignty and 
render the section title as the Power of the Sovereign. The original German uses fürstliche, 
souveränität and the title section is die fürstliche Gewalt, whilst French translations of Hegel’s 
text tend to use le prince, La souveraineté and the section title is Le Prince, following the 
German. Nancy’s use of Monarch (le monarque ) therefore seems odd as it clashes with the 
general French terminology for Hegel’s Sovereign which seems to avoid le monarque. By 
translating Nancy’s terminology directly Mary Ann and Peter Caws, carry over Nancy’s clash using 
Monarch against the more usual English terminology for this text, Sovereign. However, in order 
to avoid clashing with the terminology of my citations I will use the term the Monarch in order to 
refer the same individual previously referred to as the Sovereign. Hegel, G.W.F. Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts, (Berlin: Acadamie Verlag, 1981) and Hegel, G.W.F. Principes De la 
philosophie Du droit, trans André Kaan with preface by Jean Hyppolite, (Paris: Gallimard, 1940). 
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which was subsequently published in English as Retreating the Political (1997) 
although the essay was omitted from the English publication.29 The essay did 
however  appear the next year in the in English in the journal Social Research.30 
For Nancy, the Monarch “is the co-presence of the elements of The State and of 
the moments of its Idea […] he is -and is only- the synthesis of The State”.31 The 
Monarch is, for Nancy, a construct made to house  the moment of synthesis or 
sublation in The State. The Monarch is therefore the completion of the dialectic 
housed in a human body in order to actualise it. Furthermore, for Nancy, 
The monarch simply actualizes the logic of subjectivity […].And it is indeed this logic which, 
in principle, hides or forbids the question of relation. There is no "real" problem of relation 
once the relation - even thought of as the actualization of a self in another- takes its origin 
in the movement of a self which goes to its exterior in order to appropriate itself. (JHM, p. 
153) 
 
For Nancy, the logic actualised by the Monarch is in fact that of subject, by which 
he means the singular being completed via a dialectical process in which it 
engages with an other and returns to itself from this opposition. This view would 
cast all being as singular first and relation only as problematic stage to be resolved 
on the way to the completion of the subject. However, what is valuable in this 
description is the movement of the self as it goes to its limit to appropriate itself, 
after all this occurs in Nancy’s description of the singular being in community. 
Crucially for Nancy though this singular being remains in unrest, it does not 
complete into a new enclosed self having passed through the problematic relation 
                                                          
29 Lacoue-Labarthe, P and Nancy, J-L, Rejouer le politique, Cahiers du Centre de recherches 
philosophiques sur le politique, (Paris: Galilée, 1981) 
30 Nancy JL, “The Jurisdiction of The Hegelian Monarch” in Social Research, Volume 49, No. 2 
(Summer 1982): pp. 481-516. Trans. Mary Ann Caws and Peter Caws, 
31 Nancy JL, “The Jurisdiction of The Hegelian Monarch” in The Birth to Presence, ed Brian 
Holmes, trans. Mary Ann Caws and Peter Caws, (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 
115. Hereafter referred to in the text as (JHM) followed by page number. 
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never to return again. For Nancy there is an unintended consequence to the 
exceptional status of Hegel’s Monarch:  
Strictly speaking, we should say that in the organic totalization of the Hegelian State the 
monarch is lacking: either he is not an individual or he is one, and then he is excepted from 
the totality, he exceeds it or he remains withdrawn from it […] beyond what Hegel thinks, - 
he [the monarch] actualizes union by not completing relation, by inscribing it in the space 
of separation, which is that of relation itself. (JHM, p. 140) 
 
The Monarch, as the physical housing of the moment of the synthesis of The State, 
in fact exceeds The State, therefore the Monarch themselves cannot be a member 
of The State. For Nancy this apparent exclusion or separation is in fact relation 
itself, which means therefore that the only singular being in The State in relation 
as Nancy sees relation, i.e., as connection and separation at the same time, is the 
Monarch.  
 
Vicky Roupa considers Nancy on Hegel’s Monarch in "On Politics as Effectuation: 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s Encounter with the Hegelian Monarch". Roupa explains how 
according to Nancy, Hegel’s embodying of the competed concept of The State in 
the actual body of the Monarch, usefully highlights, “a crucial gesture, one that is 
typical of the entire tradition of Western philosophy, which thinks of the political 
as effectuation, as the making effective of an essence.”32 Hegel’s insistence on 
making the synthesis actual in the very body of the Sovereign is depicted here as 
a continuation of the metaphysical tradition of making essence effective, of 
requiring all being to have presence, and for Roupa’s Nancy, it is imperative to 
show the impossibility of this. 
                                                          
32Roupa, Vicky. "On Politics as Effectuation: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Encounter with the Hegelian 
Monarch" in Journal for Cultural Research, Volume 9, Issue 4, 2005 , p. 408 
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For Ignaas Devisch in Jean-Luc Nancy and the Question of Community, for Nancy, 
“everything for Hegel is centred on the absolute disorder of becoming” and this 
prompts Nancy to enthusiastically take up Bataille’s “elaboration of the Hegelian 
negation without use [as] a way of escaping the dialectic.”33 For Nancy, the 
disorder of becoming, when being is neither non-being nor being, is what Hegel is 
centred on as something to be resolved, however, for Nancy it is that which is 
never truly resolved and never at rest which is of interest and indeed use. In a 
footnote early on in “The Inoperative Community, Nancy remarks that “there are 
two ways of escaping the dialectic […] either by slipping away from into 
immanence or by opening up its negativity to the point of rendering it “unworked” 
[désouvrée] as Bataille puts it” (IC, p. 6). Under this view, Nancy’s project becomes 
one of always opening up negativity in Hegel. Devisch explores this footnote in an 
earlier essay, “The disclosure of a metaphysical horizon, or how to escape 
dialectics”, remarking that in “The Inoperative Community”, Nancy seeks to do 
escape the dialectic by “disclosing” a community that would be a “contemporary 
form of social bond that does not end up in a fusional or dialectical relation 
identities.”34 For Devisch’s Nancy what community is truly, that is when viewed 
non-dialectically or non-metaphysically, is a social bond which is not the result of 
the fusing together of its constituent members but a bond which is nothing more 
                                                          
33 Devisch, I. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Question of Community, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p.29 
34 Devisch, I. “The disclosure of a metaphysical horizon, or how to escape dialectics” South 
African Journal of Philosophy, 2010, Vol. 29 Issue 1, p.26 
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than the sharing by the members of the experience of restless negativity, a social 
bond which is an identity based on a restless negativity. 
 
Nancy’s concern with Relational Being is exposed in “The Inoperative Community” 
because for him, Community is relation. To relate this to the points that emerge 
as engagements with Hegel, Community is not a work to be achieved but relation 
to be experienced. Singularity is always a co-appearance and an unworking 
between multiples because it is relation. Community can only be communicated 
as an experience by a discourse which exhausts itself because relation can only be 
experienced, its essence cannot be made effective as Roupa has it, or captured in 
a concept but is experienced in interruption and loss. Hegel’s use of the Monarch 
to try and make this essence of community effective results in nothing but an 
actualisation of the logic of subjectivity although it does for Nancy, albeit 
unintentionally, expose a situation of simultaneous separation and connection 
which for him is constitutive of relation. Additionally, the Monarch itself does 
provide a depiction of Singularity as Nancy wants it but at the cost of denying this 
to the other members of The State. As Devisch points out, what Nancy offers in 
“The Inoperative Community” is a depiction of group identity based on restless 
negativity. If community is relation and singularity is relation and “The Inoperative 
Community” gives us a depiction of group identity based on restless negativity, 
then what is currently missing so far is the development of a depiction of singular 
identity based on restless negativity, this Nancy will call Being Singular Plural.  
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Chapter Four 
Nancy and Hegel on Singularity 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Problematic 
In this chapter I shall offer a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit which 
exposes an account of The Self that does not complete, which I shall argue is the 
very situation that Nancy terms Being Singular Plural in his essay “Being Singular 
Plural” and furthermore that Being Singular Plural is indissociable from the same 
situation that Nancy terms Community. 
 
In the previous chapter I offered a reading of Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
which exposed a view of The State in unrest, which I argued, is the very situation 
that Nancy terms Community. This was done in order to meet the first part of the 
challenge to read Elements of the Philosophy of Right for an account of The State 
which remains in unrest and The Phenomenology of Spirit for an account of Self 
that does not complete. Providing an account of the Self which does not complete 
will therefore be the task of this chapter and whilst the account of the Self will be 
explicitly given in Hegel’s text, this account will assume completion. A Self that 
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does not complete, I shall argue is precisely what Relational Being looks like in a 
singular being, a situation Nancy terms Being Singular Plural. 
 
In Hegel’s text an account of a self is quite explicitly given. However, whilst Nancy’s 
work features frequent reference to Hegel’s thought, as was explored in the 
Chapter Two, there is no piece that sets itself up to directly comment on The 
Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole or the section within it on Self Consciousness 
which will be used to consider Hegel on Self. There is also, once again, nothing in 
the secondary literature on Hegel with a direct focus on this task, therefore, once 
again delineating the relation between “Being Singular Plural” and Hegel’s account 
of Self-Consciousness will be the second task of this chapter. 
 
I shall begin by explicating Hegel’s description of Self-Consciousness as it appears 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit, beginning with a condensed summary of the 
trajectory of The Phenomenology of Spirit, and the place of the discussion of Self-
Consciousness within it. As previously, I shall follow Morin’s observation regarding 
the way in which Nancy allows Hegel’s logic to still function whilst at the same 
time observing the underlying disruption as well as bearing in mind Peter Fenves 
notion of palimpsestic reading as discussed in the previous chapter.1 Therefore, I 
will draw out the places in the text in which Hegel’s logic and structure begin to 
unravel and reveal a Self which does not complete. 
 
                                                          
1 Morin, M-E. Jean-Luc Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p.10 and Nancy, J.L. The Experience of 
Freedom, trans. Bridget MacDonald, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.20 
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Next, I will explicate Nancy’s description of Being Singular Plural as it appears in 
his essay “Being Singular Plural”, beginning with a summary of the collection of 
the same name that the essay appears in and its relation to the other essays in it. 
Once again, following the guidance given in the Introduction by various of Nancy’s 
commentators that there is an undeclared engagement with Hegel taking place 
and that this writing is purposefully non-dialectical or non-systematic in structure 
which reflects the way Nancy believes Sense itself functions, I shall draw out the 
undeclared engagement in “Being Singular Plural” with Hegel’s theory of Self-
Consciousness, paying attention to the way in which Nancy’s non-dialectical text 
allows this engagement to be exposed.2 
 
Finally, in conclusion I will outline the relationship between Nancy’s account of 
Being Singular Plural and a Self which does not complete, drawing on Nancy’s 
essay “Banks, Edges Limits (of singularity)” and contributions from Nancy’s 
commentators in the Anglophone reception, Morin and James. I will again, draw 
out how this relationship exposes Nancy’s concern with Relational Being as that 
in which both sense and identity are those in which multiple significations are held 
together in a ceaseless restless movement. 
  
                                                          
2 Hutchens, B.C. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy, (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), p.27 
and Rugo, D. Jean-Luc Nancy and the Thinking of Otherness, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) 
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4.2 Self-Consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
Phenomenology of Spirit 
Hegel’s concept of Self-Consciousness is expounded in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, which in summary is concerned with the development of consciousness 
through experience.3 The progression of this from what Hegel calls Sense-
Certainty, through many descriptions of intervening stages, to what he calls 
Absolute Knowing forms the trajectory of the text.  
 
The Phenomenology of Spirit, which appeared in 1807 and is one of Hegel’s earliest 
and most well-known works, is intended as an introduction to his philosophical 
system. 4 At the time of its composition, Hegel had been an unsalaried lecturer at 
the University of Jena for several years (living on a rapidly dwindling inheritance) 
and had eagerly accepted a lucrative if inflexible publishing contract, which 
required that he submit chapters as they were finished with little opportunity to 
revise them.5 The progression of the stages of consciousness in the text itself does 
seem marked by this constraint, the various stages are given in descriptions of 
                                                          
3 As in the previous chapter, it is the case here that the Hegelian concept under consideration is 
laid out in the section of the same name. To differentiate which I am referring to I will refer the 
concept as Self-Consciousness and the book section as Self-Consciousness and will apply this to 
similar concept /title pairings. 
4 Hegel had previously published an extended essay entitled The Difference between Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s System of Philosophy and several pieces in the Critical Journal of Philosophy which he 
edited with Schelling but The Phenomenology is his first book length text.  
5Hegel famously completed the last few hurried sections to meet his deadline as the battle of 
Jena raged outside and the French defeated the Prussian army. Desperately trying to meet his 
deadline to avoid a harsh penalty threatened by his publisher and Hegel found himself faced with 
the challenge of how to get the final pages of his manuscript to the publisher and when the only 
route was through a warzone and across enemy lines. See, Houlgate, Stephen, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). p. 1 and Singer, Peter. Hegel, A Very Short 
Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 10 
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consciousness assuming an immediate position, subsequently adopting an 
opposing position and then finally realising the way forward is to encompass both 
but frequently unable or unwilling to do so, making the whole into a series of 
stages between which it is in fact we the reader that make the progression. 
Stephen Houlgate characterises this effect by casting Hegel and his reader as the 
Phenomenological Observers, “our role as phenomenologists, is to think through 
the experience that consciousness is required to make by its own conception of 
the object. […] ‘we’ comprise the philosopher (acting as phenomenologist) and 
the readers if the Phenomenology.”6 The progression or movement between the 
stage described is performed then by both Hegel and his reader. 
 
The various stages in the development of consciousness are divided amongst the 
three major divisions of the text, giving The Phenomenology a noticeably tripartite 
structure, like Elements of the Philosophy of Right, and again there is an imbalance 
to the text with the third section being considerably larger than the preceding 
two.7 The Phenomenology does not suffer the interruptive Anmerkungen and 
Züsatze of Elements. It should be noted however that the section that will be 
explicated later in this chapter, and the section that has been of most interest to 
French Hegelian scholarship, is the one that disrupts the tripartite structure. The 
simplest way to begin to understand the text initially is to consider the relationship 
between the three major divisions. Part A Consciousness, is concerned with a kind 
                                                          
6 Houlgate, Stephen, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 23 
7 See Appendix 2, Diagram of the Structure of The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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of consciousness whose object is something other than itself.8 Part B Self-
Consciousness, is concerned with a kind of consciousness whose object is itself.9 
Part C Reason, is concerned with the kind of a consciousness whose object is a 
unity between itself and what is not itself, that is both a unity between subject 
and object and a unity between the individual and the universal. However as can 
be seen in the diagram of the structure in Appendix 2, the chapters labelled with 
Roman Numerals from their own progression through the three parts. 
 
In A Consciousness, Hegel describes three main stages of consciousness in this 
division, which he calls Sense Certainty, Perception and Understanding and which 
he explores in sub-sections of the same name. In I Sense Certainty, consciousness 
initially believes that that the object is immediate and simple and that knowledge 
of it is therefore immediate and specific (this thing, here, now). For Hegel, 
observing the experience of the negation of this belief that consciousness 
undergoes, causes us as Phenomenological Observers to realise that knowledge is 
in fact relational (this thing not that one, here not there, now and not previously 
or in the future). In II Perception, consciousness takes the object to be a self-
identical thing with many properties and where these properties are contradictory 
properties (different heres and nows); this is a fault of perception not the object. 
For Hegel, observing the experience of the negation of this belief causes us to 
realise that relational knowledge allows for opposition and separation as much as 
it does connection and unity. In III Force and Understanding, consciousness takes 
                                                          
8 Robert Stern summarises this the dialectic of the object. Stern, R, The Routledge Guide Book to 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), p. 43 
9 Robert Stern summarises this section as the dialectic of the subject. Stern, Ibid., p. 71 
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the opposing properties of the object to be a play of forces in which each solicits 
the other in turn. For Hegel, observing the negation of this belief causes us to 
realise that that the knowledge we have of the object is in fact a process in which 
differences arise and immediately undermine one another, Hegel calls this infinity.  
 
In B Self-Consciousness, the pattern of subdivisions and corresponding stages, 
established so far and which will be picked up again in C Reason, is abandoned. 
There is only one numbered subdivision in part B Self-Consciousness and this is 
entitled IV The Truth of Self-Certainty. This is itself further divided into two 
sections entitled A Lordship and Bondage, and B Stoicism, Scepticism and The 
Unhappy Consciousness. In both the sections Hegel describes the further 
consequences of consciousness’s inability or unwillingness to encompass the 
opposing positions it has encountered through its experience. For Hegel, Self–
Consciousness is a new stage of consciousness in which consciousness recognises 
that the infinity (the process of differences arising and undermining each other) it 
has found in the object is also found in itself. In this section, which will be 
explicated further shortly, consciousness now seeks to understand itself in 
relation to another consciousness rather than an object. By the end of this section 
consciousness is struggling to resolve an impasse between itself as individual and 
what is other than it and therefore universal. 
 
In C Reason, Hegel reverts to the previous pattern of explicating three main stages 
of consciousness which he calls V The Certainty of Truth and Reason, VI Spirit and 
VII Religion. Also included in this part, although much shorter than the others (just 
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over two pages), and without the usual explication of an initial position, an 
opposing one, and the impasse between them, is the final destination for 
consciousness and Hegel’s grand finale, VIII Absolute Knowing. In V The Certainty 
of Truth and Reason, consciousness initially believes that there is an immediate 
unity between the individual and the universal and it takes both itself and the 
world to have that structure. For Hegel, observing the negation of this belief 
causes us to realise that for an individual consciousness it is they themselves that 
makes the universal actual and that to truly understand the universal we must 
next observe a consciousness that is not individual. In VI Spirit, consciousness is 
now not an individual consciousness but is the consciousness of individuals (self-
consciousness plural) bound by law (the universal).10 This kind of consciousness 
initially believes that there is an immediate unity between law and an individual. 
For Hegel, observation of the experience of the negation of this belief (via the 
intermediate opposing belief that the unity of the individual and the universal 
occurs in or is mediated by language and several further stages in which the 
individual finally comes to see the universal or absolute as that which is made 
manifest between individuals) causes us to realise that the next stage of 
consciousness would need to understand this absolute as the divine and to see 
itself, self-consciousness, in the divine. In VII Religion, consciousness is now not 
that of an individual but of that of a religion. This consciousness initially does not 
see itself in the divine and represents the divine to itself as nature in general or as 
a specific animal or, Hegel claims, plant. The advent of religious practices in which 
                                                          
10 In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel expands of the sketch of Spirit begun in this 
chapter. 
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the divine is represented in a human form provides negation of the other initial 
type of religious practice for Hegel. However, these newer practices which see the 
divine as having human form still conceive of the true nature of the divine as 
available to self-consciousness only in glimpses and Hegel calls these practices 
Revealed Religion. For Hegel, observation of this negation causes us to conclude 
that what is required is a religion or a religious consciousness in which it is 
conceived that the divine is manifest and in a form such that self-consciousness 
can see itself in the divine. For Hegel, this religion or religious consciousness is 
Christianity.  However, for Hegel there is one final stage of consciousness in which 
the consciousness comes to realise that it is not just that they can see their own 
shape in the divine, but that there is an essential identity between them. 
 
In VIII Absolute Knowing Hegel describes this final stage, or rather he describes 
what it will be when it eventually comes to pass. Absolute Knowing will be a 
consciousness which has being as its object. This will be a consciousness which will 
have replaced what Hegel calls picture thinking with thought which is an 
understanding that the subject and object, the universal and the absolute have 
the same form, that of the concept. 
 
Self-Consciousness  
The discussion of Self-Consciousness, as can now be seen from the overview just 
given, occupies a slightly odd place in The Phenomenology.11 Logically, Self-
                                                          
11 For Judith Butler, whose main interest in the Phenomenology is desire which is discussed in the 
Self-Consciousness section, “The appearance of desire at this juncture is curious, for if the 
progress of the Phenomenology is impelled by desire, why does desire emerge as an explicit 
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Consciousness is the bridge between Consciousness and Reason, but the size of 
the third part, C Reason, locates the discussion of Self-Consciousness not halfway 
through the text as might be reasonably expected but in fact barely a quarter of 
the way through the entire text. As previously noted the structure of part B Self-
Consciousness is not the tripartite one used in part A Consciousness or part C 
Reason, just one numbered subdivision is given (rather than three).12 Within the 
single numbered subdivision, the pattern of initial position, an opposing one and 
a third position that would encompass both is frequently present. However, this 
single subdivision is then followed by two further subdivisions (A Lordship and 
Bondage and B Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness) which 
further examine the consequences of consciousness being unable to take up a 
position that would encompass the opposition described. This all combines to give 
the discussion of Self-Consciousness and its location in the text the feel of a short 
interruptive diversion before the main part of the text begins. This description 
seems startling, almost absurd when considered against the extraordinary 
influence this particular section of The Phenomenology has had not just on French 
Twentieth Century Philosophy as but more widely both culturally and globally 
speaking, due to its take up and transformation by Marx as we saw in the 
discussions in the Introduction.13 
                                                          
theme only in the fourth chapter of the text?” As we will see, the arrival of Self-Consciousness is 
problematic as arrival, as it seems for Nancy and Butler that its content is pre-supposed from the 
beginning by Hegel. Butler, J. Subjects of Desire, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 
24 
12 Please see Appendix 2, Diagram of the Structure of The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
13 For Peter Singer, "perhaps the most celebrated passage in the Phenomenology concerns the 
relationship of a master to a slave, it well, illustrates what Hegel means by dialectic and it 
introduces and idea echoed in Marx's view of the relationship between capitalist and worker." 
Singer, Peter. Marx (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 17 
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Part B, Section IV) The Truth of Self-Certainty 
Hegel’s discussion of the concept of Self-Consciousness occurs in the short 
numbered subdivision entitled IV The Truth of Self-Certainty. In this section, Hegel 
expounds what he considers to be the next logical form of consciousness given 
the impasse reached in the previous section. In the prior section A Consciousness, 
consciousness has as its object something that is other than it.  In this form, 
consciousness understands that the differing properties of the object before it, 
are due to what Hegel calls a Play of Forces in which differences solicit each other 
reciprocally and therefore are, that is they exist, only through each other. Initially 
however consciousness believes that in actuality or appearance, these differences 
are dissolved in unity whereas in the non-actual concept or inner being, these 
differences are held together but with their differences none-the-less intact. At 
the close of A Consciousness, consciousness is facing an impasse between 
appearance and inner being and for Hegel it is we, (writer and reader as 
Phenomenological Observers) who realise that “we have to think pure change, or 
think antithesis with in the antithesis itself, or contradiction.”14 The antithesis of 
antithesis, or pure change, is for Hegel infinity, or “the simple essence of life, the 
soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed 
nor interrupted by any difference.” (PoS, pp162). Instances of difference are 
merely separate “sundered moments” of this infinity. What was taken for 
opposition is in fact therefore the self-relation of this infinite essence of Life. 
According to Hegel therefore, 
                                                          
14 Hegel, G.W.F. The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V.Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), p. 99. pp. 160. Hereafter referred to in the text as PoS, followed by paragraph number.  
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we do not need to ask the question, still less to think that fretting over a such a question is 
philosophy, or even that it is a question philosophy cannot answer, the question viz. ‘How, 
from this pure essence, how does difference or otherness issue forth from it?’  (PoS, pp. 
162). 
 
This realisation that difference is in fact the self-relation of the infinite essence of 
Life is not made by consciousness as a result of its experience (which has led to an 
impasse) but by us as readers, as we reflect on what consciousness has 
undergone.15 Furthermore, once we realise the proper nature of difference, that 
it is the result of viewing moments of self-relation in isolation, it is no longer 
necessary to concern ourselves with how this wrongly imagined difference arises. 
What is important for Hegel is that consciousness as it is at the end of Part A, is 
not capable of the reflection and realisation that we have just undergone and 
therefore the next move is to examine the next stage of consciousness in the 
search for the kind that is capable of the reflection and realisation described. 
 
Hegel begins IV The Truth of Self-Certainty, with a description of the initial position 
of this new stage or shape of self-consciousness. Initially Self-Consciousness is 
aware of itself and that which is not itself, or that which is other, and it takes this 
other to be mere appearance. Truth for Self-Consciousness is no longer to be 
found in the object which revealed itself as a sundered moment of the infinite 
essence of Life, and although Self-Consciousness still does not understand this, it 
none the less feels the need to negate what is other than it. Therefore, for Hegel, 
“in point of fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world 
                                                          
15 For Houlgate,”sense-certainty experiences those micro-transitions [it experiences its belief 
being negated] but it does not experience the macro-transition- we do.” Houlgate, Ibid., p. 43 
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of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from otherness.” (PoS, 
pp167). Self-consciousness finds its truth in its return from having negated 
otherness, from having consumed it, a process which Hegel terms Desire and 
which forms the first moment of Self-Consciousness.16 
 
In the second moment, Self-Consciousness begins to finds this negation less 
satisfactory. For Hegel, this is because this Self-Consciousness is negating 
instances of otherness but not otherness itself. For Hegel, “Thus self-
consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it” 
(PoS , pp.175). By relating to the object (the instance of otherness) as something 
that must be negated, Self-Consciousness makes itself dependant on the object, 
all the while unware that it is not negation of the object but instead negation of 
what that object is an instance of (otherness) that will actually satiate the Desire 
of Self-Consciousness. The effect is that negation or consumption of the object is 
unsatisfactory and that the object is in fact still un-negated and not superseded. 
For Hegel, it is clear that a third moment of Self-Consciousness is required. 
 
In this third moment Self-Consciousness achieves satisfaction “when the object 
itself effects the negation within itself.” (PoS, pp.175). It now appears that there 
a situation in which Self-Consciousness can achieve satisfaction and this is when 
the object negated, the instance of otherness, is in fact able to carry out that 
                                                          
16 Butler makes the point that Desire at this stage in the Phenomenology is associated with 
“animal appetite” a connation carried more strongly in the German Begierde, but that for Hegel 
human desire will be distinguished from animal desire “in virtue of its reflexivity, its philosophical 
project, and its rhetorical project.” Butler, Ibid, p. 33 
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negation itself. For Hegel, what we Phenomenological Observers realise is that the 
only entity capable of this self negation is something else with consciousness, 
thus, for Hegel, “Self-consciousness achieves it satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness.” (PoS, pp.175). Self-consciousness achieves satisfaction in its 
return to itself following the negation of an other (or the causing of negation 
within an other) that is also a self-consciousness. Self-Consciousness then, finds 
its satisfaction in what Hegel calls a “double reflection” (PoS, pp.176). For Hegel, 
“with this, we have already have before us the Notion of Spirit. What still lies 
ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is- […] ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and 
‘We’ that is ‘I’.” (PoS, pp.177). At this stage, Self-Consciousness is experiencing 
unity with another Self-Consciousness only through negation; what we the 
Phenomenological Observers realise is that unity that Self-Consciousness is 
enjoying comes not from the negation of the other but the mutual recognition 
between itself and the other Self-Consciousness, the further development of 
which will become Spirit. At this point in the text however Hegel prefers to 
postpone describing the next stage of consciousness but instead to consider the 
consequences of a relation between self-consciousnesses in which there is there 
is recognition but in which status is unequal, that of the Lord and Bondsman.17  
 
Part B, Section IV, Subsection A) Lordship and Bondage 
                                                          
17 A similar translation problem occurs here as with Sovereign and Monarch in the previous 
chapter. Whilst English language translations of Hegel use Lord and Bondsman, Hegel’s 
commentators and interlocutors often use Master and Slave, such as Judith Butler and Bruce 
Baugh. To avoid clashing with my citations I use Lord and Bondsman. Baugh, Bruce. French Hegel: 
From Surrealism to Postmodernism, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), Butler, J. Subjects of Desire, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
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Hegel begins his explication by describing the initial position of the two self-
consciousness who will become the Lord and Bondsman. For Hegel, “Self-
consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness: it has come out if itself […]it 
has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being.” (PoS, pp. 179). Self-
consciousness is faced by another and so “comes out” of itself, leaving itself 
behind and losing itself. The first Self-consciousness (Georg) realises the second 
Self-consciousness (Wilhelm) resembles itself, Georg. In this realisation, Georg 
finds himself again. What has happened is not that Georg sees himself and 
Wilhelm as the same, but that he sees Wilhelm as like himself (Georg), in the sense 
of modelled after or in relation to an original. However, exactly the same thing has 
been happening for Wilhelm on the other side of the interaction. This is important 
because for Hegel, “action by one side only would be useless because what is to 
happen can only be brought about by both” (PoS, pp. 182). What follows will be 
the consequence of both Georg and Wilhelm each recognising the other, not as 
an equal but as something other which is in some way like themselves but crucially 
is not fully, equally, so.18 
 
Hegel explicates this paradoxical double occurrence of a kind of one-sided 
recognition further, “appearing thus immediately on the scene, they are for one 
another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the 
being [or immediacy] of Life.” (PoS, pp.186.) Each self-consciousness appears for 
the other as a kind self-consciousness which is like themselves but which differs 
                                                          
18 For Houlgate, “Self-consciousness’s situation is ambiguous, therefore because the way in 
which it sees itself in the other deprives it of a clear consciousness of either itself or the other”. 
Houlgate, Ibid. p. 90 
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by being more object-like and submerged in Life. Each self-consciousness, which 
regards itself as a pure abstraction from Life or pure negativity, then seeks the 
death of the other at the risk of its own life, in order to demonstrate this lack of 
attachment to Life as “it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won.” 
(PoS, pp.187) However, the demonstration is meaningless if it is not recognized 
and this recognition requires that the other who does the recognising and the one 
who is recognised are both alive. In this way for Hegel, “this trial by death, 
however, does away with the truth which is supposed issue from it”. (PoS, p. 114, 
pp. 188). If either party win the trial by death and therefore the other dies, mutual 
recognition cannot take place, therefore the two self-consciousness are faced 
with an impasse and assume new roles. 
In this final position, 
there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself 
but for another, i.e., is a merely immediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of 
thinghood. […] The former is the lord, the other is the bondsman. (PoS, pp. 189) 
 
The two self-consciousness who until now have been, despite both their refusal 
to acknowledge it, in fact exactly the same, now become to two different types of 
self-consciousness. The first type, the Lord, still believes itself to be free from 
attachment to life but allows the other to live and to provide the desired 
recognition of this. The second type gives up seeking the death of the Lord and 
submits, truly becoming the thing-like consciousness that each self-consciousness 
initially took the other to be, this is the Bondsman.  
 
However, just as with previous stages of consciousness, reflection on the part of 
the Phenomenological Observer reveals that the understanding that 
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consciousness has of its own experience turns out to in fact invert what is 
occurring. Both the Lord and the Bondsman see the Lord as being independent 
and less dependent of life and things as it is the Lord that has won the struggle 
and now no longer has to deal with things directly. This is because the Bondsman 
can prepare things for consumption by the Lord who is then free to consume for 
pleasure, unlike the Bondsman. In this way, the Lord is reaffirmed to himself as 
Lord. However, what we as Phenomenological Observers can see is that the Lord 
is dependent on the Bondsman to mediate for him between himself (the Lord) and 
what he is not; the Lord is therefore not the independent nature he (and the 
Bondsman) take him to be. For Hegel,  
just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too 
servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is. 
(PoS, pp. 193)  
 
The Bondsman shares the Lord’s view that the Lord is less attached to things and 
independent and that the Bondsman is more attached and essentially dependant. 
The Bondsman see things as independent and resisting him, and that negation is 
only for the Lord who consumes things. What we as Phenomenological Observers 
can see is that that in fact the Bondsman achieves a different kind of negation to 
the Lord, he does not consume or obliterate things but instead changes them by 
working on them.19 In working on things and imposing a new form on them, the 
Bondsman sees his selfhood in the object he is working on and accesses a freedom 
denied the Lord. This freedom is not in spite of the fact the work undertaken by 
the Bondsman is forced through fear of death at the hands of the Lord, as for 
                                                          
19 For Robert Stern, “the slave therefore comes to a different conception of individuality from 
that adopted by the master (who has not gone much beyond desire)”. Stern, Ibid. p. 85 
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Hegel, “in fear, the being-for-self is present in the bondsman himself; in fashioning 
the thing he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him.” (PoS, pp.195) It 
is in labour that the Bondsman becomes aware of himself as pure negativity, 
unattached to Life and being-for-self, (i.e. himself as he was before he submitted 
to the Lord), precisely because he sees this being-for-self in the thing he has 
transformed. Just as the Bondsman has begun to realise what we as 
Phenomenological Observers can see, so too does the Lord for whom the 
Bondsman becomes the constant reminder of the Lord’s utter dependence. In the 
next section, Stoicism, Scepticism and The Unhappy Consciousness, Hegel explores 
further the experience of the Bondsman. 
 
Part B, Section IV, Subsection B) Stoicism, Scepticism, The Unhappy Consciousness 
For Hegel, the Bondsman will pass through three stages as he becomes aware of 
his conflicted freedom. In the first stage, Stoicism, the Bondsman attempts to 
negate things not by consuming them or working on them but by thinking about 
and understanding them, as for the Stoic, “in thinking I am free, because I am not 
in an other.” (PoS, pp. 197)  The Stoic turns inwards into themselves in their 
enslavement and is indifferent to things and Life, finding freedom in thought. As 
Phenomenological Observers we quickly see that this freedom is only abstract and 
not actual and that the negation is only partial. For Hegel it is “Scepticism [that] is 
the realization of that which Stoicism was only the Notion, and is the actual 
experience of what the freedom of thought is.” (PoS, pp.202) The Sceptic commits 
truly to finding freedom in thought and is not just indifferent to things and Life but 
“annihilates” them in thought, regarding them as having no reality exterior to 
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thought and to be merely a “medley” of sensuous appearances. The Sceptic also 
considers their own changing perceptions to have no reality and to be part of this 
medley or flux of Life and each of these previous perceptions are also annihilated. 
In this way for Hegel, at this stage, “consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical 
unrest.” (PoS, pp.205) as The Stoic cannot settle on an identity but constantly, 
restlessly moves on from what it previous took itself be and what it find itself to 
be now in the freedom that comes in the wake of the annihilation. For Hegel “from 
this experience emerges a new form of consciousness which brings together the 
two thoughts which Scepticism holds apart,” (PoS, pp.206) that is, a form of 
conscious which holds together the previous annihilated self and the newly 
discovered self. This new form of consciousness is the Unhappy Consciousness. 
 
In the Unhappy Consciousness “the duplication [of consciousness] which formerly 
was divided between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged 
in one.” (PoS, pp. 206) The Unhappy Consciousness is, however, as yet unaware 
that it is an essential part of its nature to be duplicated in this way, true awareness 
does not come until the consciousness reaches stage of Spirit. The Unhappy 
Consciousness sees itself instead as problematically divided into two opposing 
parts or identities, the individual Changeable and the universal Unchangeable, 
although it “takes itself to be merely the Changeable, and the Unchangeable is, 
for it, an alien Being.” (PoS, pp. 208) As the Unhappy Consciousness is unable to 
settle happily in either of these identities it assumes that its essential nature must 
be to be Changeable and that the part of it which seems to be Unchangeable is an 
alien part.  The Unhappy Consciousness therefore is alienated from its own 
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essential nature which we the Phenomenological Observers can see.20 Faced with 
this impasse, the Unhappy Consciousness seeks to “raise” itself out of its 
individual Changeable nature and seek union with the universal Unchangeable.  
 
Hegel describes three stages of the experience of the attempt to achieve union 
with the Unchangeable by the Unhappy Consciousness; Devotion, Gratitude, 
Asceticism. In Devotion, the Unhappy Consciousness does not relate to the 
Unchangeable as a thinking thing but feels a devotional yearning towards it.  In 
this way Consciousness can achieve a union of sorts with the Unchangeable but 
cannot grasp its conceptual form and Hegel says that Consciousness “only feels it 
[the union]and has fallen back into itself.” (PoS, pp.217) 
 
In the second experience, the Unhappy Consciousness comes to believe that 
things are incarnations of The Unchangeable. It is through the beneficence of the 
Unchangeable which has surrendered its “embodied form” (PoS, pp.220) that 
Consciousness is able to negate things by desire and working on them. In a 
reciprocal gesture the Unhappy Conscious now surrenders itself in gratitude and 
seeks union with the Unchangeable in this way. However, this surrender is an 
action and in acting, the Unhappy Consciousness asserts itself as an individual and 
the union immediately collapses.  
 
                                                          
20 For Bruce Baugh, “at the stage of the unhappy consciousness, consciousness experiences itself 
not simply as negativity but as a nothing.” Baugh, Bruce. French Hegel: From Surrealism to 
Postmodernism. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), p. 3 
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In the third experience, Asceticism, The Unhappy Consciousness becomes “aware 
of itself as this actual individual in the animal functions.” (PoS, pp.225) In the wake 
of the collapse of the attempted union with the universal Unchangeable, the 
Unhappy Consciousness becomes painfully aware of its own individuality which 
prevented the union and turns against its own physical or animal self which is now 
the enemy or that which mediates the union with the Unchangeable. In an 
attempt to relieve itself of the burden of its hated individuality, the Unhappy 
Consciousness “casts upon the mediator or minister its own freedom of decision, 
and herewith the responsibility for its own action.” (PoS, pp. 136) In this sacrifice, 
the Unhappy Consciousness “in principle obtains relief from its misery” (PoS, 
pp.137) that is, it does allow itself to be taken over by the Unchangeable or so the 
minister tells it. However, as it has surrendered its own individuality the Unhappy 
Consciousness can take no enjoyment from this or feel any abatement of its 
wretchedness. For Hegel, a new type of consciousness is now required, one that 
could truly comprehend and indeed be the unity of the individual Changeable and 
the universal Unchangeable and this will turn out to be Reason. Hegel will then 
spend the remainder (and by far the largest part) of The Phenomenology of Spirit 
explicating this stage of consciousness. 
 
A Self That Does Not Complete 
If for Nancy, identity is that which exists in a restless trembling between 
significations, then the account of Self that Hegel gives in his explication of Self-
Consciousness, would seem to be concerned with an entirely different task of 
establishing what would be necessary for the Self to be complete and be at rest. 
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Whilst Hegel takes us through various iterations of the self and in the description 
of the Unhappy Consciousness offers us a Self utterly unable to complete and be 
at rest, for him the Self unable to complete is a problematic stage to be overcome 
on the way to eventual completion. 
 
In Part B, Section IV) The Truth of Self-Certainty, Hegel warns us of the danger of 
sundering moments as it gives the misleading impression that difference is 
between different entities whereas in fact it is always for him, merely the essence 
of Life relating to itself at different times or in different instances. In essence Hegel 
is making the valid point that describing movement in stages fails to capture 
movement, that each stage is a frozen snapshot like the images on a zoetrope 
drum which only give the illusion of movement. However, for Hegel the 
movement we are missing is when we sunder moments is the self-relation of one 
over-arching entity whose presence does not occur as a temporary event in 
restless movement but which is always in existence however appearance might 
mislead us. What is surprising is that, despite the warning not to sunder moments, 
that is exactly what Hegel does as each stage of consciousness is abandoned as 
we the Phenomenological Observers move to the next stage of consciousness. 
Hegel’s account of the development of conscious exposes countless incomplete 
interactions of self discarded along the way. 
 
In Part B, Section IV, Subsection A) Lordship and Bondage, each of the mortally 
opposed self-consciousness can see itself only in the return from negating the 
other but is unable to achieve this as such as it to complete here would require 
164 
 
killing the one who provides the necessary recognition. The two selves described 
who go on to become either the Lord or The Bondsman, are each a self which 
cannot complete. Whilst further reflection reveals that the initial state of 
dependence and independence of these two is ultimately the opposite of what it 
appears to be, they remain incomplete and new stage of consciousness is posited 
to overcome the impasse.  
 
In, Part B, Section IV, Subsection B) Stoicism, Scepticism, The Unhappy 
Consciousness, the Stoic turned away from the world and things in his 
enslavement, affecting an indifference towards them. The Sceptic on the other 
hand tries to actively annihilate the world and things including himself in order to 
find himself as he “returns” from that annihilation. The wretched Unhappy 
Consciousness who tries in vain to surrender its individuality in the universal only 
to assert its individuality in the very act, is truly a self that cannot complete its 
identity. Paradoxically however it does assert itself in the face of all that is not 
itself. As we will see in the next section, this paradoxical individuality will be 
central to Nancy’s account of Singularity. 
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4.3 Singularity in Nancy’s Being Singular Plural 
 
Being Singular Plural 
Nancy’s account of his notion of Being Singular Plural is given in his essay “Being 
Singular Plural” which occurs in the collection of the same name. The collection is 
made up of essays which relate more or less to this central idea in which there 
are, as Morin describes, 
singularities whose identity or selfhood can only be found in their “relation” to other 
singularities; what exists finds itself in being exposed to or being in contact with other 
singularities in such a way that nothing exists or makes sense on its own.21 
 
Published in French as Être singular pluriel, in 1996, the original collection 
consisted of five essays including the title one, with a sixth essay added for the 
Stanford University Press translation I shall be using.22  
 
The essay “War, Right, Sovereignty-Technē” appeared first in Les Temps Modernes 
1991 and is concerned with being–with in the context of International Law as part 
of a response by Nancy to a request for a reflection on War and Technology. The 
essay “Eulogy for the Mêlée” is concerned with the multiplicity of identity with a 
particular focus on the identity conveyed by the proper name “Sarajevo”, (the city 
itself was still under siege at the time the essay was written). The essay appeared 
in several journals and magazines in 1993 (in German in LettreInternationale, in 
                                                          
21 Morin, M-E. Jean-Luc Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p. 2.  
22 Nancy, JL. Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert.D.Richardson and Anne.E.O’Byrne, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000). Hereafter referred to in the text as BSP followed by page 
number. 
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Serbian in Mostovoi) as well as in French in Transeuropénnes whose director 
Ghislane Glasson-Deschaumes had requested the piece.23 The essay “The Surprise 
of the Event” is presented without prior publishing details and appears in the 
original French line up so it is fair to assume that it was written for the original 
French publication of the Being Singular Plural collection. The essay itself is 
concerned with the notion of event as Nancy finds it in an isolated quote from 
Hegel’s Science of Logic and the need, for Nancy, to think the surprise and chance 
inherent in event in order to be able to comprehend the event of meaning or 
identity. Like The Speculative Remark, the essay does not provide a critique of The 
Science of Logic as a whole, but uses a single sentence as a taking off point for a 
meditation. The essay “Human Excess” appeared in the Journal européen in 1984 
and is concerned with number and excess, that is, the excess, multiplicity or 
plurality inherent for Nancy in meaning and in relation. The essay “Cosmos 
Baselius” has been added for the English translation and appeared first in the 
internet journal Basileus in 1998. The essay is concerned with the diverse nature 
of the unity of the world (we share it which means we equally access it and are 
divided by it) and how, or if, justice can function in this situation. 
 
Singularity 
The essay “Being Singular Plural” is considerably more substantial than the other 
essays in the collections (it is well over three times the length all the others essays 
except “War, Right, Sovereignty-Technē”), consisting of thirteen separate titled 
                                                          
23 See footnote in Nancy, JL. Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert.D.Richardson and 
Anne.E.O’Byrne, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 205 
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sections, which, says Nancy, “can be read in any order” (BSP, p. xv) having been 
composed non-sequentially. However, the fourth, fifth and sixth sections, which 
include one entitled Being Singular Plural, were presented together as a separate 
piece by Nancy at a conference at Vanderbilt University in 1996 entitled 
“Openings: The Space of Thinking” in January 1996. Uncharacteristically, Nancy 
gives a very clear intention in the preface to the collection, declaring that “this 
text does not disguise its ambition of re-doing the whole of “first philosophy” by 
giving the “singular plural of Being as its foundation.” (BSP, p. xv). What follows 
however is not a treatise, which Nancy claims is inappropriate for this task and for 
which at the time of writing he had not the strength but instead an offering of 
thirteen interlinked meditations on singular plural being as that which is 
foundational for a consideration of Being, foundational for Philosophy. 24 As Nancy 
points out there is a certain amount of repetition amongst these thirteen sections 
and therefore I will proceed by briefly describing each but giving a more focussed 
reading on the central three sections which work well as a cohesive section of 
their own. These are the same three sections which were presented together as a 
piece at Vanderbilt University. 
 
In the first three sections, We Are Meaning, People Are Strange and Gaining 
Access to the Origin, Nancy considers the notions that “there is no meaning if it is 
not shared” (BSP. p. 2), “from one singular to another, there is contiguity but not 
                                                          
24 In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s Nancy had suffered serious ill health, undergoing a heart 
transplant and then a fight with cancer which developed as a result of the medication he took in 
order to stop his body rejecting the new heart, famously writing about this experience in the 
essay “The Intruder” Nancy, J.L, Corpus trans. Richard A. Rand, (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008). 
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continuity ” (BSP. p.5) and the idea that “if the origin is irreducibly plural [which 
for him it is] it need not operate then, in the dialectical mode.” (BSP, p. 12) For 
Nancy meaning is always shared but however that meaning is not passed from 
one to another, but exists where we meet, where we are contiguous. Origin 
therefore is not the one true version of accounts or meaning, but something that 
is plural, it signifies nothing other than shared meaning and a dialectical approach 
which would seek to resolve this plurality would not expose this. The next three 
sections The Creation of The World and Curiosity, Between Us: First Philosophy 
and Being Singular Plural formed the paper given by Nancy at Vanderbilt 
University in 1996 and I will explicate these in further detail in the section that 
follows this one. 
 
In the next four sections, Co-existence, Conditions of Critique, Co-appearing and 
The Spectacle of Society, Nancy considers the suitability of Situationist critique 
(and the thought of Guy Debord in particular) as a tool for exposing Being Singular 
Plural.25 For Nancy this “critique remains obedient to the most trenchant and 
“metaphysical” tradition of philosophy, […] the refusal to consider an order of 
“appearances.” (BSP, p.52) and furthermore, “there is no society without the 
spectacle of society” (BSP. p. 67). For Nancy, in order to understand Being Singular 
Plural we must attend to how it appears (i.e. between us) which means not 
                                                          
25 Nancy’s section title is a deliberate play on Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle. For 
Debord, “The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as society itself, as part of society [...] but 
due to the very fact that this sector is separate, it is in reality the domain of delusion and false 
consciousnesses, the unification it achieves is nothing but an official language of universal 
separation" Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Ken Knabb, (London: Rebel Press, 
2000) p.7 
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regarding appearance as something false which obscures a hidden true reality and 
recognising that spectacle is itself a co-appearing and therefore constituent of 
society not a secondary corruption of it. For Nancy what is to be gained if we can 
do this, is the insight that, “not only must Being with one another not be 
understood starting from the presupposition of being-one, but on the contrary, 
being-one […] can only be understood by starting with being-with-one another” 
(BSP. p.56). For Nancy, singular being can only by understood by starting from 
being-with-one another because what this shows us is that in fact being-one and 
being-with one-another are the same thing, an insight which is lost when we try 
to multiply being-one in order to understand being-with one another. 
 
In the final three sections, The Measure of the “With”, Body, Language and Co-
existential Analytic, Nancy considers the notion that “the “we” is not a subject […] 
neither is the “We” “composed” of subjects”, (BSP. p. 75) and that, “Language is 
the exposing of plural singularity” (BSP, p.84). For Nancy, the “we”, that is being-
with-one another, is not something that can be looked at as a made up of subjects 
which form something that itself is singular and which can then be considered as 
subject itself, rather, being-with-one another is nothing other than plural 
singularity, which is exposed in language. In the final section, Nancy concludes the 
essay by setting his project in relation to that of Heidegger (for Nancy Heidegger’s 
consideration of Mitsein is a preliminary sketch of being singular plural) and 
stating that, “we understand ourselves infinitely, ourselves and the world and 
nothing else” (BSP. p.98). For Nancy, what is possible for us to understand is 
ourselves which means understanding the relation between ourselves as beings 
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that are with one another, and the relation between ourselves and anything and 
everything that is not ourselves, that is, the world.  
 
The Creation of The World and Curiosity 
In the first of three sections originally presented as the Vanderbilt paper, Nancy 
sates that, “the concept of the “creation of the world” represents the origin as 
originally shared, spaced between us and between all beings.” (BSP p. 15) For 
Nancy, the very notion of the creation of the world does not show that there must 
be a creator but instead points to an implicit understanding that “the world” is a 
situation of the experience of “between us” and it comes to be as this world, as a 
situation that is already between us. 26  As such, the origin of the world or of the 
situation between us, is shared and in fact for Nancy this points to the inescapable 
conclusion that origin itself is shared.  
 
Meditating further on the notion of creation, Nancy says, “if creation is indeed this 
singular ex-position of being, then its real name is existence. Existence is creation, 
our creation; it is the beginning and end that we are.” (BSP, p. 17) If we accept 
creation as something that is without a creator but which, in a way particular to 
itself, exposes the coming into being of being itself, then for Nancy its real name 
is existence, because there is for him no difference between being and being’s 
coming into being. This simultaneous being and coming into being is for Nancy the 
situation of “we” or the between us and as such it is our creation, i.e., it belongs 
                                                          
26 Nancy does not indicate that he is referring use of this term by any particular thinker. 
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to the we. The situation of the “we” is therefore indistinguishable from its coming 
into being, it arrives as it is. 
 
Turning to consider further the notion of world in the notion of the creation of the 
world, Nancy states that, “it is not so much the world of humanity as it is the world 
of the nonhuman to which humanity is exposed and which humanity, in turn, 
exposes.” (BSP, p. 18) For Nancy when we are in this situation of there being a 
world it is not immediately apparent to us, to each being that forms the us, that 
the others who also form the us are also human, in fact they appear as nothing 
but otherness or pure alterity. For Nancy, “we find this alterity primarily and 
essentially intriguing […] because it exposes the always-other as origin.” (BSP, p. 
19) The alterity of those who also form the us, is essential to us and endlessly 
curious to us, because it exposes always the plurality of origin. Seemingly 
paradoxically, as the us we all share the experience of finding those who also make 
up the us to be other. 
 
Between Us: First Philosophy  
In this next section, Nancy considers the history of (and what a history itself would 
be) of philosophical politics, including a consideration of the relation between 
philosophy and “the city”, before stating that, “philosophical politics regularly 
proceeds according to the surreptitious appeal to a metaphysics of the one-origin, 
where at the same time it nevertheless exposes, volens nolens, the situation of 
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the dis-position of origins.” (BSP, p. 24) 27 For Nancy, philosophical politics as 
project which would seek to provide a philosophical ground for the understanding 
of and organisations humans in social groups or communities, is guided by the 
urge that the truth of a situation is; something that is singular, which underlies the 
appearance of a situation and must be therefore be revealed. However, this does 
not stop that project, whether or not it wishes or intends it, from none the less 
exposing the multiplicity of origin in its attempt to bring to light the one true 
origin. For Nancy, “once this horizon [political philosophy] is deconstructed 
however, the necessity of the plural singular of the origin comes into play.” (BSP. 
p. 24) When we reflect on the project of philosophical politics and consider how 
its underlying assumptions guide its conclusions, what becomes clear is that we 
must attend to the both singular and plural nature of the origin.  For Nancy whilst 
always shared this origin is always singular in that it occurs each in time in each of 
us that share it, therefore it is, however problematically, both singular and plural.  
 
Next, Nancy considers what he characterises as the most recent attempt at a first 
philosophy, that of Heidegger, referring to the famous opening of Being and Time 
in which Heidegger states that the question of the meaning Being has “today been 
forgotten.”28 For Nancy,  
it is less important to respond to the question of the meaning of Being (if it is a question, 
and if we do not already basically respond every day and each time…) than it is to pay 
attention to the fact of its exhibition. (BSP. p. 28). 
 
                                                          
27 The usual expression of this Latin phrase is nolens volens meaning willing or unwilling but for 
some reason which he does not give, Nancy reverses the order here. The meaning however is not 
lost. 
28 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), p. 2 
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For Nancy, the question of Being is in fact responded to, so therefore it is in some 
way asked, in our experience of being, over and over, each day and every time. 
For Nancy, what is key is to attend to is the exhibition of Being, that is, how we 
experience Being, which for Nancy is as one of the “we”, a situation which we find 
ourselves each time already involved in. 
 
Being Singular Plural 
In this next section, the final of the three that make up the Vanderbilt paper, 
Nancy focuses explicitly on his notion of Being Singular Plural. He begins by 
commenting on the syntactic function of the phrase; ““being” is a verb or noun; 
“singular“ and “plural” are nouns or adjectives; all can be rearranged in different 
combinations.” (BSP, p. 28) The multiplicity of possible orderings of these three 
terms is important for Nancy because it prevents singular and plural becoming 
predicates of Being. For Nancy, it is also vital to note that “Being does not pre-
exist its singular plural. To be more precise, Being absolutely does not pre-exist; 
nothing pre-exists; only what exists exists.” (BSP, p.29) For Nancy there is no being 
before we can think of it as singular plural, it is already always singular plural, not 
least because nothing pre-exists its own existence.  
 
For Nancy, “Being singular plural means the essence of Being is only as 
coessence.” (BSP, p. 30) Being, then, does not have a singular essence but has 
coessence, that is an essence that is shared. Being is not Being unless it is plural 
and singular also therefore it shares its essence with them. Nancy continues, 
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 Each time, “Being” is always an instance of Being […] it is also always an instance of “with”; 
singulars singularly together, where the togetherness is neither the sum, nor the 
incorporation, not the “society”, nor the “community” (where these words only give rise to 
problems). The togetherness of singulars is singularity “itself. (BSP. p. 33) 
 
Being is both singular and plural because it is always a singular instance of Being 
but it is also a singular instance of Being with. I am always a singular instance of 
me, but I am always with other singulars, I am a Being among Beings regardless of 
physical proximity. The with that I share with other Beings is not defined by 
number, not ensured by legislation or membership of community but it is 
coessential in that I am me in relation to other beings, as they are each themselves 
in relation to me and each other (for them I am just one of the others). Therefore, 
we share the fact that our essence is shared, our Being is coessential. For Nancy 
this is what singularity is, the sharing of the fact that we are singular only in 
relation to one another, there is no singular without a plural that a given singular, 
is an instance of. 
 
Considering the notion of Being Singular Plural and the wider scope of his own 
work, Nancy states that, “the retreat of the political does not signify the 
disappearance of the political […] the retreat of the political is the uncovering, the 
ontological laying bare of being-with.” (BSP. p. 37) The need to “retreat” the 
political was made by Nancy during the period in which worked closely with 
Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s culminating in the 
setting up the Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique following the 
conference on Derrida organised by the pair entitled Les fins de l'homme. The 
retreat of the political, that is the deconstruction of the theories of how to ensure 
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being-with through legislation and social organisation constitutes for Nancy the 
“ontological laying bare” or the exposing of the coessential nature of Being, that 
it is Being Singular Plural. 
 
Finally, Nancy turns to consider the problematic presentation of coessence; 
The co- itself and as such, the co-presence of Being, is not presentable as that Being which 
“is”, since it only in the distancing. It is unpresentable, not because it occupies the most 
withdrawn and mysterious region of Being, the region of nothingness, but quite simply 
because it is not subject to a logic of presentation. (BSP, p. p.40) 
 
For Nancy, the with of being-with, between us, relation or co coessence is 
precisely that which separates and connects simultaneously. It is not presentable 
because is not a being, it has no existence except as coessential with Being. This 
does not mean it is some kind of underlying mysterious or secret inner being which 
must be revealed to fully understand Being, but, is that which Being exposes.  
 
Singularity and Self-Consciousness 
Having reached the end of Nancy’s essay, as before, any mention on Nancy’s part 
of reading the essay as engagement with Hegel remains firmly undeclared. 
However, Nancy does not omit mention of Hegel’s thought entirely and in the 
section entitled Being Singular Plural, he remarks: 
when Hegel begins the Phenomenology of Spirit with the moment of “sense certainty”, 
where it appears that consciousness has not yet entered into relation with another 
consciousness, this moment is nonetheless characterised by the language with which 
consciousness appropriates for itself the truth of what is immediately sensible (the famous 
“now it is night”). In doing so, the relation to another consciousness remains surreptitiously 
presupposed. (BSP. p. 31) 
 
For Nancy, the philosophical tradition has generally explained singular being first 
and dealt with relation of these singular beings afterwards as a kind of secondary 
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phenomenon. However, for Nancy, these kinds of accounts given of singular being 
usually presuppose relational being, a point he also makes with respect to 
Heidegger and Descartes in the same section. In the case of Hegel, this 
presupposition is revealed, for Nancy, by Hegel’s language or in fact by language 
itself. For Nancy, the problematic different heres and nows that self-certainty 
grapples with regarding its own perception are in fact merely the stand-ins for the 
different heres and nows that belong to other beings that consciousness will be 
forced to deal with later in its progress through Hegel’s text. For Nancy, to give an 
account of Singularity will be, necessarily and unavoidably, to simultaneously give 
an account of beings in relation. Beyond this early remark, the engagement with 
Hegel’s thought becomes more opaque and therefore, in order to read for an 
undeclared engagement, it will be necessary to consider the moments in which 
Nancy’s thought on Singularity exposes itself in the account above to see how 
these could function as undeclared engagement on Hegel’s Self-Consciousness. 
In the explication given above of Nancy’s own explication of Singularity, I wish to 
draw out several key points to consider as engagements with Hegel’s thought. 
These are; that for Nancy to understand Being Singular Plural we must look at how 
it appears, that “we” is not a subject and relatedly that “we” arrives in the same 
manner in which it exists, that the question of being is not forgotten but lived 
every day and the finally that the coessence of Being Singular Plural is exposed 
when we attend to its coexistence. 
 
For Nancy, to understand Singularity or Being Singular Plural we must attend to 
how it appears. Singularity appears simultaneously with, or is coexistent with 
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beings in relation, a situation Nancy calls, variously, “we”, “between us” or 
sometimes” being-with-one-another”. For Nancy observing this provides the 
insight that we cannot understand Being Singular Plural from “being-one” and 
multiplying it but must start from understanding “being-with-one-another”. 
Nancy characterises the refusal to consider the order of appearances as 
“metaphysical” but apart from the claim the Situationist critique falls under this 
criterion, he does not elucidate which other thinkers this would also do so. As we 
have already seen Nancy believes Hegel to presuppose relation in his account of 
the supposedly singular start of the journey consciousness takes in The 
Phenomenology. In the previous chapter, we saw that for Hegel the coming-into-
being of the concept of right fell outside the science of right but in The 
Phenomenology he states in the Preface that “it is this coming –to-be of Science 
as such or of knowledge, that is described” (PoS, pp.27). Hegel’s intention is to 
describe to us his reader how consciousness own experience appears to itself at 
various stages of the development of consciousness. This is not the same as 
attending to appearance of the coming-into being of consciousness itself and 
furthermore the sequential staging of the different stages of conscious with the 
Phenomenological Observer as the one who connects these leaps would obscure 
any glimpse of the coming-to-be of the individual stages. For Nancy, the exposure 
of the simultaneous coexistence of singularity and being-with one another has an 
appearance of a different order to that of an individual stage. Hegel’s project 
would then, despite’s its own intentions, make an excellent example of the type 
of project that refuses to attend to the appearance of the coming-to-be of 
consciousness and can only comprehend isolated stages of it, missing therefore 
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the simultaneous coexistence of Singularity and beings in relation. This does not 
mean however that Hegel will be unable to give an account of Singularity that 
would satisfy Nancy but that he will give it in spite of his project and as we saw in 
the previous chapter, in a moment of unworking. 
 
For Nancy, the being-with-one-another or the “we”, is not a subject itself, nor is it 
a singular identity which is composed of a conglomeration of subjects. If 
Singularity is coexistent with the “we”, then there are two implications for 
Singularity from this notion, firstly that for Nancy, Singularity is not a component 
part of the “we” and secondly that for Nancy Singularity or being-one is not a 
subject. Additionally, for Nancy, the “we” arrives as it is, its existence and its 
coming-to-be are simultaneous, Singularity therefore must also arrive as it is, in 
simultaneous coming-to-be with being-together. In the preface to The 
Phenomenology, Hegel tells us, 
“The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than essence consummating itself 
through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that 
only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its’s nature, viz, to be 
actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself” (PoS, pp. 20) 
 
For Hegel, for something to be what it is, to be true, whole, actual and to have the 
single identity of a subject, is something that is a result at the end of a process, 
and end he calls the Absolute. Hegel’s depiction of Self-Consciousness as that 
which finds itself in the return from the other, is for him only a stage on the way 
to the final perfect insanitation of consciousness (it’s end) which he calls Absolute 
Knowing. Hegel’s depiction of the Unhappy Consciousness as a being in whom the 
consciousness of both the Lord and The Bondsman are lodged and who is 
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alienated from himself unable to reconcile his opposing natures is  not a depiction 
of a subject with a single identity but one of a Singular being who is 
problematically (for Hegel) coexistent. Hegel’s Unhappy Consciousness would 
then serve as a useful model for Nancy’s Singularity or Being Singular Plural 
despite its mode of arrival and place in a larger scheme, or to put it in Nancean 
terms, the Unhappy Consciousness offers and exposes itself as a depiction of being 
Singular Plural. 
 
For Nancy, the question of the meaning being is responded to every day and each 
time that each of us are and also that we, as we, are. For Nancy, it is attention to 
appearance or co-appearance of our being that will tell us more about being than 
a reformulation of the question of being, a point Nancy makes in reference to 
Heidegger. If Being Singular Plural is that which arrives as simultaneous coexistent 
Singularity and Being-together and for Nancy Being is nothing other than Being 
Singular Plural then the question of being is responded to each day and every time 
by a simultaneous coexistence. For Hegel, for all that he claims to be performing 
phenomenology, it is not possible to be content with observing the each day and 
every time occurrence of Being Singular Plural or The Unhappy Consciousness as 
a response to the question of Being, to know what is true and actual about being, 
the question must be framed in terms that will produce a result, which, resolves 
the prior opposition to give a whole in which “the true” can be known. The re-
doing “first philosophy” that Nancy admits to as an ambition (rather than declares) 
would then be one which would not mean to achieve its ambition by re-framing a 
question but by attending to the appearance, not of how consciousness would 
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appear to itself in particular situations but to the mode in which Singularity 
appears as coexistent to being-together. 
 
For Nancy, what is exposed when we attend to the simultaneous coexistence of 
Being Singular Plural is that Being Singular Plural is itself coessential. Nancy 
generally avoids neologisms, preferring to leave established tropes in problematic 
play but in the creation of his term Being Singular Plural he purposefully 
formulates a proposition in which the three components could be ordered in any 
combination without loss of meaning. Being Plural Singular for example would 
express the same coessential coexistence of the Singular and the Plural that Nancy 
is after and for Nancy this prevents Singular and Plural being predicated of Being 
and exposes the coessentiality of the three terms. What this coessential 
coexistence means for Nancy is that as Being is always coessential and coexistent 
with Being with, then Being is, and is only, Being Singular Plural and it is in an 
instant or an event. To be singular is to be coexistent with those with whom one 
is together in an occurrence of Being Singular Plural and as an occurrence, Being 
Singular Plural is not therefore for Nancy, “subject to a logic of presentation”. 
(BSP, p.40). As a temporary event of the being-together of two different entities, 
Being Singular Plural has no single identity to be presented, it remains therefore 
unpresentable and problematic therefore to speak of and for Nancy must be 
instead exposed. It this exposing that Nancy is after when he describes his call for 
a retreat of the political as an ontological laying bare of Being Singular Plural. As 
we saw previously, for Hegel the Absolute is a result,  
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“But this result itself is a simple immediacy, for it is self-conscious freedom at peace with 
itself, which is has not set the antithesis on side and left it lying there, but has been 
reconciled with it.” (PoS, pp. 21) 
 
For Hegel, the final stage of Consciousness, Absolute Knowing, is one in which 
consciousness is reconciled with itself, with its own internal oppositions, and it’s 
being is now one of simple immediacy, it arrives as it is. In this final stage, 
consciousness does seem to be somehow coessential, the antithesis has not been 
discarded but somehow incorporated in a way that does not dissolve the 
antithesis but allows it to be somehow presentable together with the thesis. 
However, for Hegel, what is presented is a simple immediacy, an identity, singular. 
Therefore, what Hegel wants at the culmination of the progress of consciousness 
is, one the hand, similar to what Nancy wants in Being Singular Plural, immediate 
spontaneous coming to be of the coessential, but on the other hand, Hegel wants 
this to be presentable, to be converted into something presentable, something 
therefore singular. For Hegel, “the Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, 
it is to be felt and intuited.” (PoS, pp. 6) The presentation therefore of this simple 
immediacy of a paradoxical coessential singularity is not to be comprehended or 
understood but is an experience of a different order. What we have now is a 
description strikingly similar to Nancy’s assertion that Being Singular Plural is not 
subject to the logic of presentation. The key difference however is that for Hegel 
this occurrence is not felt each day every time “we” are, but is the result of a 
process. For this reason, the Unhappy Consciousness which corresponds to 
Nancy’s description of Being Singular Plural as of course do many other stages of 
incomplete consciousness that Hegel describes in The Phenomenology, will not do 
for Hegel but must be reconciled, must be resolved to complete the process.  
182 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Reflections 
At the beginning of this chapter I set out the intention of offering a reading of 
Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit, which exposes an account of a Self that does 
not complete, which I promised to argue is the very situation that Nancy terms 
Being Singular Plural in his essay “Being Singular Plural”. So far, I have explicated 
Hegel’s description of Self-Consciousness as it appears in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, beginning with a condensed summary of the trajectory of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the place of the discussion of Self-Consciousness 
within it, drawing out the places in the text in which Hegel’s logic begin to unravel 
and reveal a Self which does not complete. I have also explicated Nancy’s 
description of Being Singular Plural as it appears in his essay “Being Singular Plural” 
beginning with a summary of the collection of the same name in which it appears, 
its relation to the other essays in the collection and drawing out the undeclared 
engagement in “Being Singular Plural” with Hegel’s account of Self-Consciousness. 
What remains is to outline the relationship between Nancy’s account of Being 
Singular Plural and a Self that does not complete, drawing on Nancy’s later essay 
“Banks, Edges, Limits (of singularity)” and various of Nancy’s commentators. 
Having drawn out the undeclared engagement with Hegel’s account of Self-
Consciousness, the following points emerged. Nancy’s notion that in order to 
understand Being Singular Plural we must look at how it appears, can be read as 
an engagement with Hegel’s missing of the appearance of the coming-into being 
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of Self-Consciousness and attending only to isolated stages of consciousness. 
Nancy’s notion that that the “we” is not a subject or composed of subjects and 
relatedly that the “we” arrives in the same manner in which it exists (it is 
coexistent with singularity) can be read as an engagement with Hegel’s need make 
singularity a stage on the way to beings in relation, a situation which arrives as a 
result and the end of a process.  Nancy’s notion that the question of being is not 
forgotten but lived or responded to every day whilst framed in his essay as a 
response to Heidegger in particular can also be seen as an engagement with 
Hegel’s claim to be performing Phenomenology but failing to attend to “each day 
and each time” occurrence of singular plural being, instead creating a structure 
that aims to yield a final result to the question of being. Nancy’s notion that that 
Being Singular Plural is not just coexistent with being-together it is also 
coessential, can be read as an engagement with Hegel’s exposure of coessence in 
the structure of Self-Consciousness but his unwillingness to leave this problematic 
coessence in its state of unspeakable unrest. 
 
Some eight years following the publication of the Being Singular Plural collection, 
Nancy published a short essay on Singularity in the journal Angelaki, entitled 
“Banks, Edges Limits (of singularity).” In the essay, whilst not using the term Being 
Singular Plural as such, Nancy seems very much to continue where he left off in 
Being Singular Plural by further refining his description of what it means to be 
singular.29 Nancy begins by asking and answering the following: “What is a 
                                                          
29 “Banks, Edges, Limits (of singularity)” even features a similar style to “Being Singular Plural”, 
replicating the divisions of text occasionally separated this time by a three dot rather than a 
three star ellipsis. 
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singularity? It is that which occurs only once, at a single point (out of time and out 
of place, in short), that which is an exception.”30 For Nancy, what is of interest is 
the point at which a singularity becomes a singularity, or becomes an exception 
and he examines the limit between the singularity and what is, or those that are, 
not, the singularity, remarking: 
the limit is therefore the interval, at once parted and without depth or thickness, which 
spaces the plurality of singulars; it is their mutual exteriority and the circulation between 
them. As a result, the limit is just as well what the singulars have in common. (BEL, p. 46) 
 
If the limit is what is between singulars then the edge is the exterior facing of a 
singular and therefore for Nancy, “in it [the edge] the unique limit pluralizes itself 
while singualrizing itself”. (BEL, p. 48) The edge as the exterior facing of a singular 
is the site at which the singular is singular in the face of its limit, or of that which 
or more accurately or those who are not, the particular singular. The arrangement 
of singulars and the limit between them is not a pre-given pre-existing harmony 
but arrives in a rupture and for Nancy, “these forces or else this unique, 
discontinuous force of tearing opens the limit and detaches the edges. The edge 
as separation, tearing, is the bank [rive].” (BEL, p.50)  For Nancy, just as river carves 
out the space it occupies and creates banks, so the limit and the edges are created 
by force. For Nancy, all existents therefore face each other over a limit like settlers 
of new lands facing off over a river, remarking and punning that “all existents are 
rivals.” (BEL, p. 51) 
 
                                                          
30 Nancy, J.L. “Rives, Bords, Limites (de la singularité) Banks, Edges, Limits (of singularity)”, in 
Angelaki, Vol 9, no 2, Aug 2004. P41. Trans. Gil Anidjar. Hereafter referred to in the text as BEL, 
followed by page number. 
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Hegel’s name is not evoked in the essay but an undeclared engagement would 
seem to be at work once again; the mutual recognition as mortally opposed 
opponents of the Lord and Bondsman would surely be the model of existents as 
rivals, par excellence, as Nancy likes to put it. Nancy does reference Bataille’s 
engagement with Hegel’s thought however, noting that, 
the limit is this “nothing-in-common” through which communication occurs; if one wills, 
the partaking of birth and death, and therefore the partaking of a nothing or of a Negativity 
without use [negativité sans emploi], following Bataille’s expression, which could also be 
transcribed here as a sense without signification. (BEL, p. 46) 
 
The limit as the in-between of singulars is therefore the “we”, the between us 
which is coexistent and coessential to singularity as has been explicated above. In 
the previous chapter, we saw that Nancy also calls the we or the in-between, 
community and that this occurs in an unworking, in the partaking of negativity 
without use or sense without signification. Nancy also calls the we or the limit, 
finitude, which he states is the “proper mode of access to being or sense.” (BEL, 
p.44) As we have already seen for Nancy sense is an event of the holding together 
of multiple significations rather than the transmission a single signification from 
one singular to another, therefore for Nancy the limit of the existence of the 
singular is also the site of the event of sense and therefore the situation Nancy 
calls both Being Singular Plural and Community.  
 
If the singularity that Nancy is describing in his essay is the same as a self then for 
Nancy that self is formed in this same space of unworking and he remarks: 
the end of a narrative is founded by right on the very organization of the narrative […] but 
the end of existence[…] begins and ends only by interrupting, that is to say by un-achieving. 
No process said to be “natural” or “technical” can be led to a completion that would not be 
as well interruption. (BEL, p.45) 
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For Nancy a singular is, that is its existence is defined or its end given, in an un-
achieving or interruption. The edges and the limit, the singular and the we, are 
formed in an interruption. Furthermore, any process, either natural or technical, 
that is any organisation of narrative can lead only to a completion that is itself an 
interruption. As we have seen for Nancy, Hegel’s account of Self-Consciousness 
can be read as exposing a self that does not complete and that remains restless 
interrupting its own completion in its restlessness exactly as Hegel’s own text 
interrupts itself. For Nancy, “to think singularity is necessarily to think outside 
myth […] but also necessarily at the extremity of metaphysics.” (BEL, p. 44) To 
think Singularity requires then letting go of process, narrative or myth and of the 
framing of a question that would seek un-earth the singular truth of what it is to 
be singular, instead we must pay attention to experience of Community and Being 
Singular Plural which is the each time each day response to the question of Being. 
Morin echoes this point remarking that, “there is a mythic Hegelianism (a Hegelian 
system presented as complete and total explanation of everything that is) that is 
interrupted by the written, material presentation of this system”31 and describing 
this notion as Nancy’s interest in The Speculative Remark. If for Nancy to think 
Singularity or Being Singular Plural is to think outside myth then the over-arching 
myth the thought of Being Singular Plural is engaged with is that of Hegel’s total 
system. However, we should not mistake Being Singular Plural for a myth or 
system itself, as we have seen Nancy has taken great care with its formulation, 
and Morin points out, “in a sense, the “singular plural” furnishes the “axiom” of 
                                                          
31 M-E Morin, Nancy, (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p. 94 
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Nancy’s thought, from which everything else follows. Yet it is also this “axiom” 
that undermines all attempts at finding any “wholeness” or “systematicity” in his 
thought.”32 Being Singular Plural is that which the multiple significations of 
Nancy’s thought are both held together and separated. 
 
James also notes Nancy’s active prevention of totality, remarking that 
Nancy’s philosophy, most evidently his thinking of the “singular plural”, turns persistently 
and insistently around the demand imposed by a thinking of being in which any possibility 
of unity and identity has withdrawn, and where the multiple demands to be thought 
without reference to any overarching unity or totality.33 
 
For James, the multiple in Nancy’s thought is informed by thinking of being in 
which to be is not be a single identity, but a relation between singularity and 
multiple singulars. It is this very understanding of being as relation, that being is 
always relational being, that means that Nancy’s thought can never be a system 
but is nothing but the restless trembling of between various significations, it is 
relation itself. 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, for Nancy, Community is a relation to be 
experienced not a work to be achieved. In this chapter it has been argued that 
Being Singular Plural and Community are terms that describe the same situation 
relation being which is simply all being, or as Nancy prefers Community and 
Singularity are indissociable. Therefore, Singularity, like Community, must be a 
relation to be experienced not a work to be achieved. Hegel’s account of the Self-
                                                          
32 Ibid, p. 2 
33 James, I. The Fragmentary Demand, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p.3 
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Consciousness is one in which the Self-Consciousness must complete itself, but his 
description of the Self-Consciousness which struggles to complete, in particular 
the account of the Unhappy Consciousness would therefore be a description of 
Being Singular Plural, which as we have seen is for Nancy self which is nothing 
other than being itself.  
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis began with the suggestion, gleaned from Nancy’s essay “Shattered 
Love” that Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right and The Phenomenology of 
Spirit could be read for the expositions they offer on Relational Being, despite (for 
Nancy) their dialectical structure. Having performed these readings and run the 
experiment so to speak, it is now possible to consider the outcomes of the enquiry 
and to reflect on new trajectories of enquiry suggested. However before 
beginning this final task of the thesis, a task I will support by drawing on Nancy’s 
essay “The Surprise of the Event”, I will summarise the stages of the enquiry so 
far. 
 
In the Introduction, I began by explicating Nancy’s essay “Shattered Love” and 
elucidating the suggestion offered above that Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right and The Phenomenology of Spirit could be read for the expositions they 
offer on Relational Being despite (for Nancy) their dialectical structure. Following 
this, I clarified the suggestion by offering a brief history of the dialectic. I began 
with Pre-Socratic elenctic duelling practices in Ancient Greece in which opponents 
attempt to drive each other into contradictions and moved on to Plato’s rejection 
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of these as adequate for genuine truth seeking (although useful for identifying 
difference) and Aristotle’s offering of demonstration as a superior method of 
establishing truth as it does not merely offer a choice between “two 
contradictories.”1 I next discussed how for Kant in the Antinomies in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, the dialectic is an illusion of opposition caused by not 
understanding the nature of understanding and how for Hegel, opposition itself is 
not the marker of a misunderstanding about how we understand in the first place, 
but a special kind of relationship in which the truth of each opposed side “belongs” 
to their unity. In the next section, I built on the emerging account of Hegel’s 
dialectic and summarised Hegel’s project and place of the dialectic within it. In the 
final section of the Introduction, I set the scene for a consideration of Nancy’s 
reception of Hegel’s philosophy and the dialectic in particular; beginning with a 
consideration of Marx’s enthusiastic use of dialectic as method but with a radical 
new focus I considered Kojève’s anthropological interpretation of Hegel’s 
philosophy which sees the unifying moment of the dialectic as human action and 
Hippolyte’s speculative interpretation in which the unifying moment is not final 
but repeats over and over. Following this I offered a selection of responses from 
the Analytical and typically Anglophone reception of Hegel, considering Russell’s 
rejection of Hegel’s project on the grounds of mysticism and faulty logic as well as 
a sketch of Pippin’s reading of the dialectic as the recognition of deficiencies. 
 
                                                          
1 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in The Complete works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathon Barnes, New Jersey: 
(Princeton University Press, 1995.) p. 30, 1, 24a 21 
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In Chapter Two, I began by sketching Nancy’s project depicting his interest in 
Hegel’s thought as a frequent theme, as well as offering a summary of the 
Anglophone reception of Nancy’s work. Nancy’s notion of Being Singular Plural as 
that in which singularities find their meaning in relation to other singularities was 
highlighted as connecting the varied scope of his thought and this view was also 
shown to be taken up by many of Nancy’s Anglophone commentators. Next, in 
order to prepare for the readings of Elements of the Philosophy of Right and The 
Phenomenology of Spirit and accompanying readings of The Inoperative 
Community and Being Singular Plural, I offered readings of Nancy’s two texts on 
Hegel, The Speculative Remark and The Restlessness of the Negative. In the 
reading of The Speculative Remark, I explicated Nancy’s concern with Hegel’s 
concept of Aufhebung as that which, as an attempt to resolve problematic 
opposing pairs, in fact exposes the multiple significations at play in an event of 
sense. This was contrasted with Malabou’s notion of plasticity which also sees 
relation between entities that differ as something that does not come about as a 
result of an operation, but which does view this originary relation as hetero–
affected rather than between multiple differing entities. In the reading of The 
Restlessness of the Negative, I explicated Nancy’s concern with a notion of identity 
as restless negativity, a notion he finds exposed in Hegel’s work, but which Hegel 
wishes to convert into a non-problematic identity with presence. This thought  
was considered as it is taken up by Derrida and his notion that Hegel’s theory of 
the sign seeks to convert the problematic semiological difference at play between 
the sign and the signifier. It was also considered with respect to Foucault’s notion 
that Hegel’s account of history as dialectical progress seeks to convert the 
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historical difference at play between the multiple origins of events. It was 
observed Derrida and Foucault set about more active programs of signposting 
difference and keeping it unresolved than Nancy whose approach is marked by a 
more passive generous reticence. These readings of the Nancean texts and the 
contrasting readings used for clarification, were consolidated into the guiding 
thought that for Nancy, Sense and Identity is understood as the situation of 
multiple significations held together in restless movement, a problematic 
situation which has no presence. This thought was considered in the light of  
insights from Victoria Fairfield and Emilia Angelova, that Nancy’s non-binary 
reading of the dialectic is one in which there is no return to, or completion of self 
and that Nancy reads in Hegel a system that does not in fact complete and is in 
perpetual unrest. These observations were applied to the original task of reading 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right and The Phenomenology of Spirit for the 
expositions they offer on Relational Being, which was clarified into the task of 
reading Elements of the Philosophy of Right for an account of The State in Unrest 
and The Phenomenology of Spirit for an account of a Self that does not Complete. 
 
In Chapter Three, I contrasted Nancy and Hegel on Community by offering a 
reading Elements of the Philosophy of Right read for an account of The State in 
Unrest and a reading of Nancy’s text The Inoperative Community. I began with an 
explication of Hegel’s notion of The State as laid out in Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right in which I drew out the coexistence of the three required moments of the 
Power of the Sovereign at the heart of Hegel’s account of The State which, as 
essential coexistence, make a final moment of dialectical unity problematic, 
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rendering the identity of The State as one unrest and therefore incomplete. I then 
offered a reading of The Inoperative Community in which I drew out Nancy’s 
notion of Community as essentially inoperative, interrupting itself and coming into 
existence again over the shared pain of that interruption. Reflecting on these two 
differing accounts of beings together and also considering Nancy’s essay “The 
Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch” I offered the following observations. For 
Nancy, community is a not a work to be achieved whereas for Hegel The State 
occurs as a culmination to a process. For Nancy Singular Being is always co-
appearance whereas for Hegel singular being is a complete state in itself (or 
should be) however the only entity that fits this description in The State is the 
Sovereign or Monarch. Finally, for Nancy Community can only be communicated 
in a discourse that exhausts itself whereas for Hegel The State must be expounded 
in a dialectical discourse which completes its intended trajectory. I also considered 
Roupa’s observation that The Monarch or Sovereign is the vessel for the event of 
the synthesis in Hegel’s intended dialectic, and as such, is part of a metaphysical 
tradition of making essence effective as well as Devisch’s observation that Nancy’s 
elaboration of inoperativity is a way of using Hegel’s workless negation to escape 
the dialectic. In conclusion, I argued that for Nancy, Community is a relation to be 
experienced not a work to be achieved like Hegel’s State, and therefore the 
situation of The State in unrest, The State unable to complete, is the very same 
situation that Nancy terms Community. Additionally, I asserted that for Nancy, 
Hegel only unintentionally exposes the situation of simultaneous separation and 
connection that is the Relational Being of Community, or group identity based on 
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restless negativity, and that a consideration of singular identity based on restless 
negativity would become the focus of the next chapter. 
 
In Chapter Four, I contrasted Nancy and Hegel on Singularity by offering a reading 
of The Phenomenology of Spirit read for an account of A Self which does not 
Complete and a reading of Nancy’s text Being Singular Plural. I began with an 
explication of Hegel’s notion of Self-Consciousness as laid out in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit in which I drew out the restless nature of Hegel’s Self-
Consciousness particularly so in his account of the tormented Unhappy 
Consciousness who is unable to reconcile the contradictory aspects of his nature 
and therefore complete as a Self. I then offered a reading of Being Singular Plural 
in which I drew out Nancy’s notion of Being Singular Plural as Singularity that is 
essentially coexistent with other singularities making it problematic to present. 
Reflecting on these two differing accounts of Singularity and also considering 
Nancy’s essay “Banks, Edges, Limits” I offered the following observations. For 
Nancy, in order to understand Being Singular Plural we must attend to how it 
appears whereas Hegel, despite his assertion that he will describe the coming-to-
be of consciousness, ends up describing isolated stages of consciousness leaving 
the reader to connect these stages and assume their coming-to-be. For Nancy, 
neither the “we” (the other singularities that are coessential to any particular 
singularity) nor Singularity itself, is a subject, something with a unified presentable 
identity whereas for Hegel an un-unified Singularity is unacceptable and therefore 
the tormented Unhappy Conscious alienated from its own self, must be resolved. 
For Nancy, the question of being or Being Singular Plural is responded to “each 
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time every day”, whereas for Hegel the question must be framed in a discourse 
that is structured logically to produce a result. For Nancy Being as Being Singular 
Plural is coessential as is reflected in his (uncharacteristic) coining of the term 
Being Singular Plural and this essentiality occurs in a temporary event, whereas 
for Hegel, Being can only be coessential in the final event of Absolute Knowledge 
in which coessentiality would finally be presentable. I considered Morin’s 
observation that Nancy’s notion of Being Singular Plural functions as an axiom 
from which his philosophical project follows and is that which prevents his project 
from becoming a system. I also considered James’ observation that Nancy’s notion 
of Being is one in which the possibility of unity and identity is lost In conclusion, I 
argued that for Nancy, as Singularity is Being Singular Plural and therefore 
coessential with other singularities it is indissociable from the situation of 
Community. Therefore, as Community was argued to be relation to be 
experienced not a work to be achieved, Singularity must also be understood as a 
relation to be experienced not a work to be achieved. I also asserted that Hegel’s 
account of Self-Consciousness requires that Self-Consciousness completes itself 
and overcomes its own internal contradiction, therefore a self which does not 
complete is the same situation as Nancy’s Being Singular Plural.  
  
Outcomes 
For Nancy, the situations that Hegel calls Self-Consciousness and The State are 
better understood as Singularity and Community respectively, both of which are 
relations to be experienced, not a work to be achieved, and furthermore they are 
the same relation, the same situation. This situation, which for Nancy is the basic 
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situation of Being, or as he prefers Being Singular Plural, is also one in which Sense 
and Identity are revealed as multiple significations held together in restless 
movement. Being is revealed therefore for Nancy, as that in which existence and 
essence have the same structure, that of multiplicity held together in connection 
and separation. What is deeply problematic about this situation, this account of 
Being, as we saw in the discussion in Chapter One, regarding Nancy’s and Derrida’s 
projects, is that it offers no completed or resolved singular existent, there is no 
entity or identity to present, just a situation to experience. For Nancy, this 
experience best provoked in a discourse which exhausts itself, in the interruption 
of Community by itself and in the inability of Self to complete itself in the face of 
other Singularities. 
 
Hegel’s project of dialectical assimilation can be seen therefore as one that tries 
to convert this problematic multiple non-presentable Being into a singular identity 
which does have presence. As we saw in Chapter Two, this is for Roupa, part of 
the metaphysical tradition of making essence effective. Hegel’s method for 
achieving this is via the third stage of the dialectic, the moment of sublation or 
synthesis. In both the Elements of The Philosophy of Right and The 
Phenomenology, whilst we are given descriptions of multiple occurrences of the 
lead up to a sublation (situations of opposition) and then the post-sublation 
situation, what is consistently missing is the moment of sublation itself. In 
Elements of The Philosophy of Right the “final” moment of sublation which will 
unify and ratify the previous sublations that have lead up to it is placed by Hegel 
in the action of an individual, The Sovereign or Monarch of The State. In The 
197 
 
Phenomenology, the final moment which will unify and ratify all the preceding 
sublations is that of Absolute Knowledge, a state of perfection in which humanity 
will finally be able to conceive of truth as the unity of opposites. 
 
However, if we reflect on the role of The Phenomenological Observer, described 
by Stephen Houlgate in Chapter Three, as a role played by both Hegel and his 
reader and who is the one who makes the leap each time between the lead up to 
a sublation and the post-sublation situation, then we start to see a situation of 
unity of opposition already occurring. The moments of sublation in each stage of 
consciousness in The Phenomenology and each stage of entities together Elements 
of the Philosophy of Right, are not described to us or given to us. The argument 
for their necessity is given, as is the desired new situation resulting from the 
sublation, but the occurrence of the sublation is in the reader as they assimilate 
this information and in Hegel as the one who gives this information and who has 
already conceived it. This results in the trajectory of both The Phenomenology and 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right taking the form a string of separate 
occurrences which appear to all intents and purposes to be a series of sundered 
moments which Hegel precisely warns against in The Phenomenology. 
Furthermore, that Hegel can conceive of the unity of opposites surely means that 
humanity has already achieved Absolute Knowledge and achieves it again, each 
time in other person who plays the role of the Phenomenological Observer, that 
is, Hegel’s reader. 
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The occurrence of this unity, each time in the reader as Phenomenological 
Observer, is I would argue, the same occurrence as Nancy’s “each time every day” 
response to the question of Being. Whilst Hegel claims in The Phenomenology to 
be doing a Phenomenology and attending to the coming-into being of the stages 
of consciousness, he never the less fails to attend to the experience of the 
Phenomenological Observer. Not attending to the experience of his own 
understanding and that of his reader, means that Hegel misses the sublation that 
occurs each time between the described stages, the already here and now of 
Absolute Knowledge and which is for Nancy, nothing other than the problematic 
non-presentable Event of Sense. To further bring out this notion, I will next offer 
a reading of Nancy’s essay of Hegel’s notion of Event, “The Surprise of the Event”. 
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5.2 “The Surprise of the Event” 
The “Surprise of the Event” appears in the Being Singular Plural collection, and in 
it Nancy is chiefly concerned with “the “surprise” in the sense of its being an 
attribute, quality or property of an event, but [also] the event itself, its being or 
essence.”2 This articulation of the surprise inherent in the event or better, event 
as surprise, comes via a consideration of a specific sentence in Hegel’s Science of 
Logic: 
But philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true 
in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition, to comprehend that which, in the 
narrative, appears as a mere happening [or pure event- Trans].3 
 
Nancy offers two possible readings of this sentence, the first “canonical” one holds 
that “the task of philosophy is to conceive that which the event is only the 
phenomenon” (SoE, p. 160) whereas in the second reading,  
Hegel wants to think the essence of what escapes a logic in which essence is understood as 
substance, subject or ground, in favour of a logic of the “to happen”, the whole essence of 
which is in the state of “agitation” that consists in not subsisting. (SoE, p. 163) 
 
For Nancy, this Hegelian sentence is not a simple instruction to disregard the 
illusory phenomenon in favour of the truth which must underlie it, and only once 
that is secure to examine the phenomenon, but an attempt to think what essence 
would be outside of a logic that thinks essence as substance or subject and would 
                                                          
2 Nancy J.L. “The Surprise of the Event” in Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert.D.Richardson and 
Anne.E.O’Byrne (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 165. Hereafter to referred to in 
the text as SoE followed by page number. Although this is a similar tactic as used by Nancy in The 
Speculative Remark, here the sentence in question is part of the main body of the text, rather 
than an appended remark. 
3 Happening is the Millar translation of Geschehen but the translators point out the event is also 
used. Hegel quoted by Nancy, SoE, p. 159, emphasis Nancy’s own. Original source given by 
translators as Hegel, GWF. Science of Logic, trans. A.V.Miller, (New Jersey: Humanities Press 
International, 1989), p. 588, §1303.  
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instead understand essence as that which is restless and unpresentable. Nancy 
admits that this is at the “extreme limit” of what he can make Hegel say, but that 
his (Nancy’s) aim is to “surprise […] Hegelian thinking from the inside.” (SoE, 
p.164) to make it say what it did not expect to say and in the process expose what 
Nancy himself wants to say about Surprise and Event.  
 
For Nancy, Hegel’s desire to understand what is true in happenings or events, that 
is, what is graspable and presentable and what therefore is not, reflects at least a 
curiosity about how essence could work if it were not a quality of a single fixed 
entity. 4 For Nancy, in his curiosity, 
Hegel seizes the Geschehen; he stops it or inspects it in its coming and going; he fixes its 
concept (it’s Geschicte). But in doing so, he demonstrates that it is exactly in the seizing that 
he misses it as such. In this way he opens volens nolens, the question of the “as such” of 
the Geschehen. (SoE, p.164) 
 
For Nancy, Hegel observes the occurrence of occurrence itself and he 
conceptualizes it, he breaks it down into its parts and draws up a schema of how 
those parts come together in a specific order to produce a result. In seizing that 
which he is studying and identifying the presentable parts and summarising their 
relationship, Hegel has stilled the restless movement of the parts and is therefore 
unable to observe the “as such”, the mode in which what happens, happens, much 
like a lepidopterist attempting to deduce how a butterfly might move through the 
air by manipulating the wing of the now dead butterfly that he has caught in a 
trap. However, for Nancy, whatever Hegel’s intention, his missing of the very 
                                                          
4 The translators point out that either happening or event is applicable to French term arriver, 
which is the term Nancy generally uses to refer to what Hegel calls Geschehen.  
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movement he is interested in, highlights the need or the challenge to think the “as 
such” of Geschehen or the event-ness of event. 
 
Nancy is aware however of the complexities of the challenge, asking, “How is one 
to think “as such” where the “as” does not refer to any one “such”? […]one cannot 
even express “the event” without losing its event-ness.” (SoE, p. 165) The “as 
such” or the event-ness of event is not a single presentable thing, it is precisely 
the complex relationship between multiple parts and as such it has no presence. 
To express the event-ness of a particular event, one has little choice but to 
enumerate the parts as Hegel does and therefore lose the vital event-ness of the 
event. In this way for Nancy, “it [the event] exceeds the resources of any 
phenomenology, even though the phenomenological theme in general has never 
been more magnetized by anything else.” (SoE, p. 169)  The approach Nancy will 
offer to counter this will be one in which, rather than attending to occurrence of 
occurrence by studying, analysing and presenting, the very event-ness of event 
will able allowed to surprise us in an event of meaning, it will be attended to by 
experiencing it. 
 
If the event is not a single presentable thing, then for Nancy it is nothing other 
than negativity-for-itself, however this is,  
not negativity understood as Hegel understood it, as “abstractly related to itself “[but is 
that which] must be understood as the nonabstract, itself understood as not the result [of 
some process- Trans]. This is exactly what Hegel lets fall by the wayside. (SoE, p. 170) 
 
For Nancy, this kind of negativity is not that which is the abstract unknowable 
aspect of an entity that can only be known through a negation which comes as a 
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result of process, unifying it with that which is positive, has presence and is 
knowable. What Nancy has in mind would be a positive negativity, an essence 
which would not be a quality of a single fixed entity and it is the curiosity for this 
which Nancy claims that Hegel lets drop. For Nancy to think the event as negativity 
for-itself, that is, the event as the occurrence of that which is not presentable in 
the very mode of that which is not presentable, means that “the experience of 
nothing is what we are trying to approach: the thinking-surprise of the event.” 
(SoE p. 171) To think this negativity, to experience this nothing is to be surprised 
by thought. In this way, the negativity that event is, does not become “negativity 
as a resource, as an available foundation, as nothingness or an abyss from the 
depths of which the event would come; for such an “event” would still be a result.” 
(SoE p. 172) Negativity must stay for Nancy as that which is not presentable, it 
must not, as in Hegel’s project be sublated into something with presence and 
turned into a resource or foundation which would become a foundation for a 
series of sublations.  
 
Event so far has been characterised as that which is the same as negativity and 
which is only thinkable as a surprise of thought and which would be lost if it we 
were to enumerate its parts and schematise it. The account has focussed on what 
event is not and how Hegel has missed it, but the essay turns at this point to 
deliver a positive account of event and what Hegel was prevented from seeing. 
Nancy states that,  
The surprise is not anything. It is not some newness of Being that would be surprising in 
comparison to the Being which is already given. When there is the event […], it is the 
“already” which leaps up, along with the “not yet”. (SoE, p. 171) 
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The surprise of the event is not the event of a new entity which is surprising in 
relation to what already is (it is not the new product or result of a process), it is 
precisely the event of what-already-is being what it already is, but not yet being 
what it is not yet. Event is what already is, right now, as it happens, both in the 
sense of when it happens and the way in which it happens. Nancy continues, 
saying that “the surprise is nothing except the leap right at [à même] Being, this 
leap where event and thinking are “the same.” (SoE, p. 172) The surprise of the 
event is for Nancy a leap in which Being and thinking are same, or to put this 
another way, in which Being and meaning are the same. The Surprise of the Event 
is therefore what has been considered so far in this thesis under the name the 
Event of Sense. For Nancy, then, Being occurs in an event of meaning, in which 
what already exists, occurs in the mode and in the time, the temporal location, in 
which it already exists. This occurrence is always unexpected because, as it is not 
the end of a process it must be unprecedented, unanticipated. This occurrence 
then is nothing other than pure event. 
 
As an event of sense, Event is necessarily unifying, but for Nancy, “the unity of the 
event is not numerical. It does not consist in being gathered at a point of origin 
(for ontology there is no Big Bang).” (SoE, p. 175)  Event for Nancy is not unifying 
in the sense of providing a singular point of origin for what follows it, it is not a 
fixing or a concretising of singularity. Furthermore, 
If the event were fundamental and unique in the ordinary – or “metaphysical”- sense of 
these words, it would be given, and this giving would also be the originary dissolution of all 
event-ness. There would be no surprise. Only because it is not given, but instead happens, 
is there surprise and an unpredictable multiplicity of what might now be called the arrivals 
(or the “arrivings” ) of the unique event. (SoE, p. 175) 
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If event provided a singular point of origin, then as something singular it would be 
able to be given. As event is not singular and is instead a holding together (where 
a holding is not a single thing) of multiplicity; event invites the enumeration and 
schematisation of these multiplicities, however if this is done then an event 
becomes able to be given, the very event-ness of event is lost. Event therefore is 
not given but instead happens (it “just happens”) and what takes place in this 
unprecedented happening is the “arrivings” of multiplicity, held together in an 
event of unity, an Event of Sense.  
 
For Nancy, in conclusion, “If Being simply were, nothing would ever happen, and 
there would not be any thinking.” (SoE 176) If Being were simple, then singular 
beings would have correspondingly singular being which would be complete and 
resolved without any interaction with other beings, this would be a non-relational 
being. If this kind of being existed then there would be no need for thought 
because being that does not require interaction and relation to know itself as 
singular would experience no contradiction, no multiplicity to bring together in an 
event of sense. Thought as an event of sense is therefore a response to the 
experience of being a being whose being is not simple, whose being means that 
to know oneself as singular can only occur in relation to multiplicity. However, 
being a being whose being is not simple and responding to this, occur in the same 
event, there is no prior different being. In this way, the event of sense which is 
nothing other than the event of being which is always unprecedented, it is always 
surprise.  
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Community, Singularity and Event 
At the close of the consideration of the outcomes of the enquiry above, Hegel’s 
accounts of Self-Consciousness and of The State, were shown to offer an 
unexpected unity in the experience, not of Self -Consciousness itself or The 
Sovereign or indeed any of the inhabitants of The State, but instead in the 
experience of what Stephen Houlgate calls the Phenomenological Observer, a role 
played both by Hegel himself and his reader. This unity which occurs each time for 
the reader in an event of sense in connection with Hegel’s text, was argued to be 
the same occurrence as Nancy’s “each time every day” response to the question 
of Being.  The unity experienced by both players of the role of the 
Phenomenological Observer, is, therefore the event of Being as Nancy wants in 
“The Surprise of the Event”. 
 
As we saw above, for Hegel this unity only arrives properly in Absolute Knowledge, 
a perfected state of consciousness which arrives as the final sublation at the end 
of a series of prior sublations. This description of the arrival of Absolute 
Knowledge would appear to match the description of the surprise of the event as 
a new kind of being which is surprising because it differs from what precedes it, a 
description Nancy says is not the surprise he is after. However, the content of 
what Hegel claims arrives in Absolute Knowledge, that unity of opposition is 
possible, is unproblematic for Nancy provided it is taken out of its place in the 
sequence and understood instead not as the product of a result but the Event of 
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Sense in the now that was for Hegel and the now that it is for his reader.5 Absolute 
Knowledge re-framed (or re-time framed) in this manner, is then already 
happening constantly in Hegel’s texts, it is everywhere but in a typically Nancean 
phrase, it is never said. Hegel’s elaborations of situations of opposition and 
difference are similarly unproblematic for Nancy, but the various sublations or 
rather the moving onto a next section in which sublation seems to have already 
occurred but the experience of the Phenomenological Observer is not accounted 
for, mark the sites therefore of missed events, or better, event missed. 
 
Hegel’s notion of The State in The Elements of The Philosophy of Right, would, 
under this view of Absolute Knowledge re-time framed, mark the site of the 
missed event of Nancy’s Community. The moment in which beings are finally able 
to exist in true freedom in which there is no opposition between morality and 
duty, is the moment which they are able to share their being as Nancy has it. Hegel 
however, places this moment as the final sublation after series for sublations and 
characterises it as the decision of the Sovereign, he gives this singular event a 
physical single location, he gives it presence. For Nancy, he therefore loses the 
event-ness of the event of Community, he loses its nature as the experience of the 
unanticipated occurrence of the simultaneous separation and connection of what 
already is, beings together. 
 
                                                          
5 It is the mistaking of the event of sense, or the action of the Phenomenological Observer, for a 
third moment, of a new surprising being, that gives rise to the triadic structure of the dialectic in 
Hegel’s thought. 
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Hegel’s notion of Self-Consciousness in The Phenomenology of Spirit and 
specifically the account of The Unhappy Consciousness under the view of Absolute 
Knowledge re-time framed, would similarly mark the site of the missed event of 
Nancy’s Being Singular Plural. The moment in which the pain that the Unhappy 
Consciousness felt at being unable to reconcile itself and what is not itself, is finally 
resolved in a moment in which there is no longer any opposition at all, in which 
multiplicity is recognised as being coessential with singularity as Nancy has it. As 
before, Hegel places this moment as the final sublation after series of sublations 
and while he doesn’t give this event a physical location, as all opposition is now 
resolved the opposition between that with presence and that without presence is 
resolved also. For Nancy, as before, Hegel loses the event-ness of event as that 
which holds multiplicity together in the now, and therefore the experience of the 
unanticipated occurrence of the simultaneous separation and connection of what 
already is, beings together.6 
 
The consequence of missing the event-ness of event is not just that Hegel 
therefore does not arrive at Nancy’s notion of beings together as Community or 
singular being as Being Singular Plural and the further realisation that Community 
and Being Singular Plural are one and the same, but that Hegel ends up with the 
                                                          
6 Nancy therefore would appear to be one of Hyppolite’s “contemporary thinkers” who deny the 
possibility of synthesis and who prefer The Unhappy Consciousness as an account of Being. 
However it is not quite right to claim that Nancy accepts Hegel’s phenomenology and rejects his 
ontology, Nancy welcomes Hegel’s phenomenology but finds its focus lacking  and he accepts 
Hegel’s ontology but re-frames it, or rather de-frames it by doing away with dialectical process 
by means of interruption and unworking, see Hyppolite, Jean. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman, (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1979), p. 205.  
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very sundered moments he warned against. In The Phenomenology, Hegel tells us 
that difference is merely what results from sundering moments of the essence of 
life in its relation to itself and that we must attend to the over-arching self relation 
of life, however, his enumeration of the various oppositions that precede the final 
destinations of the decision of The Sovereign in Elements of The Philosophy of 
Right and Absolute Knowledge in the Phenomenology, cast those oppositions as 
separate sundered instances. The overarching self-relation of life that we are 
supposed to attend to, is the missed experience of the Phenomenological 
Observer. 
 
As we saw in the explication of The Event of Sense, attending to and expressing 
the event-ness of event presents the problem of the difficulty of speaking of that 
which has no presence. Additionally, when trying to express the event-ness of 
event in relation to Hegel’s thought on event, Nancy faces the challenge that given 
the long shadow Hegel’s thought and specific technique has cast over thought on 
opposition and difference, any philosophical move that takes a contra or anti 
position to Hegel’s thought risks being sucked into the dialectic process itself. To 
be anti-dialectical, is of course a position contained within the structure of Hegel’s 
notion of the truth of two opposites being contained in their unity, it is to provide 
the antithesis to Hegel’s thesis, the truth of both of which is known in their unity. 
If this truth is not yet clear it is merely because Absolute Knowledge has not yet 
arrived. As we saw in “Shattered Love” as explicated in the Introduction, for Nancy 
we have missed the rendez-vous with love and therefore with thinking (because 
thinking is love) because we have thought dialectically, therefore we can safely 
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say Nancy’s position is to think outside a logic of the dialectic. However, whilst 
Nancy is certainly for a non-dialectical approach it is quite firmly Hegel’s technique 
that he is working against rather than a wholesale rejection the content of Hegel’s 
project as we have seen in Nancy’s consistent fascination with Hegel’s thought. 
For Nancy, to reclaim Hegel’s useful descriptions of opposition, negativity and also 
the descriptions Nancy finds that Hegel does not intend, to rescue all these 
treasures from their place in the schema, Nancy favours an approach which 
reflects what he says about the structure of meaning and how it works in the event 
of sense. 
 
Throughout those of Nancy works I have explicated in this thesis, this approach 
has been more or less obliquely described or intimated under various names; 
interruption, unworking, the surprise of the event. In his consistent effort not to 
schematise and name techniques Nancy rarely sticks with his own terms, keeping 
his thought restless and preventing easy summarisation and accidental 
concretisation into any concepts but especially wrong ones. What characterises 
Nancy’s approach however is an intent to acknowledge that the existence and 
essence of the thing under consideration are the same and to make his 
consideration and exposition reflect that structure. The existence and essence of 
both Singularity and Community is simultaneous connection and separation. 
Community and Relational Being are the same situation, the same river, to use the 
analogy in “Banks, Edges, Limits”, viewed from different banks. Nancy’s approach 
to convey this, is to provoke an experience of simultaneous connection and 
separation, an event of sense. 
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 To provoke us, his readers, into an experience of simultaneous connection and 
separation, Nancy provides us with multiplicities to bring together. As we have 
seen in “The Surprise of the Event” this happens anyway, whenever we think, and 
it is the primary experience of Being for Nancy. However, Nancy’s strategies, if we 
can call them such, of presenting not arguments but meditations and fragments 
as Ian James calls them, of avoiding progressive structures in texts and insisting 
that the fragments he provides can be read in any order, of preferring to use 
existing terms and work with both the rehabilitated sense he wants to bring to 
them as well as their complicated and contradictory histories, all provoke the 
interruptions, unworkings, surprises and events he finds so useful in promoting 
the experience of simultaneous separation and connection he is after. However, 
the exception Nancy makes to these strategies is the coining of his term Being 
Singular Plural, the term that Morin finds “axiomatic” in his work. This term, as we 
saw, is designed such that it’s three components can be arranged in any order, it 
provides a multiplicity of significations that make thinking it nothing other than 
experience of simultaneous separation and connection. To think Being Singular 
Plural (for both Nancy and his reader) is to experience Being Singular Plural, to 
think Being Singular Plural is to experience Being as it happens, in the event of it’s 
happening and in the manner of its event, it is to think it’s essence as its existence. 
In the “Surprise of the Event” Nancy gives another name for this experience, “In 
going much further back than Hegel, as far back as the Platonic and the 
Aristotelian topos of “wonder”, what may need to be understood is that this is the 
task of philosophy, and that philosophy is surprised thought.” (SoE, p. 165) 
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5.3 Surprising Trajectories 
If Sense is, as Nancy has it, an unprecedented event in which we experience the 
simultaneous connection and separation inherent in holding together of 
multiplicity of significations which are in restless movement, then my task as the 
writer of this thesis has been to record and convey the events of my readings of 
Hegel and Nancy’s texts. As reader and writer in this thesis, I have therefore played 
both parts inherent to the role of the Phenomenological Observer. The constraints 
of the academic exercise that is the PhD thesis have meant that I have had to be 
more explicit than Nancy in my communication, I cannot so happily leave to 
chance that event of sense occurs in my reader in the way in which I need it to, I 
cannot exercise the “generous reticence” he calls for in “Shattered Love.” To 
present an argument is to de-limit the range of overwhelming significations 
presented to the reader and to minimise the interruptive devices, even at the risk 
as Nancy points out of losing the event-ness of event or the experience of Being. 
The events of my reading of Nancy and Hegel’s texts therefore featured more 
significations, more trajectories of thought than I could coherently include in any 
kind of in-depth elaboration in this thesis and I therefore will sketch these here. 
In “Being Singular Plural” Nancy considers Heideggerian Being-with remarking 
that,  
The analytic of Mitsein that appears within the coexistential analytic remains nothing more 
than a sketch; that is, even though Mitsein is coessential with Dasein, it remains in a 
subordinate position. (BSP, p. 93) 
 
It would be hard to argue that Heidegger does not realise the coessentiality of 
Dasein and Mitsein, the explication of this occupies a significant portion of Being 
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and Time and Heidegger is quite explicit; “So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-
with-one-another as it’s kind of Being.”7 Picking out Nancy’s claim and tracing how 
for Nancy whilst Heidegger recognises the coessentiality of Mitsein and Dasein he 
still affords Mitsein a secondary role (it is certainly true that Dasein is expounded 
first and Mitsein is explained by means of in reference to this prior articulation) 
would provide a rich seam of enquiry. Nancy does not elaborate on the potential 
project in detail in “Being Singular Plural” and whilst Heidegger is one of his 
frequent reference points when sketching a philosophical backdrop to a topic in 
hand, Nancy has to date not produced studies on Heidegger of the length and 
focus he has lavished on Hegel. However, he does hint at direction this study could 
take; 
What is necessary is that we retrace the outline of its analysis and push it to the point where 
it becomes apparent that the coessentiality of being-with is nothing less that the matter of 
the co-originarity of meaning. (BSP, p. 94) 
 
Any comparative study of Nancy and Heidegger on Being Singular Plural and the 
apparently problematic coessentiality of Dasein and Mitsein would need therefore 
to orientate itself via a consideration of the approaches of both Nancy and 
Heidegger to meaning and sense-making. 
 
Kierkegaard is not a thinker whom Nancy makes a frequent reference as he does 
with Heidegger, he references Kierkegaard briefly in “Shattered Love” as one of 
many who have written on love, but gives no indication of how one might bring 
                                                          
7 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962) p. 163, H 125. 
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together their projects.8 However, Nancy’s concern with the leap of thought in 
“The Surprise of the Event” echoed for me, a similar concern with leap that 
Kierkegaard exhibits in Fear and Trembling. As we saw for Nancy in the event there 
is a leaping up of what already is and Nancy goes on to remark that “thinking can 
only be accomplished by a leap of thought- by thought as a leap, as the leap that 
it knows and is aware of becoming necessarily.( SoE, p.172) This notion of thought 
occurring in a leap into something that it already is and already knows, reminded 
me instantly of Kierkegaard’s remark that,  
It is said that the dancer’s hardest task is to leap straight into a definite position, so that not 
for a second does he have to catch at the position but stands there in it in the leap itself. 9 
 
This remark is made during the Preamble from the Heart which proceeds 
Kierkegaard’s main explication of Abraham’s action in his interrupted attempt to 
obey God’s command to kill his son. For Kierkegaard, Abraham is a Knight of Faith, 
he is one who can move past the initial stage of being Knight of Infinite 
Resignation, a position of being resigned to the impossibility of saving his son in 
any way, to a position of faith that if he obeys God and really does kill his son, then 
through his faith in God and an earlier promise that he will not lose his son, the 
paradox will be somehow be resolved and he will indeed kill but keep his son. For 
Kierkegaard, the movement between being the Knight of infinite Resignation and 
                                                          
8 As was discussed in Chapter Two, there is a possible (and unacknowledged) reference to 
Kierkegaardian trembling in The Restlessness of The Negative. Nancy, JL. The Restlessness of the 
Negative, trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002), p.44 
9 Kierkegaard, Søren, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alistair Hannay, (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 
1985), p.70.  
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the Knight of Faith is that of a leap in which the Knight of Faith assumes the 
position in the leap. In a footnote to this passage Kierkegaard says that,  
Every movement of infinity occurs in passion, and no reflection can bring about a movement. 
That’s the perpetual leap in life which explains the movement, while mediation is a chimera 
which in Hegel is supposed explain everything and besides is the only thing he has never 
tried to explain.10 
 
Abraham is therefore willing to live the paradox and not to attempt to resolve it, 
to mediate it. For Kierkegaard, Hegel’s philosophy is therefore an attempt to 
mediate the paradox, to make a composite of the disparate parts which would 
seek to explain the whole. For Kierkegaard, it is the leap that explains the 
movement, reflection cannot bring it about but would instead create a 
hypothetical construct as mythical and implausible as a fire breathing lion with a 
snake’s head for a tail and the head of goat protruding from its back.  Any attempt 
to bring together the thought Nancy and Kierkegaard could prove instructive if it 
orientated itself via the notion of on unresolved paradox. Also, to be considered 
in such an enquiry would be a comparison of Nancy’s interruptive devices and 
attempts to provoke unworkings by not offering traditionally structured 
progressively argued theses with Kierkegaard’s frequent offering of his writing in 
a variety of forms also outside the standard theoretical treatise and under a 
variety of pseudonyms.  
 
In the Preface to the Being Singular Plural collection, Nancy acknowledges the 
specificity of writing about community and being together in his specific historical 
                                                          
10 Kierkegaard, Ibid, p.71 
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era, drawing particular attention to the end of the siege of Sarajevo in the year 
the collection was published.11 He asserts that in his now,  
This earth is anything but a sharing of humanity. It is a world that does not even manage to 
constitute a world; it is a world lacking in world, and lacking in the meaning of world, it is 
an enumeration that brings to light the sheer number and proliferation of these various 
poles of attraction and repulsion. […] It is a litany, a prayer of pure sorrow and pure loss, 
the plea that falls from the lip of millions of refugees every day; whether they be deportees, 
people besieged, those who are mutilated people who starve, who are raped, ostracized, 
excluded, exiled, expelled. (BSP, p. xiii) 
 
Nancy acknowledges the difficulty of saying the “we” he will go on to explore in 
“The Inoperative Community” essay, when that “we” has to encompass both 
those who are currently suffering and those who have perpetrated that suffering. 
When I began this thesis, I was content with Nancy’s desire to re-treat the political 
and to maintain reticence regarding prescriptions for his diagnosis of an 
inoperative community. As I have completed final stages of this thesis during a 
time of profound political change as the United Kingdom prepares to leave the 
European Union (it remains unclear whether article 50 will or will not be triggered 
before I submit) it has become harder not to search for some kind of answer in 
Nancy’s writing. As I have explained my thesis to people unwise enough to ask me 
about it, I have had to explain over and over that I sadly don’t have a solution to 
unite a post-Brexit Britain. Community remains however on Nancy’s mind and in 
2014 he published The Disavowed Community, a collection of essays in response 
to Blanchot’s The Unavowable Community in 1983, itself a response to The 
Inoperative Community.12  Also in 2014 Nancy published a short article in The 
                                                          
11 The essay “Eulogy for the Mêlée” is dedicated to Sarajevo. Nancy, JL. Being Singular Plural, 
trans. Robert.D.Richardson and Anne.E.O’Byrne, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
p.145 
12 Nancy had also made much shorter response to Blanchot in an earlier essay called “The 
Confronted Community” which appears in The Obsessions of Georges Bataille: Community and 
216 
 
Political and/or Politics in which he re-iterates the need to resist the urge to 
prescribe a politics saying that “It is too late to found a State of any kind and too 
early to have an intimation of something else.”13 It would seem then for Nancy, 
we are still unable to risk a politics that would be as concrete as Hegel’s State but 
it is still too early to know what the alternative is, we are still struggling to think 
the thought of Inoperative Community, we will always struggle to think 
Community, all we can do is to think it by experiencing it. In July 2016, not long 
after the result of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 
Nancy gave an interview in which he was asked why the Soviet form of 
communism had failed. In his reply, he warned against prescribing solutions 
without analysis, in this case a universal minimum wage, and remarked that, 
The truth is that nowadays, in order to invent, first we must think. And we must scream as 
well. Brexit was an outcry by those who have been treated with contempt by the ruling 
class in Europe. We have to listen to that outcry. But what should we understand from it? 
That is what remains to be seen. 14 
 
For Nancy, it seems we must experience and therefore think (they are coexistent 
and coessential) the simultaneous situation of separation and connection 
inherent in the United Kingdom’s leaving the European Union, we must attend in 
particular to specific feeling of the inoperativity of a specific community as 
expressed by the referendum result. For Nancy, as ever, it is too early to know 
what this means. It may however mean for Nancy, what this always means, that 
                                                          
Communication, ed. Andrew J. Mitchell and Jason Kemp Winfree, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press 2009) 
13 Nancy, JL. “The Political and/or Politics” in The Oxford Literary Review, 36.1, (2014). Trans. 
Christopher Sauder, p.6.                                                                                       
14 http://www.alejandradeargos.com/index.php/en/all-articles/21-guests-with-
art/1418-interview-with-jean-luc-nancy-the-west-is-no-more 
 
217 
 
where there is separation there is also connection. In the preface to the Being 
Singular Plural collection, following the devastating list of reasons why we struggle 
to think the “we”, Nancy continues that,  
What I am talking about here is compassion, but not compassion as a pity that feels sorry 
for itself and feeds on itself, Com-passion is the contagion, the contact of being with one 
another in this turmoil. Compassion is not altruism, nor is it identifications; it is the 
disturbance of violent relatedness. (BSP, p. xiii) 
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure 1, Diagram of the Structure of Elements of Philosophy of Right
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Appendix 2 
 
Figure 2, Diagram of the Structure of The Phenomenology of Spirit 
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Jean-Luc Nancy, by Marie-Eve Morin, Cambridge, Polity Press, £15.99 (paperback), pp. 188,
ISBN 978-0-7456-5241-2
Nancy is well known for both the diversity of his corpus and his insistence that meaning (sense)
arises, as Morin puts it, from moving across sentences rather than from the internal signiﬁcation of
a single sentence. Morin’s response to this challenge is to discuss four trajectories of Nancy’s
thought, named in the chapter headings as Christianity, Community, Politics and Body to Art,
through their relation to what is probably Nancy’s most well-known ontological concept
‘being singular plural’. Morin advises that these four chapters can be read in any order following
an initial reading of the ﬁrst chapter entitled Ontology. In this review I will, therefore, look ﬁrst at
the Ontology chapter before discussing the remaining four and ﬁnally evaluating the success of
Morin’s approach.
Morin’s aim in the chapter on Ontology is to sketch Nancy’s ontological project and its diver-
gence from that of Heidegger. Nancy’s problem with Heidegger’s ontology is that being-with
remains on the side of the average, everyday, common existence in a false dichotomy with
common existence on one side and Dasein, on the other. For Morin, what is signiﬁcant in
Nancy’s thought of being singular plural is that being-with is essential to existence; Dasein is
in and only in, its being-with. Importantly, ﬁnitude for Nancy will not be the delimitation of a
particular being against inﬁnite common being (this he calls ﬁniteness) but will describe
instead a being that exists at its limit, at the exact point at which its interior singularity is
exposed or opened to exterior plurality. The product or creation of this event is sense or
meaning, with world as a totality of sense; a thought at odds with the conception of a pre-existing
world in which particular instances of Dasein ﬁnd themselves thrown alongside one another.
Morin’s aim in the chapter on Christianity is to show how Nancy’s deconstruction of Chris-
tianity makes possible an ontology of ﬁnitude. According to Morin, Nancy holds that Christianity
is essentially self-deconstructing, containing within it thoughts and concepts which unsettle
theism. The resulting and unavoidable atheism inherent within Christianity has the paradoxical
character of being without God but still monotheistic, what Nancy calls absentheistic or nihilism.
However, for Nancy nihilism is to be seen not as a ground and abandonment to the immanent but
an opening between transcendence and immanence. This opening is the same in which the singu-
lar being is exposed to exterior plurality in the thought of being singular plural.
Morin’s aim in the chapter on Community is to show how Nancy’s ontology arises from the
thinking of community which chronologically precedes it. For Morin, Nancy shows that commu-
nity has thus far been thought of as pure unobstructed communion between the members of the
community and has been tinted always with nostalgia for a lost community. However, for Nancy
true communion would be a black hole of immanence. For Nancy, community is what happens in
the inevitable failure of attempted communion, when the community experiences its own
absence. Community therefore is the exposure of immanence to transcendence and the limit
point between the two. It is also the exposing of the limit point between the singular being and
the exterior plurality, the exposing of human beings as essentially in relation.
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Morin’s aim in the chapter on Politics is to examine the relation between Nancy’s ontology
and his thinking on politics. For Nancy, the essence of the political is relation, and thus far, clas-
sical philosophical conceptions of the political have not allowed this view. Social contract type
theories suppose a relation-less natural human state prior to the inception of the social contract
whilst Hegel’s State, as realization of ethical life, absorbs the relations between citizens into a
pure subjectivity. For Nancy these conceptions are not surprising, however, for just as philosophy
has missed the being-with of being singular plural, then philosophy’s own coexistence with poli-
tics has caused politics to miss the relation as the essential nature of the political. For Nancy what
makes us human, namely that our being is necessarily being-with, or being singular plural, makes
us political in the same stroke.
Morin’s aim in the chapter on Body to Art is to show the relation of Nancy’s ontology to his
thinking of the traditional dichotomy of mind and body. For Nancy this dichotomy is broken
down in the thought of exscription. For Nancy, sense is an event between two bodies, a statue
therefore is not an imprisoned incarnated Idea made intelligible in physical form, it does not
refer to or signify anything, but its meaning or sense occurs in the encounter (via the statue)
between the body that made the statue and the body that views it. Sense, then, is a material embo-
died event in which sense and body are each at their limit in the same way as the singular being
and the exterior plurality it is exposed to, are, in the thought of being singular plural.
What Morin has done in this book is give a series of meditations on what is for her Nancy’s
central ontological concept, being singular plural. In this book, we are introduced to the extraordi-
nary range of Nancy’s thinking and despite the necessary condensing, are not spared the complex-
ities of the problematic at play. We are, however, given a useful touchstone to return to when we
are overwhelmed; this approach makes the book an extremely useful and remarkably clear intro-
duction to Nancy’s thinking. The great success of this approach is that even if on ﬁrst reading we
do not grasp each aspect of the various Nancean projects discussed, we do at least gain an increas-
ingly strong sense of the central concept of being singular plural, allowing greater insight each
time we return to Nancy’s thought in this text or any other.
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Gadamer and the Limits of the Modern Techno-Scientiﬁc Civilization, by Stefano Marino,
Bern-Berlin-Bruxelles-Frankfurt a. M.-New York-Oxford-Wien, Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 295, €
61,10 (paperback), ISBN.
Although Gadamer certainly belongs to what we could deﬁne as the great chain of the twentieth-
century critics of techno-scientiﬁc modernity, and although he has sometimes expressed his
opinion on this topic in quite a radical or drastic way, he has nevertheless not gone so far as to con-
ceive science and technology as omnipotent and perhaps even monstrous forces (145).
This statement captures the key thesis at stake in this book, and in its balanced formulation it
also embodies one of the strongest points of Marino’s work. The author successfully distances
Gadamer’s position from all possible forms of ‘demonization’ of science and technology, and
moreover shows how, in Gadamer’s estimation, these issues are deeply connected with a kind
of uneasiness within modern civilization.
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